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Abstract
Our modern society is increasingly relying on the collection, processing, and sharing of
digital information. There are two fundamental trends: (1) Enabled by the rapid devel-
opments in sensor, wireless, and networking technologies, communication and networking
are becoming more and more pervasive and ad hoc. (2) Driven by the explosive growth
of hardware and software capabilities, computation power is becoming a public utility and
information is often stored in centralized servers which facilitate ubiquitous access and shar-
ing. Many emerging platforms and systems hinge on both dimensions, such as E-healthcare
and Smart Grid. However, the majority information handled by these critical systems is
usually sensitive and of high value, while various security breaches could compromise the
social welfare of these systems. Thus there is an urgent need to develop security and privacy
mechanisms to protect the authenticity, integrity and condentiality of the collected data,
and to control the disclosure of private information. In achieving that, two unique chal-
lenges arise: (1) There lacks centralized trusted parties in pervasive networking; (2) The
remote data servers tend not to be trusted by system users in handling their data. They
make existing security solutions developed for traditional networked information systems
unsuitable. To this end, in this dissertation we propose a series of user-centric security and
privacy mechanisms that resolve these challenging issues in untrusted network and comput-
ing environments, spanning wireless body area networks (WBAN), mobile social networks
(MSN), and cloud computing.
The main contributions of this dissertation are fourfold. First, we propose a secure ad
hoc trust initialization protocol for WBAN, without relying on any pre-established security
context among nodes, while defending against a powerful wireless attacker that may or may
not compromise sensor nodes. The protocol is highly usable for a human user. Second, we
present novel schemes for sharing sensitive information among distributed mobile hosts in
MSN which preserves user privacy, where the users neither need to fully trust each other nor
rely on any central trusted party. Third, to realize owner-controlled sharing of sensitive data
stored on untrusted servers, we put forward a data access control framework using Multi-
Authority Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), that supports scalable ne-grained access
i
and on-demand user revocation, and is free of key-escrow. Finally, we propose mechanisms
for authorized keyword search over encrypted data on untrusted servers, with ecient multi-
dimensional range, subset and equality query capabilities, and with enhanced search privacy.
The common characteristic of our contributions is they minimize the extent of trust that
users must place in the corresponding network or computing environments, in a way that
is user-centric, i.e., favoring individual owners/users.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Our modern society is increasingly relying on the collection, processing, and sharing
of digital information. Recently two fundamental trends begin to emerge. On the
one hand, enabled by the rapid developments in sensor, wireless, and networking
technologies, there is an explosive growth of mobile devices which takes networking
and computation to the pervasive extreme. For example, smart sensors that are
equipped with sensing, data processing and communication capabilities are entering
every realm of people's lives, such like homes, cars, or even surrounding our bodies.
These sensors play important roles in monitoring our environment, home appliances,
utility spending, or our own health, and the monitor data can be in turn utilized
to enhance safety, help reduce energy wastes and promote healthy life styles, etc.
For another example, smart phone platforms that integrate multiple sensing and
computing functionalities, are becoming the key to the convenience of people's social
life. According to statistics, there are 5.3 Billion mobile users in the world by 20111
and this gure is continuously growing. The common advantage of these smart sensors
and mobile devices is that they can directly communicate and coordinate with each
other in an ad hoc manner without relying on central parties, which greatly facilitates
1http://mobithinking.com/mobile-marketing-tools/latest-mobile-stats
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2local information exchange and contributes to a smarter physical world.
On the other hand, driven by the sharp increase of hardware and software capa-
bilities, computation power is gradually becoming a public utility and information
is often stored in centralized servers which facilitate ubiquitous access and sharing.
This is usually called as \cloud computing". Although remote servers have long been
utilized to store data such as in various online applications like online social networks
and documents, with the advent of cloud computing, it promises to deliver virtually
innite storage and computation resources to the clients over the Internet, with a
high degree of resource elasticity [11]. Though at its early stage, cloud computing
has already attracted lots of enterprises and individual users to outsource their IT
services, applications and data into the cloud data centers so as to enjoy the much
reduced management cost.
Many critical systems in the real world embody the integration of both trends.
In the following, we use an E-healthcare system to exemplify this observation. The
architecture is depicted in Fig. 1.1, where there are three tiers. The lowest tier is
called wireless body area networks (WBANs). It mainly consists of tiny interopera-
ble medical devices (IMDs) that are placed in, on, or around a patient's body. The
sensors of the IMDs consistently monitor the patient's vital signs, such as electrocar-
diogram (ECG), pulse, and blood pressure; or important environmental parameters
like temperature and humidity. The monitor readings, patient prole, and so on to-
gether are called personal health information (PHI). The WBAN is widely applied
in ubiquitous health monitoring (UHM), computer-assisted rehabilitation, emergency
medical response system (EMRS), etc. In particular, in UHM the WBAN frees people
from visiting the hospital frequently, and eases the heavy dependence on a special-
ized workforce in healthcare. A WBAN works in an ad hoc manner, and to set it up,
no specialized knowledge is anticipated. \Plug-and-play" is the envisioned ultimate
goal [166]. Thus, the WBAN is an excellent example of the pervasive networking
3Figure 1.1: An example architecture of a modern E-healthcare system that reects
the trends of both pervasive networking and cloud computing.
environment.
In tier 2, the sensors collect and transmit the PHI to one or more local gateways
such as mobile phones, which may perform further data processing, aggregation, or
distributed storage. Healthcare stas can query the sketches of PHI locally from the
WBAN in order to make in-time decisions. More importantly, the patients can form a
mobile social network (MSN), in which they can nd patients with similar symptoms
by storing their PHI in their smart phones [107, 120]. In this way, patients can seek
mental or physical support from nearby peers, and the distance among people is
shortened.
In tier 3, the PHI from all WBANs may ultimately be sent to a centralized health-
care database for permanent records, for example, a cloud-based personal health
record (PHR) system2. Those patient records are shared among and accessed by
2Famous examples are Indivo [4], and Microsoft HealthVault [3].
4various users from the Internet, such as healthcare sta, researchers, government a-
gencies, and insurance companies. In this way healthcare processes, such as clinical
diagnosis and emergency medical response, will be facilitated and expedited, thereby
greatly increase the eciency of healthcare. Compared with traditional paper-based
health records or electronic medical records (EMRs) maintained separately by each
health-provider, a cloud-based PHR system has numerous advantages, e.g., allowing
more convenient health information exchange, and enabling a patient him/herself to
manage, and control her PHI in one place through the web.
The above is only one showcase of the previously mentioned trends. Other similar
system may include the smart grid. In the smart grid, sensors or smart meters are
widely used to monitor the electric usage of appliances and homes, while their readings
are sent in real time and aggregated to be stored in centralized servers, for example
the Google PowerMeter [2]. Owners of those sensors can view their readings online
and share them with friends, family members or the utility company. Therefore, not
only can the users save energy spending, but the utility companies can also better
balance the electricity load.
Despite the excitement surrounding the above trends, ideas and applications, se-
curity and privacy concerns are the dark side of the cloud. Since the majority in-
formation handled by these critical systems is usually sensitive and of high value,
various security breaches could compromise the social welfare of these systems. For
example, in an E-healthcare system, failure to obtain authentic and correct medical
data in time will possibly prevent a patient from being treated eectively, or even
lead to wrong treatments [36,101]. And unintended leakage of private personal health
information from the central server may cause social discrimination [163]. Thus there
is an urgent need to develop security and privacy mechanisms to protect the authen-
ticity, integrity and condentiality of the collected data, and to control the disclosure
of private information.
51.1 Motivation
There exist many prior works in the contexts of security in wireless sensor net-
works [54], ad hoc networks [119], and data access control [10, 61]. However, the
above requirements are never easy tasks to achieve under the networking and comput-
ing environments considered in this dissertation, as they contain signicant research
challenges that cannot be dealt with by previous work. In a nutshell, it is all about
trust.
1.1.1 Security and Privacy in Untrusted Networking Envi-
ronments
In pervasive networking environments, there exist all kinds of wireless attackers, ei-
ther passive or active, and their capabilities vary. Devices could also get compromised
by attackers. As cryptographic keys are essential to realize the security requirements
including data authenticity, integrity and condentiality, a fundamental question is:
how do we establish trust among the nodes from scratch? The devices are becoming
more and more small, low-cost and mobile, thus are always constrained in resources,
and the network is ad hoc, dynamic in nature. Thus, naive methods that assume the
universal existence of a centralized trusted authority, or a public key infrastructure
(PKI) goes against the untethered nature of such communication paradigm. Instead,
previous works often assume the presence of authorities or trusted initializers in the
pre-deployment phase of an ad hoc/sensor network [38, 51, 60, 91, 97, 143], but that
would also severely limit its usability, which is not user-friendly and user-centric. It is
desirable that user's trust of the networking environment is minimized. Ideally, trust
should be established while relying on as few external assumptions as possible. The
communication channel is untrusted, the distribution chain of a device is untrusted,
and some devices may be untrusted as well | that is why we term it \untrusted
6networking environment". In this dissertation, we rst investigate ad hoc trust ini-
tialization and key management in wireless body area networks (WBAN), a typical
untrusted networking environment, and then focus on how to preserve privacy when
the users exchange personal information under a mobile social network.
 Ad Hoc Trust Initialization and Key Management. In traditional wire-
less sensor networks (WSNs) the secret keys are usually pre-distributed before
network deployment. The existing methods for key distribution in WSNs can
be divided into several categories. (1) Rely on knowledge of the network topol-
ogy [143]; (2) Require less topology information but need the sensors to store a
large number of keys [38,51,57,60,116,117]; (3) Assume the existence of root of
trust from certain central entities [181,182], or rely on public key infrastructure
(PKI) [123]. However, in a WBAN these methods are not suitable for several
reasons. First, interoperable medical device (IMDs) often form a WBAN in an
ad hoc way with unpredictable topology. It is hard for key pre-distribution not
to incur high storage overhead. Even if keys were pre-distributed, the distribu-
tion chain of a medical sensor node may not be fully trusted by the end user: the
devices could come out of the hands of dierent manufacturers and users. This
rules out the rst two types of pre-distribution methods in traditional WSNs.
Second, a central root of trust or a PKI would be impractical for WBANs,
not only because they require costly infrastructure, but also due to the high
complexity involved in node revocation3. Third, very likely the sensors may
have never communicated with each other before they form a WBAN around a
patient, which means there exist no common security context. If keys were not
already established, the user has to distribute keys by him/herself. This requires
the trust establishment mechanism to be very user-friendly, because one cannot
3Node revocation refers to the event that when a node is out of power or is compromised by
attacker, it needs to be excluded from the network by revoking its keys.
7expect the end users to be experts. But most existing works on user-aided key
pre-distribution in WSNs involve cumbersome human eorts [91,97].
This gives rise to the problem of secure ad hoc initial trust establishment for a
WBAN, which happens before the WBAN is actually deployed. Here we high-
light several key dierences between this and traditional key pre-distribution in
WSNs. (1) Since secret keys are not assumed to be pre-distributed, trust must
be established despite the lack of a common security context, and no central
trusted parties as the root of trust except that the user trusts him/herself. In
particular, in practice, a group of WBAN devices must be correctly associat-
ed with the intended patient, lest the wrong medical data be collected. This
requires the IMDs to be authenticated to each other and to the WBAN con-
troller, which forms the group securely. Secret keys, which can belong only
to the intended group, should be generated. (2) The traditional authentica-
tion goal [23] only stipulates that each participant is assured that each message
appears to come from the true identity that generated it. However, since the
wireless communication cannot be perceived by a human, in addition to tradi-
tional authentication, it is desirable to let a human user physically make sure
that the devices ultimately authenticated to each other include and only include
the intended devices that s/he wants to group together 4. To achieve this, the
mechanism should be user-friendly, i.e., involving as few human interactions
as possible. (3) WBAN applications are usually time-critical, which mandates
the trust bootstrap process to be fast and scalable. For instance, in EMRS an
additional 5 minutes delay may result in a dierence between life and death.
Of course, overhead is an important concern since the medical sensor nodes are
extremely resource-constrained.
A unique challenge is that, a secure communication channel shall be established
4This is often referred to as demonstrative identication [41, 114] in usable security.
8out of an unsecure channel for all the WBAN devices upon their rst meet, s-
ince IMDs communicate through wireless. This can be achieved by the so called
secure device pairing concept that \pairs up" two devices [102]. A straightfor-
ward solution is to apply device pairing between the controller and each of the
(N   1) IMDs to establish individual keys, based on which the pairwise keys
and group key can be derived. However, this requires about (N   1) human
interactions while each one needs tens of seconds. Many current device pairing
techniques are designed for pairing only two devices, which will require many
runs for a WBAN. Many others are unsuited for IMDs with limited resources
and little human interface. GAnGS [41] is an exception, but it still requires N
interactions.
 Privacy-Preserving Distributed Prole Matching. In a untrusted net-
working environment, after trust initialization, the devices can perform data
transfer in a secure and condential manner. In addition, if we consider each
device to be used by a human user (e.g., smart phone), we should allow users to
exchange sensitive information in a fully distributed way, without leaking too
much privacy to other users or an attacker. Otherwise, an attacker or malicious
user will easily collect sensitive user information. Applications can be found in
symptom matching, friend nding, etc, in a mobile social network. This moti-
vates us to study the privacy-preserving distributed prole matching problem,
where each user has a prole (set of attributes) and wants to nd out other
user(s) with common attributes, while only letting each other learn the result
of the match (e.g., the intersected attributes).
This problem is non-trivial, especially if we desire high level of security but
are unwilling to pay the high costs of computation and communication. As
a straightforward solution, one may think of simply turning o the cellphone
or input very few attributes, but these would interfere with the system us-
9ability. Recently, Yang et. al. proposed E-SmallTalker [173], a practical sys-
tem for matching people's interests before initiating a small-talk. However,
E-SmallTalker reveals the exact common attributes between the initiator and
every other user and is subjected to dictionary attacks. Another diculty of
private matching under a MSN setting is the lack of a centralized authority. Lu
et. al. [120] proposed a symptom matching scheme for mobile health social
networks, assuming the existence of a semi-online central authority.
Similar problems can be found in the literature, namely private set intersection
(PSI) and private cardinality5 of set intersection (PCSI) [64], and they are
mostly tackled under the framework of Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC).
The general SMC techniques [175] are often far from ecient. Researchers have
proposed various customized solutions for those problems, but when applied to
the ones dened here, they lead to high consumption of computational resources
and long protocol run time. In this dissertation, we explore novel methods with
higher eciency, while achieving reasonable security.
1.1.2 Secure and Private Data Sharing in Untrusted Com-
puting Environments
As more and more data are stored in remote servers in cloud computing environments,
data owners care more about their integrity, availability, and privacy. We focus
on the privacy part in this dissertation, since disclosure of sensitive information,
such as patients' PHI has to be strictly protected before users have freedom to use
the data services. Ideally, the owners should be able to control in a ne-grained
manner which users have access to which parts of her data les. However, in a cloud
computing environment the data is not physically protected by owners themselves,
and since those remote servers are outside of owners' trust domain, the owners cannot
5Another name of set size.
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fully trust the servers to perform access control operations like in the traditional
reference monitor framework [10]. Through numerous cloud data breaches over the
years [17, 44, 50, 62, 98, 171], one can see that current practices fail to preserve user
privacy against the cloud servers. They can \see" our data. This is why we use
\untrusted computing environment" to refer to the diminish of trust of users/owners
towards such remote cloud servers. And this dissertation tries to give user-enforced
(user-centric) privacy solutions to two tough problems listed below, where we consider
multi-user data storage systems such as a PHR system.
 Scalable Encryption-based Data Access Control. For untrusted6 com-
puting environment, a feasible and promising approach to user-enforced access
control is to encrypt the data before outsourcing. Basically, the data own-
er him/herself should decide how to encrypt her les and to allow which set
of users to obtain access to each le. A data le should only be available to
the users who are given the corresponding decryption key, while remain con-
dential to the rest of users. Furthermore, the owner shall always retain the
right to not only grant, but also revoke access privileges when they feel it is
necessary [126]. In the literature, various schemes have been proposed for cryp-
tographically enforced access control to outsourced data stored on semi-trusted
servers [12,25,29,49,52,53,83,85,169], which are based on le group/hierarchy or
access control lists (ACLs). However, they face high complexity of key manage-
ment in implementing ne-grained access policies especially when the number
of authorized users is large.
The goal of user-centric privacy is often in conict with scalability in a multi-
user data storage system. The authorized users may either need to access the
data for personal use or professional purposes. Examples of the former are fam-
6Strictly speaking, the cloud servers are actually assumed to be semi-trusted this dissertation,
whose denition will be given later.
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ily member and friends, while the latter can be medical doctors, pharmacists,
and researchers, etc. We refer to the two categories of users as personal and
professional users, respectively. The latter has potentially large scale; should
each owner him/herself be directly responsible for managing all the profession-
al users, she will easily be overwhelmed by the key management overhead. In
addition, since those users' access requests are generally unpredictable, it is d-
icult for an owner to determine a list of them, which renders the traditional
ACL based access control schemes less practical. On the other hand, in a multi-
user data storage system, dierent from the single data owner scenario that was
considered by most of the existing works [25,178], multiple owners may encrypt
according to their own ways, possibly using dierent sets of cryptographic keys.
Letting each user obtain keys from every owner whose data she wants to read
would limit the accessibility since owners are not always online. An alternative
is to employ a central authority (CA) to do the key management on behalf of
all the data owners, but this requires too much trust on a single authority (i.e.,
cause the key escrow problem).
In this dissertation, we endeavor to study the user-centric and secure data
sharing on semi-trusted servers, and focus on addressing the complicated and
challenging key management issues. In order to protect the personal health
information stored on a semi-trusted server, we adopt Attribute-Based Encryp-
tion (ABE) as the main encryption primitive. Using ABE, access policies are
expressed based on the attributes of users or data, which enables a owner to se-
lectively share her data among a set of users by encrypting the le under a set of
attributes, without the need to know a complete list of users. The complexities
per encryption, key generation and decryption are only linear with the num-
ber of attributes involved. However, to integrate ABE into a large-scale data
storage system, important issues such as key management scalability, dynamic
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policy updates, and ecient on-demand revocation are non-trivial to solve, and
remain largely open up-to-date.
 Private Searches over Encrypted Data. With encrypted data, one of the
key functionalities of a data storage system |- keyword search becomes an e-
specially challenging issue. First we need to support frequently used complex
query conditions eciently. For example, a user may want to nd out other pa-
tients with the same disease and symptoms from an encrypted PHR database,
by submitting a query like \(20<age<30) AND (sex=\female") AND (ill-
ness=\diabetes")". Also, a medical researcher may query the database using
the following: (age>50)AND (region=\Massachusetts")AND (illness=\cancer").
This class of boolean formulas feature conjunctions among dierent keyword
elds and we will refer to them as multi-dimensional keyword search in this
paper. To hide the query keywords from the server, it is apparently inecien-
t for a user to download the whole database and try to decrypt the records
one by one. Searchable encryption (SE) has been proposed as a better solu-
tion [32, 37, 47, 66, 157, 168]; informally speaking, a user submits a \capability"
encoding her query to the server, who searches through the encrypted keyword
indexes created by the owners, and returns a subset of encrypted documents
that satisfy the underlying query without ever knowing the keywords in the
query and the index.
However, most existing solutions of SE lack the above query exibility or do
not have enough eciency. Early works mostly only support single-keyword
search [39, 47, 66, 174]. Later, several multi-keyword search schemes were pro-
posed [19,33,37,68,86,99,153{155] that enable conjunctive or disjunctive search
formulas. It usually incurs high computational complexity to realize multi-
dimensional range query over encrypted data due to the heavy reliance on
public-key cryptography (PKC). There are only a few works that specical-
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ly tackle this challenging problem, such as [154]. In this dissertation, we aim at
supporting ecient multi-dimensional equality, subset and range queries, while
considering critical issues such as search authorization and system scalability.
In many existing SE schemes, the legitimate users are often given a secret/private
key that endows her unlimited capability to generate any query of her choice,
which is essentially a \0" or \1" authorization. However, we note that \ne-
grained search authorization" is an indispensable component for a secure data
outsourcing system. Although the accesses to actual documents can be con-
trolled by separate cryptographic enforced access control techniques such as
attribute-based encryption [28, 103, 178], \0-1" search authorization may stil-
l lead to leakage of data owners' sensitive information. For example, if Alice
is the only patient with a rare disease in a PHR database, by designing the
query in a clever way (e.g., submitting two queries with/without the name of
that disease and with Alice's demographic info), from the results a user Bob
will be certain that Alice has that disease. Thus, we argue that a user should
only be allowed to search for some specic sets of keywords; in particular, the
authorization shall be based on a user's attributes.
Furthermore, system scalability is an important concern for SE. For symmetric-
key based SE schemes, the encryption and search capabilities are not separable,
so a multi-owner system would require every owner to act as a capability dis-
tribution center, which is not scalable. PKC-based schemes do not have this
problem, but if every user obtains restricted search capabilities from a central
trusted authority (TA) who assumes the responsibility of authorization at the
same time, it shall be always online, dealing with large workload, and facing
the threat of single-point-of-failure. In addition, since the global TA does not
directly possess the necessary information to check the attributes of users from
dierent local domains, additional infrastructure needs to be employed (such
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as using a credential chain [109]). It is therefore desirable for the users to be
authorized locally.
Note that, the scope of problems discussed in this dissertation is not limited to the
example E-health application discussed above. First, the untrusted networking envi-
ronment can nd its concept rooted in general wireless ad hoc networks, which is not
limited to health oriented applications. For example in disaster response (earthquake,
tsunami, etc), when the infrastructure communication networks (e.g., cell towers) are
destroyed, we need to quickly establish an ad hoc network to regain communication
from the disaster area to outside world. Furthermore, in a military scenario, such
decentralized communication paradigm is more robust to targeted attacks than cen-
tralized ones. It can be seen that the minimal trust assumption is indeed critical to
the security of such networking environments. Second, the untrusted computing en-
vironment also represents any system with untrusted storage, such like sensor nodes
that may easily be compromised.
1.2 Dissertation Contribution
The main contributions of this dissertation are listed as follows:
 We propose a suite of novel schemes for secure ad hoc initial trust establishment
and key management in WBAN. Specically, we put forward group device pair-
ing (GDP), a novel scheme for initial trust establishment that relies on zero prior
security context. GDP is essentially a user-aided multi-party authenticated key
agreement protocol, which combines the concept of device pairing and group
key agreement in a unique way. We propose to use simultaneous comparison of
synchronous LED blinking sequences on multiple resource constrained devices
by human user as an auxiliary out-of-band (OOB) channel to authenticate the
key exchange in the group. In addition, we formally prove the security of our
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proposed schemes based on the Bellare-Rogaway model [23], and give concrete
security guarantees under the existence of a computational bounded adversary.
The GDP relies on commitment schemes that can be eciently constructed
from hash functions, while it is also secure against compromised insider nodes,
with the fewest communication rounds. Furthermore, we implement GDP on a
10 node sensor network testbed to evaluate its performance. It is shown that
GDP is not only secure but also practical; it is fast, ecient, and highly usable.
This part of the dissertation is published in part in [103].
 We then study the privacy-preserving distributed prole matching problem in
MSNs. We formulate the privacy preservation problem of prole matching
in MSN by dening three increasing levels of privacy, and propose two fully
distributed privacy-preserving prole matching protocols. We leverage secure
multi-party computation (SMC) based on polynomial secret sharing, and pro-
pose several key enhancements to improve the computation and communication
eciency. Also, users can choose personalized privacy levels when running the
same matching instance. We provide formal security analysis and performance
evaluation for our proposed schemes. This part of the dissertation is published
in part in [105].
 Next, we propose user-centric cryptographically enforced data access control
mechanisms in untrusted computing environments, using PHR system as a case
study. We propose a novel ABE-based framework for user-centric secure shar-
ing of data in cloud computing environments, under the multi-owner settings.
The framework conceptually divides the users in the system into two type-
s of domains in order to reduce key management overhead. We also resolve
important technical challenges including on-demand and ecient user revoca-
tion, computation delegation, and avoiding key escrow. We use multi-authority
ABE (MA-ABE) to improve security and avoid key escrow problem, while we
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enhance MA-ABE by proposing an ecient and on-demand user/attribute re-
vocation scheme, and prove its security under standard security assumptions.
We also provide formal security proofs and perform experiments to evaluate our
proposed scheme. This part of the dissertation is published in part in [108].
 Finally, we investigate private searches over encrypted data in untrusted com-
puting environments, again using PHR system as a case study. We propose
a ne-grained search authorization framework a with a high level of system
scalability, and propose two solutions for searching on encrypted data, name-
ly APKS and APKS+. Both of our solutions enable ecient multi-dimensional
equality, subset and range queries, while in APKS+, the query privacy is en-
hanced. We also implement our scheme on a modern workstation and carry out
extensive performance evaluation. This part of the dissertation is published in
part in [106].
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The contents of each chapter are described as follows.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation studies the secure ad hoc initial trust establish-
ment and key management in WBAN. In Sec. 2.1 we review the related works. In
Sec. 2.2 the problem is dened, while Sec. 2.3 introduces some necessary background
and technical preliminaries. Sec. 2.4 presents our main designs, PDP and GDP in
detail; Sec. 2.5 analyzes the security of them by giving formal security proofs. The
performance evaluation is presented in Sec. 2.6, where we carry out both theoretical
and experimental evaluation of GDP. Sec. 2.7 wraps up the chapter.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation investigates privacy-preserving distributed prole
matching in MSNs. In Sec. 3.1 the problem is dened. In Sec. 3.2 we review the
related works, while Sec. 3.3 introduces the technical preliminaries. Sec. 3.4 presents
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our main design, two novel distributed prole matching schemes. Sec. 3.5 analyzes the
security of them with formal security proofs. The performance evaluation is presented
in Sec. 3.6, where we carry out both theoretical and simulation evaluations. Sec. 3.7
wraps up the chapter.
Chapter 4 of this dissertation proposes user-centric cryptographically enforced
data access control framework and mechanisms in cloud computing environment. In
Sec. 4.1 we review the related works. Sec. 4.2 introduces the technical preliminaries,
including attribute-based encryption (ABE). Then, we present the proposed frame-
work in Sec. 4.3. Sec. Sec. 4.4 addresses several important design issues, and puts
forward an enhanced multi-authority attribute-based encryption scheme with ecient
user revocation capabilities. Sec. 4.5 analyzes the security of the proposed scheme
and gives formal security proof. The performance evaluation is presented in Sec. 4.6,
and we give theoretical, simulation and experimental results. Sec. 4.7 summarizes the
chapter.
Chapter 5 of this dissertation extends the data sharing framework in Chapter 4
and proposes authorized private keyword search (APKS) schemes over encrypted data
in cloud computing. In Sec. 5.1 we review the related works. In Sec. 5.2 the problem
is dened, and Sec. 4.2 briey reviews a cryptographic primitive called hierarchical
predicate encryption (HPE). Next, a ne-grained authorization framework for APKS
is presented in Sec. 5.4. Sec. 5.5 puts forward our basic APKS scheme, while Sec. 5.6
contains the enhanced APKS scheme. Sec. 5.7 analyzes the security of the proposed
schemes, and the performance evaluation is presented in Sec. 5.8, where we give
experimental results. Sec. 5.9 summarizes the chapter.
Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation and points out several future directions.
Chapter 2
Secure Ad-Hoc Trust Initialization
and Key Management in Wireless
Body Area Networks
In this chapter, we propose group device pairing (GDP) for secure ad hoc initial trust
establishment in WBAN (or BAN for short). GDP establishes an authenticated BAN
group (including a shared group key and individual secret keys among devices), with
much fewer human interactions (constant) than establishing authenticated individual
shared keys between the nodes one at a time using traditional device pairing tech-
niques. GDP sets up initial trust among the group based on no prior shared secrets
and no PKI, where each device authenticates itself to every other device in the group
as a legitimate member, which can be veried visually by a human. With the initial
shared secret keys, standard cryptographic methods can be applied to generate other
secret keys on demand after BAN deployment.
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2.1 Related Works
The problem of secure initial trust establishment in BAN has received not much
attention so far. In BAN, most previous works focus on security issues such as
key management [118, 124, 129], encryption [118, 124, 159], and access control [159].
However, it is a non-trivial issue to securely establish a secure communication channel
among a BAN and associate it to the correct patient before any data communication
happens.
2.1.1 Biometrical Methods
Biometrical values [144, 156, 164, 165] have been used to establish a secure channel
from which nodes can derive a common secret that associates the BSN to a specic
patient's body. For example, electrocardiogram (EEG) and photoplethysmogram
(PPG) has been exploited in [144, 164, 165]. This realizes initial trust establishment
in a plug-and-play manner. However, it requires specic hardware for all the nodes
to be equipped with the same sensing capability. Moreover, this biometrical channel
is not always available since it does not apply to sensor devices that are not placed
on the human body, for example, those that monitor the surrounding environment.
2.1.2 Key Pre-distribution in BAN
Recently, the trust establishment in BAN is studied by [87] under the context of
secure sensor association. Each sensor node is associated with the controller one-
by-one using public key based authentication, where a user compares LED blinking
patterns to verify each association. However, their scheme assumes the existence of
a trusted authority (TA), and still relies on the pre-distribution of public keys onto
the sensor nodes. Also, it does not support batch deployment. In \message-in-a-
bottle" [91] and KALwEN [97], a closed faraday-cage is employed as a secure channel,
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in which keying materials are pre-distributed to all the intended sensor nodes before
deployment. Secure sensor association is achieved in the sense that the user is assured
no attackers out of the cage can associate with the same patient. However, costly
additional hardware is required and it is cumbersome to add new nodes.
2.1.3 Secure Device Pairing
Device pairing is a promising technique to generate a common secret between two
devices that shared no prior-secrets with minimum or without additional hardware. It
employs some low-bandwith out-of-band (OOB) channel to aid the authentication of
information exchanged in the insecure wireless channel. Most proposed OOB channels
rely on some form of human user participation. Well-known examples include the
\resurrecting duckling" [158], \talking-to-strangers" [18], \seeing-is-believing" [127],
Loud-and-clear [69] and short string comparison based key agreement schemes [34,
139]. In [90, 136], the usability of device pairing protocols based on various OOB
channels are evaluated. For a comprehensive survey, please refer to [134].
2.1.4 Group Message Authentication Protocols
The idea of user-aided authentication has also been adopted in group message au-
thentication protocols, where each group member wants to transfer an authenticated
data copy from her device to each other's. For example, GAnGS [41] requires O(N)
human interactions, and also uses digital signatures, which increase computational
complexity. In SPATE [114], this is done through comparing T-ags. Each group
member carries out N comparisons in parallel to authenticate other members' data.
However, SPATE is specically designed for message exchange and is not for group
key agreement, and it lacks a formal security proof. [96] proposed a group message au-
thentication and key agreement protocol (SAS-GAKA) based on comparison of short
authentication strings (SAS). However, it does not achieve group demonstrative i-
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dentication. Moreover, SAS and T-ags are not applicable for sensor nodes because
they require richer device interfaces. Therefore, none of SPATE and SAS-GAKA is
suitable for secure, fast, ecient and user-friendly initial trust establishment in BAN.
In GDP, the whole group is authenticated and group key is generated in one shot
(i.e., requires one-time visual comparison of synchronized LED blinking patterns).
The most recent work that is close to ours is GAP [142]. GAP is a user-aided group
message authentication protocol that can be applied to wireless sensor networks. It
also exploits the idea of synchronous LED blinking pattern as the OOB channel.
The authors also discussed how to deal with semi-authenticated visual light channels
which is orthogonal to our contribution. However, the security of GAP requires the
use of non-malleable commitment schemes, where known constructions are much more
inecient than hash commitments used in this chapter.
2.2 Problem Denition
2.2.1 Network Model
A BAN consists of a controller (gateway node) and a group of IMDs (medical sensor
nodes). The size of the network varies, which may range from a few to the order of
hundreds. Although the IMDs could be heterogenous in functionalities, we assume
they are equipped with low-end, form-factor sensor nodes (e.g., comparable with
Tmote). To meet the interoperability requirement, all of them are equipped with the
same wireless communication interface, say ZigBee, and so does the controller. The
sensors are limited in energy, communication, processing and storage capabilities,
while the energy and computation resources of the controller are more ample.
The sensors may be placed in, on, or around the patient's body. Although there is
no consensus on the communication technologies in BAN, the communication ranges
in most current proposals are larger than 3m (e.g. ZigBee). This is enough to assure
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that all nodes can be reached in one hop after deployment. Hence, we will assume a
star topology. Each BAN has a patient, who may be regarded as its owner, as well as
a user who sets up the network. The latter is often a nurse, but may be the patient
herself.
2.2.2 Design Requirements
Security Goals. The initial trust establishment during pre-deployment should estab-
lish a group key and/or individual keys shared between each sensor and the controller,
which can be used for the controller to securely broadcast messages to the BAN later,
such as queries. For the design of the PDP and GDP (user-aided authenticated key
agreement protocols), we have the following security goals:
1. Key secrecy and key conrmation [13]. For key secrecy, each group member
should be assured that no non-member can obtain the group key. Key conr-
mation means each member is assured that the peers actually possess the same
key.
2. Group demonstrative identication. Suppose that a set G of devices is intended
by the user to be the group associated with a specic patient. If a group
formation process causes the set G 0 of devices to derive the same group key,
then the user should be able to physically verify that G and G 0 are the same set.
Actually, this includes two properties | 1) key authenticity or consistency:
each legitimate group member derives the same group key. If it also obtains
individual shared keys, it must be assured that those keys come from the claimed
true identities; 2) exclusiveness: the group includes only legitimate members and
no attackers. This extends the \demonstrative identication" in [18, 127], but
is dierent from PAALP in GAnGS [41].
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In addition, for the key management after deployment, it should have forward
secrecy : compromise of a group key for one session should not give adversary any
information about previous session keys. The session keys may include pairwise keys
shared between pairs of sensor nodes, so that they can securely distribute their data
to other sensors. Sometimes, cluster keys are also needed in BAN.
Usability Goals.
1. Eciency. A BAN is often consisted of low-end devices, relies on battery en-
ergy and is intended to last at least for several days [74,84,118]. To match the
low-capabilities of the sensors in BAN and to minimize energy consumption,
it is important to minimize computation, communication and storage over-
head. Therefore, expensive cryptographic functions such as public-key oper-
ations should be avoided whenever possible.
2. Fast operation and user-friendliness. The initial trust establishment in a BAN
should be fast, while involving as few and intuitive human interactions as pos-
sible. Especially, batch-deployment of devices should be supported.
3. Error-proof. Since humans make mistakes, the procedure must be easy to follow.
Also, the system should be able to detect errors or attackers and alert the user.
4. Requires no additional hardware. In order to reduce the cost of the system, it
is essential to use commercial-o-the-shelf (COTS) products, and to use fewer
hardware components. For example, there should be no auxiliary devices. Also,
the sensors usually do not have physical interfaces such as USB, because they
may constrained form factors.
In addition, because the devices may be manufactured by dierent vendors which
are hard to inter-operate, we assume there are no pre-loaded public keys, certicates,
or pre-shared secrets among the devices in BAN. The sensors are used in a plug-and-
play manner.
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2.2.3 Attack Model
The attacker can either be an outsider or insider. An outsider does not compromise
any devices in the intended BAN group, while an insider can compromise any of the
sensor device. The attacker is able to eavesdrop, intercept, modify, replay or inject
the wireless communication between any devices in range. The attacker can also
compromise a certain number of sensor nodes after deployment.
The main goals of an attacker are: obtain the secret keys by eavesdropping; im-
personate as a legitimate group member to join the group; prevent one or more
legitimate group member to join the group; act as man-in-the-middle and try to split
the intended group into two or more subgroups; maliciously modify the information
contributed by legitimate group members so as to violate key authentication and dis-
rupt the group. The attacker can also pose as multiple identities to join the group,
which is a Sybil attack. We do not consider denial of service (DoS) attacks in this
chapter.
We assume only that the controller is not compromised during the initial trust
establishment process (i.e., is trusted by the user). This is because the user can
recognize his/her controller by password, and the controller is usually better kept
and protected. Note that, devices do not trust each other before the initial trust
establishment.
2.3 Background, Notations and Denitions
2.3.1 Communication Channels in Device Pairing
In this chapter, we consider secure device pairing protocols (or user-aided authenti-
cation protocols) with multiple communication channels. Usually there are two kinds
of channels: one is the normal Dolev-Yao channel, the other is an auxiliary out-of-
band (OOB) channel. In a Dolev-Yao channel, all the messages transmitted between
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H() A cryptographic hash function
H(m; r) Digest function with input m and key r
x
R   S; x 2R S Choose x uniformly from set S
EKfg Symmetric encryption with key Kbx The unauthenticated version of x
ajb Concatenation of a and b
Mi The i-th group member
G The group of devices intended to associate to a patient
KG;Kij The group key, the pairwise key between nodes i and j
Sk A subgroup of index k
N Total number of devices in the group
Zq Multiplicative group of prime order q
Fp Finite eld of size p
n The length of nonces
` Length of the short authentication string
Table 2.1: Frequently used notations
two devices can be overheard, deleted, or modied by the adversary. Examples may
include the wireless channel. In an OOB channel considered in this chapter, messages
cannot be modied or delayed from one to another session. The denition of the OOB
channel corresponds to the \empirical channel" dened in [134], and can be regarded
as \authentic". The OOB channel is usually bandwidth-limited as compared with
a Dolev-Yao channel. The former is represented as \$" in this chapter, while the
latter is denoted as \()".
Practical factors need to be considered when choosing the type of OOB channel
in a device pairing protocol. In a BAN, sensor nodes may only have LED lights,
beepers and buttons, but no interfaces such as camera, displays or keyboards; yet
the controller may have all of them. Under this asymmetric setting, the methods
in [18, 127] are unable to achieve mutual authentication. Fortunately, the \Blink-
Blink" (BB) pairing method proposed in [145] was shown to be a practical approach.
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Briey, both devices encode a short authentication string (SAS) obtained from a
protocol run to a synchronized LED blinking pattern, where a `1' bit encodes to a
\blink" (on) period and `0' bit encodes to an \o". Then the user compares the
patterns and accepts the results if they are the same. The above is essentially a
visual OOB channel between two devices, and we extend it to multiple devices in this
chapter.
2.3.2 Commitment Schemes
Commitment schemes are important cryptographic primitives that have been widely
used in message authentication [95] and authenticated key agreement protocols [34,
96,139]. Typically, a commitment scheme consists of two algorithms:1
 Commit(INFO; x)! (c; d): This mapping takes input some public data INFO,
an n-bit private data x, some internal randomness (not shown), and outputs c
that serves as the commitment value, and d as the opening value. The algorithm
is probabilistic.
 Open(INFO; c; d) ! x 2 f0; 1gn [ f?g: This mapping takes input the public
data INFO, a commitment value c and an opening value d, and outputs the
committed value x. If c is not a valid commitment, then it returns ?. This
algorithm is deterministic, and correctness implies that for any x 2 f0; 1gn,
Open(INFO;Commit(INFO; x)) = x.
A commitment scheme should have two basic properties: hiding and binding.
Their denitions are as follows.
Denition 2.3.1 ((h; Th)-hiding). given (c; INFO), the probability that an adver-
sary can correctly guess the value of x before the opening value d is revealed is upper
1In this chapter we adopt the denition from [134].
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bounded by h in time Th. When h = 2
 n and Th = +1, we say that the scheme is
perfectly hiding.
Denition 2.3.2 ((b; Tb)-binding). the probability that an adversary can open an
commitment value c to a dierent x0 afterwards than the one committed by c is upper
bounded by b in a time Tb. When b = 2
 n and Tb = +1, the scheme is called
perfectly binding.
Note that, a commitment scheme cannot be perfectly hiding and perfectly binding
at the same time [67]. In many existing user-aided authentication protocols [93, 94,
96, 142, 162], the commitment schemes used are required to have a third property
| non-malleability, which is stronger than the basic ones above. However, non-
malleable commitment schemes are usually very inecient in practice [93,95], which
will be unsuitable for low-end sensor nodes like Tmote. Fortunately, as we will show
later, this property is not necessary for provable security of our proposed protocols.
We instantiate the commitments using the following ecient construction from [140]
based on a cryptographic hash function 2.
Denition 2.3.3 (Hash based commitment scheme). Assume we have a cryptograph-
ic hash function H that can be modeled as a random oracle: f0; 1g2n ! f0; 1gl(n),
where l(n)  poly(n). Then we have the following scheme:
 Commit: given x, randomly picks r  f0; 1gn, and compute c = H(x; r).
 Open: let d = (x; r). Output x if c = H(x; r).
The above scheme achieves hiding and binding [140]. To commit to a longer
message x, we can rst hash it to n bits using a collision-resistant hash function and
2In a few previous user-aided message authentication protocols, one-way hash functions (OHF)
have been adopted as a practical alternative for commitment schemes [9, 114, 183]. But to the best
of our knowledge, there have been no formal security proofs for such protocols up to date. In [94] a
security proof was posed as an open problem. We here provide security proofs for our protocols.
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then commit, which is a general method [73]. Therefore, with public data INFO
and a message to be committed (m), we can set x = INFOjm while the hiding and
binding properties dened in Defs. 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 still hold. We will denote the hash
commitment using HCommit and HOpen.
2.3.3 Digest Functions
In this chapter, we will make use of a digest function proposed by [133, 134]. The
digest function is dened as a mapping:
Denition 2.3.4 (Digest function ). H(m; k): f0; 1gL  f0; 1gn ! f0; 1g` is a map-
ping where m is the message to be digested and k is the key. It shall have two
properties:
(1) (key-based uniformity) for any xed m and y, Prk2Rf0;1gn [H(m; k) = y] = u.
(2) (no uniform compensation) for any xed  and m 6= m0, Prk2Rf0;1gn [H(m; k) =
H(m0; k  )] = r.
The \key-based uniformity" says that, upon varying the key k, the output of the
digest function should be uniformly distributed. And \no uniform compensation"
means there should not exist  such that it can always compensate the change in the
digest output incurred by a dierent m0 than m, for any varying key k.
A concrete construction is given in [133] based on matrix product, where the ideal
properties are achieved: u = r =
1
2`
. Usually the output of a digest function is a
short string, e.g., ` = 16 bits. Note that, it is similar to a universal hash function,
but a universal hash usually concerns collision resistance w.r.t. the same key.
2.3.4 Group Key Agreement Scheme
A contributory group key agreement establishes a group key based on no pre-shared
secret, where every member equally contributes one share of the group key. In this
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chapter, we choose the unauthenticated group key agreement protocol (UDB) pro-
posed by Dutta and Barua [58] as a primitive. It is based on Die-Hellman (DH)
key agreement and is provably secure, and only requires 2 rounds of communication.
However, its authenticated version uses digital signatures, which requires PKI and
is unsuitable for BAN. We describe the UDB protocol for completeness in Fig. 2.1.
Zq is a multiplicative group of prime order q, where g is a generator. Note that,
KG = g
x1x2+x2x3+:::+xnx1 . Each node broadcasts two messages, and performs three
modular exponentiations, 2N   2 modular multiplications and 1 modular division.
Figure 2.1: Unauthenticated DB Key Agreement Protocol. (1  i  N)
/* Round 1: */
1 Mi: xi
R   Zq ; Xi  gxi ;
2 Mi !Mi 1;Mi+1: Xi //can be achieved by a broadcast;
/* Round 2: */
3 Mi: K
L
i  Xxii 1; KRi  Xxii+1; Yi  KRi =KLi ;
4 Mi  ! : Yi //\ ! " stands for broadcast in the wireless channel;
5 Mi: bKRi+1  Yi+1KRi ;
6 for j = 2 to n  1 do
7 Mi: bKRi+j  Yi+j bKRi+j 1;
8 end
/* Key computation: */
9 Mi: veries K
L
i =
bKRi+n 1; if fails, abort;
10 Mi: group key: KG  bKR1 bKR2 ::: bKRn ;
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2.4 Secure Ad Hoc Trust Initialization and Key
Management for BAN
2.4.1 Overview
Conceptually, the working cycle of a BAN mainly consists of three phases: pre-
deployment, deployment and working phases. In the pre-deployment phase, the sensor
nodes are bootstrapped for the rst time after being purchased; thus, initial trust
among sensors should be established in this phase. For this phase, we propose two
schemes for securely establishing the initial shared secrets among a group of ad hoc
BAN devices (including a controller and multiple sensors), without relying on any
prior security context (or pre-shared secrets) among the devices. The core of the
rst scheme (Scheme-I) is a pairwise device pairing protocol (PDP), a.k.a. user-aided
two-party authenticated key agreement, where a human user aids the authentication
process by verifying simultaneous LED blinking patterns on both devices. By running
the PDP protocol between the controller and each sensor one-by-one, each sensor
derives an individual symmetric secret key with the controller. After that, the group
key and pairwise keys can be established. The Scheme-I's complexity is O(N) in
terms of human eort. To improve upon it, we propose the group device pairing
(GDP) protocol, a.k.a. user-aided multi-party authenticated key agreement. The
GDP establishes authenticated group key and individual symmetric keys in a group
of devices in one shot, with O(1) human eort. Pairwise keys can also be subsequently
obtained based on those keys. In the GDP, the only additional assumption is that the
controller is not compromised, which is reasonable since it is usually better protected
by the human user. In the next section, we also prove the security of both PDP and
GDP formally, while the GDP protocol is also secure against compromised sensor
nodes inside the group.
In the deployment phase, nodes are actually deployed to designated places on/in/around
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the human body. Neighbor discovery is performed to form a BAN topology, pairwise
keys are actually computed, and a logical key hierarchy is established. For the working
phase, the regular functions (e.g. collecting and reporting medical data) are executed.
We then discuss periodical key updates and how to handle node join/leave/revocation
operations eciently.
2.4.2 Initial Trust Establishment via User-Aided Two-Party
Authenticated Key Agreement
In the pre-deployment phase, a group of sensor nodes and a controller picked by the
user must be uniquely and securely associated to the patient they will serve for. This
is done through establishing initial secret keys including individual keys and group
key. Rather than pre-distributing key materials onto each device beforehand (where
the whole process may not be fully trusted), our approach is based on the concept of
device pairing, which does not rely on any prior security context among nodes. In this
subsection, we rst present a straightforward scheme (Scheme I) where the controller
establishes a individual secret key with each sensor one-by-one via our PDP protocol.
The Pairwise Device Pairing Protocol. The PDP is depicted in Fig. 2.2. It is
based on DH key agreement, and takes the DH public keys as part of the messages to
be authenticated. The protocol essentially has three rounds; and the high-level idea
can be described as \joint commitment before knowledge" [134]: it means there is a
point in every partial execution of the protocol such that both parties are committed
to a value D (in our case it is the SAS digest), but they do not yet know D; and
in every successful completion of this partial execution, the parties are committed to
the same value for D.
At rst, A and B both generate a DH public value (XA and XB), and a random
nonce (rA, rB), respectively. In the rst round, they compute hash commitments
(cA; cB) to their corresponding nonces and IDs, and exchange the messages mA and
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Controller (A) Sensor Node (B)
Input: IDA; xA
R   Zq ; XA = gxA IDB ; xB R   Zq ; XB = gxB
Pick rA
R   f0; 1gn Pick rB R   f0; 1gn
mA  IDAjXA mB  IDB jXB
(cA; dA) HCommit(mA; rA) mA;cA    !
mB ;cB      (cB; dB) HCommit(mB ; rB)
dA  ! If HOpen(bcA; bdA) =?, abort
If HOpen(bcB ; bdB) =?, abort dB   
sasA  H((mAjbmB jcAjbcB); rA  brB) sasB  H((bmAjmB jbcAjcB); brA  rB)
LED blinking pattern sasA auth compare() LED blinking pattern sasB
//Key conrmation:
If sasA = sasB , user presses a button on both side
Otherwise, user resets both devices
Note: \(): OOB channel; \ !": wireless channel.
Figure 2.2: User-aided two-party authenticated key agreement protocol (PDP) be-
tween the controller and a sensor node in Scheme I.
mB along with the commitments. In the second round, the decommitment values are
exchanged which reveal the nonces to each other. The above two rounds exchange
messages using the wireless channel. In the third round, A and B both compute
a SAS in order to authenticate mB and mA, which is a digest based on their own
and received messages and keys. The SASes are encoded into LED blinking patterns
which are displayed synchronously over a visual OOB channel. The user compares
the patterns (in an authenticated way), and accepts the authentication if they are
the same. If authenticated, KAB = bXxAB = bXxBA = gxAxB . After that, the user needs
to let both the controller and the sensor \know" the acceptance of the authentication
result (key conrmation), by simply pressing a button on both devices.
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There are some subtle points to be noticed. First, we have included the ID and
DH public value of each party in its hash commitment. The ID is used to prevent the
replay attack, where the adversary can copy a commitment of A and later deliver it to
A again. And the inclusion of DH public value binds it with the commitment value,
whose function will be more clear in the security proof. Second, we need to ensure
a strict order of message exchange between the parties in order to synchronize both
devices about the ending of phases. This can be done by announcing the devices'
IDs before round I, and a node only sends its own data after receiving from the
one with smaller ID. In the PDP, there is no constraint to the controller's ID. In
contrast, we will see later in the GDP protocol, the controller's ID is required to be
maximum. Third, in the SAS we have included both parties' IDs, DH public values
and commitments, i.e., the protocol transcript. This also turns out to be an important
factor for the security of both PDP and GDP protocols. Finally, the key conrmation
can only be done manually, because otherwise there will be man-in-the-middle attacks
at this stage. For example, in [103], if the adversary establishes a dierent key with
each of A and B before key conrmation, she will be able to deceive both A and B
again at this stage.
Establishment of Group Key and Pairwise Keys. After N   1 individual
shared keys are established, a group key KG is generated by the controller. To
distribute the group key, the controller simply encrypts it N   1 times using the
individual shared keys, and unicasts to each sensor node. Now, the user enters the
ID of the patient into the controller, and associates the individual keys and the group
key with this ID, which is also the ID of the BAN.
Next, in order to prepare for secure communication in the deployment phase
and working phase, we need to distribute key materials to sensors so that they can
establish pairwise keys afterwards. Here we use the Blundo's polynomial based key
pre-distribution method [30]. The controller rst randomly generates a bivariate t-
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degree symmetric polynomial f(x; y) =
Pt
i;j=0 ai;jx
iyj dened over a nite eld Fp
with p being a large prime number3. The controller C (the group member with largest
ID, sometimes denoted asMN) computes a univariate polynomial share for each node
Mi (with ID i): fi(y) = f(i; y). Then it encrypts and unicasts this to each sensor
node:
(msg1) C  !Mi : i; EKNiffi(y)jMACKNi(fi(y))g: (2.1)
where the message authentication code (MAC) provides authentication and integrity
check, and KCi stands for the key shared between C and Mi. Now, the pairwise key
between i and j is: Kij = fi(j) = fj(i) = Kji.
In addition, in order for the controller to authenticate itself afterwards, the con-
troller generates a one-way hash chain [92]: kn; kn 1; :::; k0, where ki = H(ki+1); 0 
i  n  1. The controller distributes the commitment of the chain (k0) to all sensor
nodes:
(msg2) C  !Mi : EKGfk0jMACKG(k0)g: (2.2)
2.4.3 Initial Trust Establishment via User-Aided Multi-Party
Authenticated Key Agreement
In Scheme-I, associating sensor nodes one-by-one is very time-consuming, since each
pair of LED blinking requires tens of seconds. Therefore, a more scalable and ecient
method must be developed. The GDP below directly establishes initial secret keys
in one shot, including a group key and individual keys among a group of devices
through multi-party authenticated key agreement. The idea is to authenticate the
messages exchanged in a group key agreement scheme with a human user's help, i.e.,
simultaneously comparing LED blinking patterns for a group of devices in an OOB
visual channel.
3For example, we can use p  280 to provide a 80 bit symmetric key.
35
We rst propose the core protocol: GDP. We present it in two steps; rstly we
give a multi-party message authentication protocol (MP-MAP), and then build the
GDP based on the MP-MAP. The MP-MAP adopts similar design principles with
the underlying MAP protocol of PDP, and their protocol structures resembles each
other.
The Proposed MP-MAP. The MP-MAP for a group G is outlined in Fig. 2.3.
It consists of four rounds. The rst three rounds use wireless channel, while the fourth
utilizes the visual channel.
Round 1 (wireless). In the counting & group forming phase, the user U would
pick a group of N devices and place them in close proximity. She chooses the con-
troller device MN which has the largest ID among all devices (this can be ensured
by assigning IDN a very large number), and enters the group member count (N)
into MN and indicates to start the protocol. Each member device Mi broadcasts its
own identity IDi to the group, and receives others' IDs. After a timeout, each Mi
sorts the pool of IDs in ascending order and keeps its own view of the group Gi. In
addition, the controller checks if the group size equals to n; if not, it will abort. The
true group is denoted as G, which can be perceived by the user.
Round 2 (wireless). In the commitment round, each Mi generates a random
nonce ri as its own share of digest key to generate the SAS in the end. Then ri is
committed along with the message mi and its ID, which are public data. Since the
digest keys are hidden from the attacker in this round, all devices essentially have
jointly committed to a SAS value that the attacker do not know. So the digest keys
provide the randomness required for security. All devices send their commitments ci
in order, i.e., IDi 1's transmission must precede that of IDi's, and each device can
verify this order. The purpose is to provide device synchronization, i.e., they must
agree on when one round ends. By using strict message ordering in rounds 2 and 3,
the message sent by the device with largest ID serves as the synchronization signal. It
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User designates controller MN , which initiates the protocol
Round 1: Given IDi (User enters group size N into MN )
Wait for fdIDjgj2bG until timeout
Set Gi = fdID1; :::; IDi; :::;[IDNg, in ascending or-
der of ID.
MN will abort if jGN j 6= N .
IDi        !
Counting&
cIDj         
GroupForming   
(wireless)
Round 2:
Pick ri
R   f0; 1gn
(ci; di) HCommit(IDijmi; ri); record bci;
Verify cIDj received after cIDj 1 ^ cIDj 6= cIDi.
cIDi 1;bmi 1;bci 1              
Commitment
IDi;mi;ci            !
(wireless)
cIDi+1;bmi+1;bci+1              
  
Round 3: If 9j 6= i;? HOpen(cIDj jbmj ;bcj ; bdj), abort;
Else, 8j 6= i; brj  HOpen(cIDj jbmj ;bcj ; bdj);
Record bGi; bmi;bri, and verify bGi = Gi;
(MN also veries jbckj = jbGij = j bmkj = jbrkj = N)
If verications OK, compute sasi  
H(bGijbcij bmi;bri)
bdi 1          
Decommitment
di       !
(wireless)
bdi+1          
  
Round 4: User veries simultaneously LED: sasi
?
= sasj , 8i 6=
j 2 G;
If verications OK, user presses a button on every
device.
Auth. & Conrm
sasi()
(visual OOB)
Figure 2.3: Multi-party message authentication protocol (MP-MAP) at each device
Mi: the message to be authenticated of each device is mi.
prevents possible attacks that exploit the desynchronization, e.g., the one discovered
in [142]. The controller will always be the last one to broadcast. Each device Mi
also keeps record of the set of received bcjs | bci = fbc1; :::; ci; :::;bcNig, where Ni should
equal to jGij.
Round 3 (wireless). In this round, each device Mi reveals its committed digest
key by broadcasting the decommitment value so that others can verify the validity of
the commitment and obtain bri (they will check if cIDi; bmi; bri and bci are a valid message-
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commitment pair). The controller, upon collecting all the other devices' commitments
and digest keys, checks if the numbers of group members, commitments, messages
and digest keys all equal to N (the controller is assumed to be not compromised). In
addition, each other device should check the consistency of the group IDs w.r.t. Gi
collected at the beginning. After that, the SAS is computed at each Mi as a digest
of the protocol transcript, with the XOR of Mi's received set of bri as digest key.
Round 4 (visual OOB). This round is when most of the human eort take
place. Next, the SASes are encoded into synchronized LED blinking patterns for user
comparison. The duration of the LED blinking depends on the number of bits of the
SAS. Usually 16  20 bits are enough for security. If all the patterns are the same, U
conrms that authentication succeeded by pressing a button on every device.
The Group Device Pairing Protocol.
Next we describe the GDP protocol which combines the MP-MAP and the UDB
group key agreement protocol. Round 1 is the same with that in MP-MAP. In round 2,
a Die-Hellman (DH) public key (Xi) is computed at each device, and is exchanged
among all the devices in the group. In round 3, each device rst computes its Yi
value based on Xjs received in round 2, and then takes XijYi as the message mi to be
authenticated. Devices compute and exchange hash commitments in this round as in
MP-MAP. Round 4 is the same as round 3 in the MP-MAP, which reveals the digest
keys. Finally, in round 5, after conrming all the LED blinking patterns match, each
device computes a group key based on all the previously received Xjs and Yjs which
should be already authenticated up to this point. In addition, as a byproduct, each
sensor computes its individual key shared with the controller using the DH public
key, and vice versa. As we will show in the next Section, the GDP achieves almost
the same level of security as the PDP, with the same SAS length. Therefore, using
the same amount of human eort as in the PDP, an authenticated group key and
individual keys are all established.
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User designates controller MN , which initiates the protocol
Round 1: The same with round 1 in MP-MAP
Round 2:
xi
R   Zq
Xi  gxi
bXi 1        
DH public key
Xi        !
(wireless)
bXi+1       
  
Round 3: Compute KLi ;K
R
i ; Yi; mi  fXijYig
Pick ri
R   f0; 1gn
(ci; di) HCommit(IDijmi; ri); record bci;
Verify cIDj received after cIDj 1 ^ cIDj 6= cIDi.
cIDi 1;bmi 1;bci 1              
Commitment
IDi;mi;ci            !
(wireless)
cIDi+1;bmi+1;bci+1              
  
Round 4: The same with round 3 in MP-MAP
Round 5:
User veries simultaneously LED: sasi
?
= sasj , 8i 6= j 2 G;
If verications OK, user presses a button on every device.
Each Mi computes f bKRj gj2bGini, KG = bKR1 bKR2 ::: bKRn ,
individual keys: KiN = ( bXN )xi ;
MN computes fKNi = ( bXi)xN gi2bGNnN .
Auth. & Conrm
sasi()
(visual OOB)
Figure 2.4: The multi-party key agreement protocol (GDP) at each device Mi. It
establishes a group key and sensors' individual keys with the controller.
Initial Trust Establishment via GDP. Now we describe some practical issues,
e.g., how the GDP is applied to initial trust establishment in the BAN (or called secure
sensor association). In reality, there is usually a limit to the number of LED blinking
devices a human user can watch at the same time. We refer to this limit as Nmax. If
the number of the intended group of devices for a BAN N = jGj  Nmax, the user
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carries out one GDP for G to setup the group keyKG. IfN > Nmax, the user randomly
picks nodes from G in a batch to form smaller subgroups whose sizes are equal to Nmax
whenever possible. The GDP protocol is then executed for each subgroup G(k). The
controller must be in every subgroup, so that it can establish a subgroup key KG(k)
with each of them through GDP. When the last subgroup has only one sensor node
left, Scheme I is automatically used to establish a pairwise key (however, it makes little
dierence to the user). After that the controller generates the nal group key KG and
broadcasts it using encryption to each subgroup: EKG(k)fKGjGjMACKG(k)(KGjG)g,
where G = [kG(k) and jGj = N .
After the sensor association is successfully done, the group of devices need to setup
the pairwise keys among them. There are two options. The simplest way is to reuse
the DH public keys and let each Mi; i 2 G compute Kij = (Xj)xi ; 8j 2 G n i. But this
incurs additionally N 2 exponentiation operations for each sensor device (except the
individual key computation), which is not desirable for resource-constrained sensors.
The other way is to use the method in Sec. 2.4.2, i.e., let the controller broadcast
material to each sensor which is encrypted under the sensor's individual key. And then
each sensor computes the shared pairwise keys with others on its own. In this way,
exponentiation operations are replaced with less costly eld multiplication operations.
2.4.4 Deployment and Thereafter
The deployment phase establishes the pairwise and logical keys. Upon deployment,
each node Mi rst performs neighbor discovery. For each neighbor Mj, Mi computes
the pairwise key Kij as previously mentioned. In practice, in order to save stor-
age space, a node can merely store the pairwise keys that it uses frequently, while
computing the other pairwise keys on-demand.
Then, the logical keys are derived naturally from the subgroup keys in GDP, which
are used to form a logical key hierarchy (LKH). The LKH [172] has been proposed to
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achieve ecient key revocation. Since the LKH is a balanced binary tree, the message
overhead for key revocation is O(log2(N)). However, it is not very ecient for batch
node addition or removal.
To avoid this drawback, we use a constant depth (d = 3), variable branch and
balanced key tree (Fig. 2.5). Each internal node stands for a logical key, and each
leaf node corresponds to the individual key of a sensor node. So we have k0;0 = KG
and k2;i = KC;i+1. The keys k1;i = KG(k) which are the subgroup keys derived in the
end of GDP. The branch of the root 0;0 equals to the number of subgroups, while
the branch of a second level node 1;i = jG(i)j. The controller C has the information
of the entire key tree. Note that, no messages are needed to transmit the logical keys
for the tree in our scheme.
Note that, our scheme can be easily extended to BANs with cluster topologies,
since we can predict which nodes will form a cluster and thereby a subgroup by looking
at their functionalities. For example, the use of several sensor nodes connected to
30 motion sensors are reported in [161] to detect patient's acceleration and gait. A
simple clustered BAN topology is shown in Fig. 2.6. Some nodes form clusters (e.g.,
M4;M5 andM6;M7;M8), while others are independent with each other (M1;M2;M3).
In order to save energy, the controller directly communicates with cluster heads and
non-clustered nodes. In this case, the cluster keys will be the logical keys and the
subgroup keys at the same time. We can use GDP to setup the cluster key for both
clusters, and use PDP to establish individual keys for each non-clustered node.
After that, the BAN is ready to function. In summary, now a sensor node Mi has
the following key (material)s: KG; Ki;N ; KG(k); fi(y); k0. Since the keys may be com-
promised by cryptanalysis afterwards, we need to introduce sessions for the working
phase |- time periods across which keys are updated regularly. The above keys are
all treated as keys in session 0. A key K in session i is denoted as K(i).
Session Key Update. Periodically, the controller broadcasts a update message
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Figure 2.5: A logical key tree for a BAN of 9 nodes (Nmax = 3). A key is indexed by
its level  and branch number . G(k) refers to a subgroup.
Figure 2.6: A simple clustered BAN topology.
to the network. It is authenticated using the local broadcast authentication method
[182], since we assume the BAN is one-hop. The controller rst updates f(x; y):
fi+1(x; y) = fi(x; y) + i+1, where i+1
R   Fp. Then, it updates the logical keys as
k0;0(i+ 1) = H(k0;0(i)); k1;(i+ 1) = H(k1;(i)), and broadcasts the following:
msg3 \Update to session i+ 1"ji+1
C  !  : Ek0;0(i)fmsg3g; ki+1; MACki+1(msg3):
Then, each sensor can authenticate C by verifying that H(ki+1) = ki.
Next, all sensor nodes update all the keys in its memory as the controller does.
For the pairwise keys, node u computes fu;i+1(y) = fu;i(y) + i+1. This achieves the
update of all n(n 1)
2
pairwise keys through only one broadcast message.
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2.4.5 Membership Management
Node Join. Adding one node is easy; we can just perform one device pairing using
Scheme I. We will elaborate on how GDP supports ecient batch node addition.
Step 1. Before l > 1 new nodes join the BAN during session i, they are reset by
the user (all dynamic memories are lost) and assumed to be benign.
Step 2. Before they are deployed, the same steps in GDP are performed by treating
them as a new group, where the controller obtains the temporary group key KTG and
all the logical keys.
Step 3. The controller advances the existing BAN to session i+1 without waiting
until the end of session i. To this end, all nodes do the same thing as in session key
update.
Step 4. The controller pre-distributes new polynomial shares fv;i+1(y) for each
new node v. Also, it encrypts KG(i + 1) and ki+1 using K
T
G and broadcasts to the
new nodes. A new key tree can then be derived that includes the new nodes. Then,
the new nodes are deployed.
Node Leave/Revocation. Upon single node leave or revocation during session
i, the group key, logical keys and pairwise keys are renewed to exclude the leaving
node. The controller randomly generates a new group key KG(i+ 1). All the logical
keys on the tree path of the leaving node are refreshed. For example, in Fig. 2.5, say
M1 is revoked. Then, the controller sends the following messages:
C !M2 : Ek2;2fk1;0(i+ 1)g;
C !M3 : Ek2;3fk1;0(i+ 1)g;
C !M2;M3 : Ek1;0(i+1)fk0;0(i+ 1)g;
C !M4;M5;M6 : Ek1;1(i+1)fk0;0(i+ 1)g;
C !M7;M8 : Ek1;2(i+1)fk0;0(i+ 1)g;
where k1;1(i+1) = H(k1;1(i)); k1;2(i+1) = H(k1;2(i)). After that, the controller sends
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the updated polynomial share (i+1) to all nodes using authenticated broadcast.
Thus, the revoked node cannot obtain the new group key and the updated polynomial
share. It is straightforward to see how the above is done when batch node leave event
happens, for which we will analyze the eciency in Sec. 2.6.
2.5 Security Analysis
For the authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols in this chapter, there are es-
sentially two security goals: key secrecy and key authenticity. A basic secrecy goal
is dened w.r.t. a passive adversary, i.e., an eavesdropper should have negligible ad-
vantage in deriving the shared key KAB. In PDP, the only information sent over the
wireless channel for the derivation of KAB is the set of the Xis. Thus, key secre-
cy with a passive adversary amounts to that of Die-Hellman key exchange, which
follows from the assumption that the Decisional Die{Hellman (DDH) problem is
intractable. In the GDP protocol, a similar passive secrecy guarantee follows from
the secrecy of the UDB key agreement protocol [58].
Thus, key authenticity will be the AKA protocol security goal we study in the
remainder of this section. The cores of our AKA protocols are their corresponding
message authentication protocols (MAPs). In the following, we focus on dening
and proving the security of MAPs. The security of an AKA protocol follows from
the security of its underlying MAP and the security of the key agreement protocol
against a passive adversary.4
4To show this, the modular approach proposed by Bellare et al. [22] can be applied. Specically,
It assumes two adversary models | the authenticated link model (AM) and un-authenticated link
model (UM). The AM is ideal in that the adversary can only invoke protocol runs, masquerade as
protocol participants and nd old session keys, but cannot forge or replay messages of uncorrupted
parties. The UM is real-world model where the adversary can additionally replay and forge messages.
If a protocol is proven to be secure in the AM, then it can be shown to be secure in the UM provided
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Without loss of generality, we state the security denition of MAP using the multi-
party scenario. Assume the group consists ofN parties (devices): G = fID1; ID2; :::; IDNg;
for simplicity we use i to represent IDi. Each party i 2 G has some message mi to be
authenticated to all the rest parties in G, for example in the PDP mi = fIDi; Xig,
while in GDP mi = fIDi; Xi; Yig.
Next, we dene the security of a MAP based on the notion of \matching conversa-
tions" introduced by [23]. If each participant i 2 G has executed a local run (or partial
run) Ri, then we can interleave the events of all the local runs, arranging them in a
single sequence, in many dierent ways. One of these sequences is a topological sort
of fRigi2G if, for all i, it preserves the order of events lying on the same Ri. We use
topological sorts to represent the notion of a proper matching up of transmission and
reception events. When a protocol uses no broadcast, but only point-to-point mes-
sages, we can require that we can always place a matching transmission-reception pair
next to each other. We will give the denitions rst for the case without broadcast,
and then loosen them for the case using broadcast, as is needed for our protocols.
Thus, we will say that the parties i 2 G have jointly matching broadcast-free
conversations in a family fRigi2G of local runs if:
there is a topological sort of the transmission and reception events of all
local runs Ri, respecting the local ordering of each Ri, such that
1. every reception event e1 immediately follows a transmission event e0,
and e1 receives the same message sent at e0; and
2. vice versa, every transmission event e0 immediately precedes a re-
that each message transferred between the parties is authenticated by a protocol called message
transfer (MT) authenticator. In our setting, by saying \security of the key agreement protocol" we
mean its unauthenticated version (e.g., original Die-Hellman) should be secure in the AM, while
the MAP can be regarded as an MT-authenticator. A similar approach is adopted by [34] to prove
the security of their key agreement protocols.
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ception event e1, and e1 receives the same message sent at e0.
Thus, if the parties have matching conversations, all messages transmitted by them
will be received unaltered, i.e., authentically. This condition also implies that the
same transmitted message is not delivered more than once, since only one reception
can follow it immediately.
To generalize this notion to a group G with an uncorrupted subset N  G, we
will suppose that associated with every reception e1 along a local run Ri with i 2 N ,
there is an expected sender j 2 G. Likewise, associated with every transmission e0
along a local run Ri with i 2 N , there is an expected recipient j 2 G. This is certainly
the case with our protocols when the group G is known. Now, a set fRigi2N of local
runs for i 2 N consists of jointly matching, broadcast-free matching conversations for
the uncorrupted participants if:
there is a topological sort of the transmission and reception events of the
local runs Ri, respecting the local ordering of each Ri, such that
1. for every reception event e1, if the expected sender of e1 is some
j 2 N , then e1 immediately follows a transmission event e0 on Rj,
and e1 receives the same message sent at e0; and
2. vice versa, for every transmission event e0, if the expected recipient
of e0 is some j 2 N , then e0 immediately precedes a reception event
e1 on Rj, and e1 receives the same message sent at e0.
Our previous denition without corruption, is equivalent to the case in which N = G,
at least when the group is known, and each message makes its expected sender and
expected recipient explicit.
To adapt our denition to the case with broadcast messages, we use a symbol 
to represent the expected recipient of a broadcast message. We assume  62 G. The
idea is that a message with expected recipient  is broadcast and may be received by
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everyone. In this case, there may be several reception events, all following immediately
after the transmission as a block. We assume here thatN is non-empty. A set fRigi2N
of local runs for i 2 N consists of jointly matching matching conversations for the
uncorrupted participants if:
there is a topological sort of the transmission and reception events of the
local runs Ri, respecting the local ordering of each Ri, such that
1. for every transmission event e0, e0 immediately precedes a reception
event e1 on some Rj, where the expected recipient of e0 is either
j or . If the expected recipient of e0 is j, then e1 is not followed
by another reception event. Moreover, e1 receives the same message
sent at e0.
2. for every reception event e1, if the expected sender of e1 is some
j 2 N , then e1 immediately follows some event e0, and e0 involving
the same message as e0. If e0 is a transmission event, then e0 lies on
Rj.
The following security denition captures the intuition that if a MAP is secure,
then the only way that an adversary can make all parties accept at the end of a pro-
tocol run is to faithfully relay all the messages. We will use bmi to denote i's received
vector (ordered set) of messages fbm1i; :::; bmi 1i;mi; bmi+1i; :::; bmNig, and similarly bci
stands for the vector of received commitments by i, etc.
Denition 2.5.1 (Secure Message Authentication). We say that  is a (; T )-secure
message authentication protocol with a group of participants G (jGj  2), if for any
T -time adversary A,
(1) (Matching conversations) acceptance) If all pairs of parties in G have matching
conversations, then all parties accept.
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(2) (Acceptance ) matching conversations) Letting Adv(A) = Pr[All-accept ^
No-MatchingA], where No-MatchingA refers to the event that the conversations
do not match, we have Adv(A)  .
In (2), we may use the uncorrupted group N = G, in which case we speak of
the adversary as an outsider. Alternatively, we may choose N ( G, and speak of
an insider adversary. In a two-party MAP, one does not need to consider one of the
parties being compromised, because then there is nothing to prove. Thus we only
discuss node compromise for the multi-party protocols.
2.5.1 Security of the PDP
We will refer to the message authentication protocol underlying the PDP as \two-
party MAP (TP-MAP)". We rst state the following theorem.
Theorem 2.5.2. Assume that the digest function is u-uniformly distributed and
r-collision resistant. If the hash commitment scheme is (h; Th)-hiding and (b; Tb)-
binding, the TP-MAP is (maxfu; rg+ h + 2b; 2Tb + Th +O(1))-secure.
Security interpretation. The security levels achieved by the TP-MAP (and the
MP-MAP as we will see) depend mainly on the SAS's length `. This is because
the adversary's deception probability is dominated by either u or r, which should
equal to 2 ` given an ideal digest function. While h; b reect the security of hash
commitment, which use long nonces. Their values are approximately 2 n, orders
smaller than 2 `.
Proof. Let the parties involved in a protocol run as A and B. The rst part of the
security goal is obvious, so we only need to show that for any Tb + 2Th + O(1)-time
adversary A, whenever the assumptions of the theorem hold, its deception probability
Adv(A) is no larger than maxfu; r; 2hg +maxfr; bg. We rst denote the event
\A succeeds in deception" as S, where
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S = fS1 ^ S2g , fBoth-accept ^ No-matchingAg; (2.3)
where No-matchingA refers to the event that A and B do no have matching conversa-
tions. Note that, in order for both of them to accept, they need to successfully verify
the SASes are equal (Fig. 2.2), and they must not abort during the protocol. It is
easy to see that Adv(A) = Pr[S].
Next we analyze Pr[S]. First we dene \viewi" as the ordered set consisting of
all the messages received by device i in the round 2 (viewA = fmA; bmB; cA;bcBg, and
viewB = fbmA;mB;bcA; cBg).
We will use the following lemma to continue our proof.
Lemma 2.5.3. In the TP-MAP, if event S2 happens (No-matching
A), then either
viewA 6= viewB, or otherwise, A and B will accept with probability b.
The above is straightforward to prove. To see that, notice if viewA = viewB, to
create no-matching conversations the adversary must break the binding property of
hash commitments (i.e., to nd a dierent d for the same m and c values), and the
probability of success is no larger than b. Thus, we can dene an event E , fviewA 6=
viewBg.
Observe that, by the total probability principle, we have
Pr[S] = Pr[SjE]P [E] + Pr[Sj E]P [ E] (2.4)
(1)
 Pr[SjE] + Pr[Sj E]
(2)
= Pr[S1jE] + b:
where (1) follows from Pr[E];Pr[ E]  1, and (2) follows from Lemma. 2.5.3 and
the fact that E implies S2 (no-matching conversations).
Therefore, next we focus on the case that event E happens, and assume A does
not break the binding property of hash commitments. There are two cases for viewA 6=
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A B
 mA;cA    ! bmA;bcA    ! 
+ +
 bmB ;bcB      mB ;cB      
+ +
 dA ! bdA ! 
+ +
 bdB   dB   
Figure 2.7: Diagram for a partial execution of the protocol in the TP-MAP for our
PDP. Note that, here mi contains IDi and the message to be authenticated.
viewB that deserves discussion. (1) bmA 6= bmB but bcA = bcB. This again corresponds
to a double opening of the hash commitment, and the probability the adversary will
succeed in this way is bounded by b. (2) bcA 6= bcB. We have the following lemma for
this case.
Lemma 2.5.4. In the TP-MAP, given bcA 6= bcB, for any Th + O(1) time adversary
that does not break the binding of hash commitments, Pr[S1jE]  maxfu; rg+ h.
Proof. To be clear, consider the diagram for a partial execution (rst four moves)
of the protocol5 in Fig. 2.7. The black dots stand for the decision points of each
party's run (also called a strand), while down arrows represent parties' internal state
transitions. The blank parts between two strands indicate a party' sent messages can
be manipulated by any outsider adversary before they are received by the other party.
The rst two moves consist the rst round, and the second and fourth moves consist
the second round.
First let us assume the adversary A does not break the hiding property of hash
5Here we adopt the protocol representation in strand spaces proposed by [72].
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commitments in the rst round (this strategy is denote as H). This does not preclude
the following three general strategies | (a) A can simply relay a message truthfully;
(b) A can create a new bcA or bcB using brA or brB values of her own choice, but are
independent of rA and rB; (c) create \related" bcA and bcB committing to unknown brA
and brB, that are \correlated" to rA and/or rB, respectively, after seeing cA and cB
(malleability). (although she does not know the latter two). The \correlation" ()
between those r variables could mean anything except their independence. But here,
it must have a constraint | the variables (regarded as bit strings) have the same
length, otherwise it does not make sense. So relations like string concatenations are
excluded. The simplest relation is equality; however, relaying is the same with (a),
while the replay attack (copying cA as bcB) is prevented since the commitments have
included sender ID in it, and the replay will not pass the verication of A.
Since A does not break the binding property of hash commitments, the digest
keys are bound to the commitments. So we can focus on the commitment round only.
In order to succeed, A must create bcA and bcB such that sasA = sasB. For bcA, if A
chooses strategy (a) and let bcA = cA, then rA and rB are independent since they are
randomly generated by A and B, respectively; if A chooses (b) or (c), due to the
precedence bcA  cB, brA will still be independent from rB, which is unknown by A.
As bcB is the last message A can send, it must obtain a corresponding brB such that
sasA = sasB. Note that, A cannot simply relay both cA and cB. Next we discuss the
case when bcA 6= cA.
 A can choose strategy (b) to construct any of bcA. No matter how bcB is con-
structed, brA must be independent from both rA and rB which are unknown to
A. So according to the key-based uniformity property of digest function, the
probability of nding brA such that H( bmA; rA  brB) = y = H( bmB; brA  rB) is
smaller or equal to u, where y is a xed number.
 So A can choose strategy (a) or (c) for bcA and bcB. According to our denitions,
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we have brA  rA and brB  rB or brB  rA. W.l.o.g., suppose brA = rA  1 andbrB = rB  2 or brB = rA  3. In the rst case, we have Pr[H( bmA; rA  rB 
2) = H( bmB; rA  rB  1)]  r according to the no uniform compensation
property of digest function, where  = 1  2. In the second case, we have
Pr[H( bmA; 3) = H( bmB; rA  rB  1) = y]  u, since y is a xed (unknown)
number.
For the case bcA = cA, it can be shown similarly that A's probability to succeed is
no larger than maxfu; rg. Combining the above, we get Pr[S1jE]  maxfu; rg for
any O(1)-time adversary that does not break hiding of hash commitments.
Second, if the hiding property of any hash commitment is broken, A's probability
of success is bounded by h for any Th time A. So the Lemma is proved.
Using Eq. (2.4) and Lemma 2.5.4, we get
Pr[S]  maxfu; rg+ h + 2b; (2.5)
for any adversary A that runs in 2Tb + Th +O(1) time.
2.5.2 Security of the GDP
The MP-MAP can be proven as secure as the TP-MAP under the Bellare-Rogaway
model, even when there exist compromised devices (insider attack). Our assumption
is that the controller is not compromised, but any other sensor could be compromised
by the adversary6.
6The minimal assumption in a user-aided multi-party AKA protocol which achieves exclusiveness,
is that at least one of the devices must be not compromised in order to verify the number of group
members is correct. E.g., see [142]. Furthermore, for any MP-MAP to make sense, there must be
at least two non-compromised devices.
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Theorem 2.5.5. Assume that the digest function is u-uniformly distributed and
r-collision resistant. If the hash commitment scheme is (h; Th)-hiding and (b; Tb)-
binding, the MP-MAP is (maxfu; rg+ h + 2b; 2Tb + Th)-strongly secure.
Proof. First we dene \viewi" as the set of information exchanged in the second round,
which is the ordered set consisting of all the messages ( bmi;bci), i.e., (fcIDjj bXjjbYjg; fbcjg); j 2
Gi received by device i in the round 2.
In this proof, we use G to denote the true group of legitimate devices (perceived by
human user), and N to denote the subset of non-compromised devices in G. Similar
to TP-MAP, we dene
S = fS1 ^ S2g , fAll-accept ^ No-matchingAg; (2.6)
where All-accept means all devices in N accept, while No-matchingA refers to the
event that there exist i; j 2 N such that their conversations do not match. We will
use the following lemma to continue our proof.
Lemma 2.5.6. If event S2 happens (No-matching
A), then either 9i; j 2 N such that
viewi 6= viewj, or otherwise, all the devices in N will accept with probability b.
The argument for this Lemma is similar to that of Lemma. 2.5.3.
Dene event E , f9i; j 2 N ; s:t:viewi 6= viewjg, we have the following:
Pr[S] = Pr[SjE]P [E] + Pr[Sj E]P [ E] (2.7)
(1)
 Pr[SjE] + Pr[Sj E]
(2)
= Pr[S1jE] + b:
The second equation follows from Lemma. 2.5.6 and the fact that E implies S2 (no-
matching conversations).
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Next, we use the following bound to constrain our discussion to the scenario that
all pair of non-compromised devices' SASes match except one pair N and i (event
denoted as S1 Ni), 8i 2 N n N , while N and i's views do not equal. Applying the
probability product rule, we get:
Pr[S1jE] = Pr[S1; E]
Pr[E]
(2.8)
 Pr[S1; E]
Pr[E; S1 Ni]
= Pr[SNijE; S1 Ni];
where SNi , fsasN = sasig, because S1 = fSNi; S1 Nig. Also, note that event E
implies there must exist some i such that viewi 6= viewN where N is the controller, we
can further decompose Pr[SNijE; S1 Ni] into two cases for i and N , i.e., jGij = N or
jGij 6= N (note that N = jGN j, otherwise MN will not accept).
Connecting the above, we thus have the following bound on Pr[S]:
Pr[S1jE]  max
8>><>>:
Pr[SNijE; S1 Ni; jGij = N ];
Pr[SNijE; S1 Ni; jGij 6= N ]:
(2.9)
It remains to show that the probabilities on the right hand side are upper bounded
by maxfu; rg+ h + b. We rst focus on the case of E; S1 Ni; jGij = N .
There are two cases for viewi 6= viewN that deserves discussion. (1) bmi 6= bmN butbci = bcN . This corresponds to a double opening of the hash commitment, and the
probability the adversary will succeed in this way is bounded by b. (2) bci 6= bcN . Here
we need to consider two cases: N = G (no compromised insiders) or N  G (some
devices are compromised). We rst discuss the former case. We have the following
lemma, whose proof is shown later.
Lemma 2.5.7. In the MP-MAP, given bci 6= bcN , for any Th time adversary that does
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not break the binding of hash commitments, Pr[SNijE; S1 Ni; jGij = N ]  maxfu; rg+
h.
For the case of E; S1 Ni; jGij 6= N , using a similar analysis to the proof of Lem-
ma. 2.5.7, the same conclusion can be drawn. Note that since jGij 6= jGN j, in the
SASes of i and N , respectively, their data input parts of the digest function will n-
ever equal to each other even if bci = bcN and bmi = bmN , while this does not aect the
result. In fact, this is why we should include all the protocol transcript into the SAS
digest.
From the above, we know that the right hand side of Eq. (2.9) is bounded by
maxfu; rg+ h+ b for a Tb+ Th time adversary. Summing up Eqs. (2.7), (2.8) and
(2.9), we get Pr[S]  maxfu; rg+ h + 2b for a 2Tb + Th time adversary.
Remarks. The MP-MAP and TP-MAP's security proofs are similar, and they
both belong to the directly binding category [134]. Interestingly, we can summarize
several principles underlying both multi-party and two-party version of the MAP
protocol in this chapter. They are: (1) they both follow the joint-commitment before
knowledge principle, where the hash commitment only needs two properties | hiding
and binding; (2) they both have the strict order of message exchanges in each round;
(3) they both use a digest function with the key-based uniformity and no uniform
compensation properties dened in Section. 2.3.3; (4) they have both bound the
message mi to the commitment, and digest for SAS involves all protocol transcript.
Proof of Lemma. 2.5.7.
Proof. Consider the simplied diagram in Fig. 2.8. When N = G, our proof strategy
is to show that, if A does not break the hiding of any hash commitments, its prob-
ability of success will be bounded by maxfu; rg. On the other hand, if any hash
commitment's hiding is broken, A's probability of success is bounded by h for any
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Mi 2 N MN 2 Nbm1i;bc1i    !  bm1N ;bc1N     ! 
+ +
...
...
+ +
 mi;ci   ! bmiN ;bciN     ! 
+ +
...
...
+ +bmN 1i;bcN 1i       !  bmN 1N ;bcN 1N         ! 
+ +
 bmNi;bcNi       mN ;cN      
Figure 2.8: Simplied diagram for a partial execution concerning devices i and N in
round 2 of protocol MP-MAP. m stands for the message to be authenticated.
Th time A.
Then we focus on proving the rst statement above. Adversary A can generate
commitments bc1i; :::;bci 1i;bci+1i; :::;bcNi and bc1N ; :::;bcN 1N in arbitrary ways. It can
either simply relay the original commitments sent by honest parties (without knowing
the underlying r values), or construct new commitments using its own br values, or
create commitment bcj0i0 that is related to any cj; j 2 G while does not know brj0i0 ,
where either j = j0 or j  j0.
Since the last message A can inject/modify is bcNi, we can focus on how A can
compute it to make sasi = sasN . The SASes are in the following forms: sasi =
H(i; br1i  ::: ri  ::: brNi) (denoting i as the data inputs); and similarly, sasN =
H(N ; br1N  ::: brN 1N  rN). In the above, both ri and rN are unknown to A, and
since bci 6= bcN , i 6= N .
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Note that, all the bc1N ; :::;bcN 1N must be created before cN is sent out due to the
message ordering, so br1N ; :::; brN 1N must be independent of rN which is unknown to
A. We have two cases:
 If A relays cN to i and brNi = rN , since bc1i; :::;bci 1i;bci+1i; :::;bcN 1i  bcNi,br1i; :::; brN 1i must be all independent with rN . Thus, sasi = H(i; irN), where
i = br1i ::: ri ::::brN 1i is independent of rN , and sasN = H(N ; N  rN),
where N = br1N  :::  rN  ::::  brN 1N is independent of rN . In the above,
no matter whether i is known to A or not, it is a xed number when A relays
rN to i, and the same is true for N . In addition, i 6= N . So according to
the no uniform compensation property of digest function, Pr[H(i; i  rN) =
H(N ; N  rN)]  r, and  = i  N .
 If bcNi is created by A using other strategies. Because A is free to create related
commitments to ci after seeing ci, and is also free to create its own commitments,
it could make ibrNi equal to a number 0i it knows (otherwise, there will be an
unknown factor rj in br1i  ::: brNi, which reduces to the same case as above).
Also, sasN is xed when A sends brNi to i. So the key-based uniformity property
of digest function applies and Pr[H(i; 0i) = H(N ; N  rN)]  u.
Finally, for the scenario with compromised devices (N  G), the only additional
information to A is the internal rj values for j 2 G n N ; j 6= i; j 6= N . It is easy to
see that the above proof still holds as long as i and N are not compromised (ri; rN
are not known by A).
Security Intuition of the Role of Member Count. The member count
information plays an important role in achieving exclusiveness (or demonstrative i-
dentication), i.e., the group authenticated in the end includes only the devices the
user sees in front of her, which excludes any outsider attacker. If there is no member
count information, exclusiveness cannot be achieved, as is the case in [96]. This is
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because before the group of devices meets with each other, they do not know the
member list in advance. An attacker A can thus claim it is one of the group members
and inject her DH public key share, trying to obtain the group key. Then the actual
group becomes bG = G [ A, while for members in G, they still have the same SAS
values. While the only sign that the user perceives is the LED blinking patterns on
the sensor nodes, she will accept bG as authenticate. However, with the count infor-
mation, this attack can be defeated. First, if N + 1 key shares are received by the
controller, GDP will abort, assuming that the user counts correctly. Second, if MN
only receives N Xis and Yis from G, but G nMN all receive N + 1 key shares from
G [ A, A will not be able to derive the same key with all j 2 G, thus have no gain.
Even if A carries out such attack to disrupt the group, it will not be able to make all
the SASes equal due to the properties of the digest function.
Security Intuition Against Compromised Devices. Here we provide more
insight into why GDP is secure against compromised devices. We illustrate it using a
potential attack in reminiscence of the one discovered in [142], if the controller (device
with largest ID) is compromised.
Suppose there are three devices: A, B and C. Controller C is under the full control
of the adversary, i.e., it can launch active attacks in the wireless channel. Depicted in
Fig. 2.9, C tries to impersonate B to A and vice versa, but it does not try to break
the group exclusiveness. C's goal is to make all the SASes equal. In the rst move,
after seeing cA, C constructs new commitments bcAC and bcAB with brAC ; brAB known by
itself. Then after B sends cB, C does the similar thing to the above. In the third
move, C sends C;mC ; cC only to A to trick A send its decommitment dA, so that C
will know rA before this round ends. At this point, C knows all the random nonces
received/generated at A, and also all the received/generated data at A, which leads
to the revealing of sasA in advance. What remains for C is to compute bcC and  oine
(after seeing cB), such that bcC opens to an brC = rB   where rB is not known by C,
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A C B
 A;mA;cA     ! A;bmAC ;bcAC       !  A;bmAB ;bcAB       ! 
+ + +
 B;bmBA;bcBA          B;bmBC ;bcBC         B;mB ;cB       
+ + +
 C;mC ;cC       C;mC ;cC        
+ +
+ dA ! dA ! 
+
 C;bmC ;bcC     ! C;bmC ;bcC     ! 
Figure 2.9: A potential attack scenario against three party MAP, if the controller (C)
is compromised.
which makes sasB = sasA. Assuming this can be done (since our hash commitment
does not preclude malleability), C can make all SASes equal while deceiving both A
and B.
In the above attack, the attacker knows the last digest key rN . However, if the con-
troller is not compromised but the attacker compromises any other device with smaller
ID (e.g. B), there is no way for she to obtain the value of rN before the commitment
round ends (except by breaking the hiding property with negligible probability). So
there is no way to know the SAS of the controller beforehand, which also means she
cannot compute the SAS of other devices (e.g., A) oine to make SASes equal.
Therefore, the key factor for MP-MAP to be immune from insider attacks is that,
the uncompromised controller is mandated to be the device with largest ID. Note
that, in [142] the similar problem is dealt with by adding another round between the
commitment and decommitment rounds. Our scheme keeps the number of rounds to
the minimum.
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2.5.3 Security of Key Management
The Polynomial based Key Distribution Scheme. This is ensured to be uncon-
ditionally secure and resists up to t colluding attackers [30]. If more than t polynomial
shares are collected, f(x; y) can be reconstructed using bivariate Lagrange interpola-
tion. Therefore, we set t as the maximum number of nodes in the BAN. For example,
t = 50 is usually enough. In this case, even if all the sensors are compromised, f(x; y)
is secure and we can replace compromised nodes by new ones, as long as the total
number of nodes is smaller than t.
Forward Secrecy. It is infeasible to break the forward secrecy of all the keys,
since it requires to break the pre-image resistance property of hash functions.
Key Update and Revocation. Because the value (i+ 1) is randomly chosen
from Fp and is encrypted thus is not known to non-legitimate members, an attacker
can only guess it randomly. The success probability is 1=p. For a revoked node
v, without knowing (i + 1), even if it possesses fv;i(y), it cannot derive fv;i+1(y),
therefore cannot obtain pairwise keys with any legitimate node.
2.6 Evaluation
In this section, we analyze the eciency of our device pairing and key management
protocols. We rst compare the overheads with an existing scheme, and then report
our implementation of GDP and experimental results.
2.6.1 Computation and Communication Eciency of GDP
It is important for the trust establishment in a BAN to have both low computation
and communication costs. A common reason is to keep low energy consumption
for resource-constrained sensor devices. But more importantly, performing complex
computations would increase the protocol run time dramatically, which is not tolerable
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for medical monitoring applications | especially under emergency situations. Many
existing group message authentication (GMA) protocols [93, 94, 96, 142, 162] require
the adoption of a \non-malleable" commitment scheme, which is usually constructed
based on number-theoretic assumptions and incurs intensive computation7 [93, 122,
162]. A representative scheme of this kind is the SAS-GMA protocol proposed in
[94,96], which we will compare with. In terms of computation, the biggest advantage
of our MP-MAP is the elimination of \non-malleable" commitment schemes. Instead,
we only require commitments with the basic hiding and binding properties, whereas
much more ecient schemes based on hash functions can be used (while still enjoying
provable security).
Therefore, we compare both the overall computation and communication overhead
between our MP-MAP and the SAS-GMA in Table. 2.2. The communication overhead
is evaluated in terms of number of bits transmitted/received. For the SAS-GMA
protocol, we assume the use of a non-malleable commitment scheme from [122]. The
constants c1 and c2 stands for the number of group elements (the length of each of
them, q is usually 1024-bits) in the commitment and decommitment, respectively.
For example, for the DSA-based commitment scheme in [122], c1 = 2 and c2 = 1.
In contrast, in the MP-MAP we use hash commitments and thus the length of a
commitment value is the hash length |n. For instance, in SHA-256 n = 256, and
this is much smaller than q.
For the computation overhead, the main parts come from commitment/decommitment,
hash function, and SAS computation. Common to both protocols is the use of a cryp-
tographic hash function H() to hash an arbitrary long data (bGjbcj bm) to the length
accepted by a universal hash (e.g., 256 bits) or digest function. The complexity for
a cryptographic hash is based on the simple model in [134], which is linear to both
7Construction based on hash function has also been proposed in [93], but the security only remains
as conjecture.
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Decomposition SAS-GMA (bits) MP-MAP (bits)
Commu. cost
ID N  jIDj 2N  jIDj
commit N  c1  q N  n
decom. N  (c2  q + n+ jIDj) 2N  n
message N  jmj N  jmj
Comput. cost
hash H() N2  n  (jIDj+ jmj) N2  n  (jIDj+ jmj+ n)
commit=decom: N  (c01 + c02) mod exp N  n  (jIDj+ jmj+ n)
sas universal hash digest function
Table 2.2: Comparison of MP-MAP and SAS-GMA [96] in terms of overall commu-
nication and computation. N : number of devices; q: length of group element in a
non-malleable commitment scheme.
the input length and the output (or key) length. The N2 factor is due to there are
N devices, and each device's hash input length is linear with N . For the commit-
ment/decommitment, c01; c
0
2 refer to the number of modular exponentiations required
in their computations respectively. For the DSA-based commitment scheme in [122],
c01 = 5; c
0
2 = 4. For the SAS, the complexity of the digest function is even smaller
than a cryptographic hash [134], and is similar to a universal hash [96]. In summary,
it can be seen that the MP-MAP is more ecient than SAS-GMA in terms of both
computation and communication.
Finally, for our GDP protocol, the additional computation overhead to the MP-
MAP is also small. It requires each sensor device to perform 3 modular exponentia-
tions and 2N   2 modular multiplications for running the UDB key agreement pro-
tocol, and only one additional modular exponentiation for computing the individual
key shared with controller. The computations for setting up the pairwise keys during
the deployment phase rely on Galois eld multiplications instead and are much more
ecient. On the other hand, the controller which is usually more powerful, needs to
carry out N + 2 modular exponentiations.
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2.6.2 Prototype Implementation
We implemented GDP on a prototype sensor network platform consisting of 10 Tmote-
Sky nodes, each with 8MHz TI-MSP430 microcontroller, 10KB RAM and 48KB Flash
(ROM), and with TinyOS. We let one of the sensor nodes be the controller, which does
not improve the performance of GDP protocol. For our experiments, we implement
rounds 2-5 in Fig. 2.4 up to the computation of the group key and the individual
keys. The counting step is omitted, by programming the IDs of the devices and the
group size into them in advance.
We convert the Die-Hellman based group key agreement (UDB) to its elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC) version, where the modular exponentiation and modular
multiplication correspond to point multiplication and point addition, respectively.
We use the primitive operations provided by TinyECC [115], including point multi-
plication and point addition, with all optimizations enabled. To provide 80-bit key
security, the nite eld size used in ECC should be 160 bits. So we rst compute 160-
bit group key and individual keys using ECC versions of the UDB and Die-Hellman
key agreement, and then hash the keys. In [115], for 160-bit ECC and with all op-
timizations enabled, the ECDH initialization time is reported to be 1.8s on Micaz,
while the key computation time is 2.1s. The required ROM and RAM sizes are 16KB
and 1.8KB which are well below the capacities of a Tmote-Sky node. Since there are
only 4 point multiplications in ECC version of the GDP protocol on sensor nodes,
GDP is fairly practical to be implemented on low-end sensors.
For the hash commitment in GDP, we use a keyed hash (standard HMAC con-
struction based on SHA-256), where the random nonce r is used as the key, and
IDjm is the input data. For implementation of the digest function, since the software
code for it is not available, we also employ the keyed hash instead, which is only for
demonstration purposes 8. We chunk the rst ` bits of the keyed hash to be the SAS.
8This only increases the computation time since the digest function is more ecient than a
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Figure 2.10: Experimental setup with 10 devices. The central node is designated as
the controller. All nodes are displaying synchronous LED blinking patterns.
Finally, we set ` = 16.
In Fig. 2.10, the experimental setup is depicted. Now we describe the protocol
process and user experience in more detail. After all devices are powered on, all the
devices display red LED by default. Then the user presses a reset button on the
controller which broadcast a \reset" signal to all the others. After resetting, the user
presses another button on the controller to initiate the protocol. The controller's
last message in each round serves as synchronization signal, and dierent rounds are
started/nished through state transitions on each device. In each round before the
nal one, the other sensors should display the same LED light pattern which indicates
that they are synchronized. Before devices start to display SASes, they display green
light for several seconds. The simultaneous LED blinking for SAS lasts for about 16
seconds; after that if the patterns are the same, the user presses a button on every
device to conrm.
hash [133].
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Decomposition Commu. Comput. LED blink. Idle Total
Time (ms) 409 11,005 15,360 3,187 29,961
Energy (mJ) 24.5 59.4 1,152 1.5 1,237.4
Table 2.3: Decomposition of overhead of each sensor device in GDP (N=10).
2.6.3 Results
In the following, we assume that Nmax = 10. And we will show that for Nmax = 10,
it is practical for a human user to perform the initial trust establishment with little
eort. For larger Nmax, specialized device could be used to aid the process such like
the one in [142].
Time Required for Initial Trust Establishment. In our experiments, N 
Nmax. So we plot the time for one GDP run (Tgdp(N)) against the group size N in
Fig. 2.11. It can be seen that Tgdp is almost constant (increases linearly but very
slowly) when N increases. This is because all nodes display LED blinking patterns
simultaneously, while the computations are quite fast. Tgdp consists of time spent
in computation (Tcp), communication (Tcm) and human interaction (TI). We then
decompose Tgdp in Table. 2.3. For ` = 16 bits, TI  16s (one bit for 1s). Obviously,
the LED blinking time takes a major portion, and then the computation time, and
nally the communications. The idle time is needed for nodes to wait to receive all
other's broadcasts in each round and to resolve collisions.
When N > Nmax, the number of subgroups k = d N 1Nmax 1e. Then the total initial
trust establishment time
Tgdp(N)  (k   1)Tgdp(Nmax) + Tgdp(N   k(Nmax   1)); (2.10)
which increases linearly with k, and repeats the almost constant pattern when N 
Nmax. The above time can be approximated theoretically, based on the experimental
values Tgdp(N); N  Nmax. For N = 20, Tgdp 60s.
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Figure 2.11: Time for initial trust establishment.
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Figure 2.12: Energy consumption per sensor node.
We also compare GDP with Scheme I, in which Tsc1(N) = (N   1)Tsc1(2), where
Tsc1(2) is the estimated time for pairwise device pairing. From Fig. 2.11, Tsc1(N) is
linear with N . For N = 20, this is 475s. Obviously, when N  3 the time of GDP
is far less than Scheme I, which is also the case for [87] that uses one-by-one sensor
association.
Energy Consumption. From the data sheet of Tmote [6], we obtain the normal
voltage and current of the mote under dierent conditions, based on which we compute
the energy consumption (EC). We plot the average EC for each sensor node in GDP
against the group size (N  10) in Fig. 2.12, and compare it to the estimated EC of
Scheme I (based on the EC break down for each primitive operation). The EC of GDP
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is a little higher than that of Scheme I, since it uses extra ECC point multiplication
and addition operations. However, the dierence is small (below 50 mJ). Note that,
for the controller, the EC of Scheme I is linear to N which is much larger than that
of GDP due to GDP's grouping mechanism.
Then we break down the EC of GDP in Table. 2.3. It can be seen that the LED
blinking takes major part in the EC, since its time is the longest and the required
power is among the largest. Although the communication needs the largest power, it
consumes the smallest energy since the time of it is quite small. Finally, note that the
energy spent in computation is very small too, because the required power is small.
Usability and Security. GDP supports batch deployment. From the experi-
ments, we found it is practical for a human to watch n  10 LED blinking patterns
simultaneously, when the nodes are put close to each other. The watch-and-compare is
easy to follow, and dierences can be identied with high probability. While MiB [91]
and KALwEN [97] also achieve batch deployment, they require additional hardware
(a faraday cage (FC), a keying device and a keying beacon). These devices add cost
to the BAN and a FC is cumbersome to carry by the user. The SAS-GAKA [96]
does not use additional device, however string comparison needs a user to remember
strings which requires N interactions. The results are summarized in Table. 2.4. We
also compare with SPATE [114], a group message authentication protocol. It requires
N comparisons of \T-ags" for each user, while each comparison needs a few seconds,
and the devices need to have screen/display.
Finally, from the security point of view, few of the compared protocols have formal
security proofs. The SAS-GAKA is proven secure under a simulation-based security
model, but it requires the use of non-malleable commitment schemes. The protocol
in [87] was proven secure using the Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic, but the
BAN logic is mainly suitable for proving traditional authentication protocols secure,
which involves the existence of pre-shared secret keys between the parties.
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b
il
it
y Fast batch deployment
p p p  p p
Error-proof
p p p p  p
# of human interactions k  N / / N N N
Human eort L M M H M M
C
os
t
Requires NO PKI
p p p  p p
No additional hardware
p   p p p
No interface on sensors
p p p p  
Involvement of PKC L NA NA M H L
Table 2.4: Comparison of GDP with related previous schemes: secure sensor as-
sociation [87]; key deployment [91, 97]; group key agreement [96]; group message
authentication [114]. L: low; NA: none; M: medium; H: high.
2.6.4 Eciency of Key Management after Initial Trust Es-
tablishment
Communication. The overhead for adding N nodes is essentially the same as initial
sensor association. The existing nodes do not need to perform extra communications.
Revoking one node in subgroup k requires #G+ jG(k)j   1 unicasts of the controller,
where #G is the number of subgroups. Our scheme is very ecient under group node
leave, where the leaving nodes all belong to one subgroup or one cluster. If m nodes
leave in G(k), the controller only needs to send #G + jGkj  m messages. Clearly, if
jGkj = Nmax, for single sensor leave/revocation there is an optimal value for Nmax,
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which equals to
p
N   1. For N  100, this is smaller than 10. Therefore, it provides
a guideline to choose Nmax for GDP.
Storage. If all the pairwise keys are stored along with the polynomial share,
the size of the keys stored on each sensor node is: 2 + (N   1 + t)  log p + n
bits, where  is the bit length of symmetric key. If the sensors do not store the
pairwise keys, then the minimum size of the keys is: 2 + t  log p + n bits. Assume
 = 80; log p = 80; t = 50; n = 256, the maximum size is 4416 + 79N bits, while the
minimum is 4416 bits. These numbers are well below 4KByte, the available RAM of
Micaz.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we address the problem of secure ad hoc initial trust establishmen-
t and key management in body area networks. We exploit the concept of \device
pairing" and propose group device pairing (GDP), a novel solution that establishes
an authenticated group consisting of low-end sensor devices and a controller, without
relying on any pre-distributed secret information. An authenticated group key and
individual keys are agreed upon using GDP, with the help of simultaneous and man-
ual comparison of LED blinking patterns on all devices, which can be done within 30
seconds with enough security strength in practical applications. GDP helps the user
of a BAN to visually make sure that the authenticated group only consists of those
nodes that she wants to deploy and associate with the intended patient. The resulting
initial key materials enable ecient key management after network deployment. We
have proven the security of the proposed GDP and its two-party version (PDP) un-
der standard security notions; especially we show the non-necessity of non-malleable
commitment schemes. Eciency analysis shows that GDP outperforms a previous
group message authentication protocol, while experimental results show that GDP
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greatly reduces the total time and complexity of human eort, and being ecient
both in communication and computation.
Chapter 3
Privacy-Preserving Distributed
Prole Matching in Mobile Social
Networks
Making new connections according to personal preferences is a crucial service in mo-
bile social networking, where the initiating user can nd matching users within phys-
ical proximity of him/her. In existing systems for such services, usually all the users
directly publish their complete proles for others to search. However, in many ap-
plications, the users' personal proles may contain sensitive information that they
do not want to make public. In this chapter, we propose FindU, the rst privacy-
preserving personal prole matching schemes for mobile social networks. In FindU,
an initiating user can nd from a group of users the one whose prole best matches
with his/her; to limit the risk of privacy exposure, only necessary and minimal infor-
mation about the private attributes of the participating users is exchanged. Several
increasing levels of user privacy are dened, with decreasing amounts of exchanged
prole information. Leveraging secure multi-party computation (SMC) techniques,
we propose novel protocols that realize two of the user privacy levels, which can also
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be personalized by the users. We provide thorough security analysis and performance
evaluation on our schemes, and show their advantages in both security and eciency
over state-of-the-art schemes.
3.1 Problem Denition
3.1.1 System Model
Our system consists of N users (parties) denoted as P1; :::; PN , each possessing a
portable device. We denote the initiating party (initiator) as P1. P1 launches the
matching process and its goal is to nd one party that best \matches" with it, from
the rest of the parties P2; :::; PN which are called candidates. Each party Pi's prole
consists of a set of attributes Si, which can be strings up to a certain length. P1
denes a matching query to be a subset of S1, and in the following we use S1 to
denote the query set unless specied. Also, we denote n = jS1j and m = jSij; i > 1,
assuming each candidate has the same set size for simplicity. Note that, we assume
that the system adopts some standard way to describe every attribute, so that two
attributes are exactly the same if they are the same semantically. A typical prole
matching scenario is depicted in Fig. 3.1.
There could be various denitions of \match". In this chapter, to keep it simple,
we consider jS1 \ Sij > 0 as match (same with [173]). The best match, Pi is dened
as the party having the maximum intersection set size with P1. P1 will rst nd out
Pi via our protocols, and then they decide whether to connect with each other based
on their actual intersection set.
For the network, we assume devices communicate through wireless interfaces such
as bluetooth or WIFI. For simplicity, we assume every participating device is in
the communication range with each other. In addition, we assume that a secure
communication channel has been established between each pair of users, which can
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Figure 3.1: Private prole matching in mobile social networks.
be done easily if each device has a public/private key pair. Otherwise, we can use the
group device pairing technique [103] to establish pairwise session keys.
We do not assume the existence of a trusted third party during the protocol run;
all parties carry out prole matching in a completely distributed way. They may
cooperate with each other, i.e., when P1 runs the protocol with each Pi, a subset of
the rest of parties would help them to compute their results.
3.1.2 Adversary Model
Denition 3.1.1 (User proling). If a party obtains one or more users' (partial or
full) attribute sets without the explicit consents from those users, it is said to conduct
user proling.
With a user's attributes, a bad guy could correlate and identify that user via its
MAC addresses or public keys. However, we cannot absolutely prevent user proling,
because at least the initiator and its best matching user will mutually learn the
intersection set between them to make connections. Thus we focus on minimizing user
proling (the amount of private information revealed) in one protocol run instead.
The parties could try to learn more info than allowed, by either inferring from
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the results but honestly following the protocol, or deviating from the protocol run.
The former corresponds to the honest-but-curious (HBC) model, while the latter is
malicious [64]. In this chapter, the protocols proposed are both proved secure under
the HBC model; although we do not prove them secure in the malicious model, we
analyze various attacks and show how they are secure against them. Note that, some
obvious misbehavior are precluded, such as halting the protocol prematurely, change
the inputs before a protocol run.
The adversary may act alone or several parties may collude. We assume that the
size of a coalition is smaller than a threshold t, where t is a parameter. And we shall
also assume N  2t+ 1 (honest majority) for our proposed schemes.
3.1.3 Design Goals
Security Goals. The main security goal is to thwart user proling attack. Since
the users may have dierent privacy requirements and it takes dierent amount of
eorts in protocol run to achieve them, we hereby dene three levels of privacy where
a higher level leaks less information to the adversaries. Note that, by default, all
of the following include letting P1 and the best match Pi learn the intersection set
between them at the end of a protocol run.
Denition 3.1.2 (Privacy level 1 (PL-1)). When the protocol ends, P1 and each
candidate Pi; 2  i  N mutually learn the intersection set between them: I1;i =
S1 \ Si. An adversary A (whose capability is dened in Sec. II-B) should learn
nothing beyond what can be derived from the above outputs and its private inputs.
If we assume the adversary has unbounded computing power, PL-1 actually corre-
sponds to unconditional security for all the parties under the HBC model. Obviously,
in PL-1, P1 can obtain all candidates' intersection sets just in one protocol run, thus
it reveals too much user information to the attacker, if he assumes the role of P1.
Therefore we dene privacy level 2 in the following.
74
Denition 3.1.3 (Privacy level 2 (PL-2)). When the protocol ends, P1 and each
candidate Pi; 2  i  N mutually learn the size of their intersection set: m1;i =
jS1 \ Sij. In addition, the best match Pi is allowed to know m1;i values of other Pis.
The adversary A should learn nothing beyond what can be derived from the above
outputs and its private inputs.
In PL-2, except whenm1;i = jS1j or jSij, P1 and each Pi both will not learn exactly
which attributes are in I1;i. The additional information for Pi is intended for it to
learn whether itself is the best match under active attacks. In PL-2, the adversary
needs to run the protocol multiple times to obtain the same amount of information
with what he can obtain under PL-1 when he assumes the role of P1. However, PL-2
still allows A to guess which attributes are in the matching set with non-negligible
probability, especially when the attribute sets are small.
Denition 3.1.4 (Privacy level 3 (PL-3)). When the protocol ends, P1 and each Pi
should only learn the ranks of each value m1;i; 2  i  N . A should learn nothing
more than what can be derived from the outputs and its private inputs.
In PL-3, we can require that P1 only contacts the best match Pi, such that it
only obtains the intersection set I1;i with the best match1. In this way, A will need
at least N   1 protocol runs to know all other user's exact information, such that A's
proling capability is much limited.
Usability and Eciency. For prole matching in MSN, it is desirable to involve
as few human interactions as possible. In this chapter, a human user only needs to
explicitly participate in the end of the protocol run, e.g., decide whether to connect
when he/she is the best match. In addition, the system design should be lightweight
and practical, i.e., being enough ecient in computation and communication to be
used in MSN. Finally, dierent users (especially the candidates) shall have the option
to exibly personalize their privacy levels.
1If there is a tie, then the party with lowest ID is chosen as the best match.
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Relations to Existing Problems. In PL-1, each sub-protocol (between P1
and Pi) relates to the two-party private set intersection (PSI) problem [46, 64, 176],
while the PL-2 relates to two-party private cardinality of set intersection (PCSI)
[64,89,176]. For PL-3, the closest problem is the privacy-preserving nearest neighbor
search [146, 152], but a key dierence is that our nearest neighbor is a party that
consists of a set of attributes, rather than a record in a database. Also, our distance
metric is based on set intersection, not dot products.
Unlike most of the existing problems in PSI and PCSI that allow only one party
to know the result, we require the output of sub-protocol between P1 and each Pi be
secret-shared between them, so that the result can be revealed to both party at once
to prevent cheating. This turns out to be an essential idea to minimize user proling
under malicious behavior.
In addition, we dene our security under the threshold cryptography model. With
such slightly weakened security, we are able to explore more ecient solutions. Finally,
we would like to point out that the dened private prole-matching problems are all
under the distributed setting, where there is no client-server relationship nor any
central party. Such framework is applicable to many scenarios beyond the motivation
problems in this chapter.
3.2 Related Work
The related works are mainly in the area of private set intersection (PSI) or private
matching. Early works such as [125] used hash function to compare the hashed sets
of two parties. The E-SmallTalker scheme [173] used bloom lter to represent a set.
However, those methods suer from the dictionary attack. Current techniques can
be categorized into three main approaches, and we will discuss their applicability to
MSN.
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3.2.1 Protocols based on Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation.
This approach can be dated back to the FNP scheme proposed by Freedman et.
al [64], where a client and a server compute the intersection of their sets such that the
client gets the result while server learns nothing. Homomorphic encryption is used to
evaluate a polynomial that represents client's input obliviously. Later, Kissner and
Song proposed a scheme (KS) [89] that enables set intersection, union, cardinality
and over-threshold operations, and extends to multiple players. Sang et. al. [148]
proposed an improvement to the KS scheme, and their complexity is O(tNn), where
t is the number of colluders. Recent works [48,170] focused on reducing the complexity
in the malicious adversary model. Ye et. al. [176] extended the FNP scheme to a
distributed private matching scheme. However, since all these schemes heavily rely on
homomorphic encryption and none of them essentially achieves linear computational
complexity in terms of encryption operations w.r.t. set size, they are impractical to
be used in MSN.
Another line of works pursue information theoretical security and is based on secret
sharing. In [110], Li and Wu (LW) proposed an unconditionally secure multi-party
set intersection scheme. Their idea is similar to the KS scheme, however the inputs
(coecients) are shared among all parties using (t; N)-threshold secret sharing, and
computations are done on those shares to obtain the shares of the outputs. Later,
Narayanan et. al. [132] improved the LW scheme using the oblivious polynomial
evaluation (OPE) idea of FNP, and also proposed anN -party private cardinality of set
intersection (PCSI) scheme. In [151] Shaneck and Kim proposed using secret sharing
to compute dot product securely, but they assume the existence of trusted third
parties. Those schemes have low computation complexities, but high communication
costs.
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3.2.2 Protocols based on Oblivious Pseudo Random Func-
tions.
This approach is due to Hazay and Lindell [75]. The idea is that two parties securely
compute a pseudo random function where one of them holds the key while the other
provides the input (set elements). They achieved linear complexity w.r.t. set size,
but the number of exponentiations is large. To improve the eciency, Jarecki and
Liu [81] proposed to securely compute function g
1
x+k , where x is the set element and
k is the random key. The complexity of their scheme is smaller than FNP's when the
set size is suciently large.
Recently in [46], Cristofaro and Tsudik proposed a construction of PSI based on
blind RSA signatures. The server computes (H(xj))
d for the client obliviously, where
xj 2 SC and d is server's one-time RSA signing key. Their scheme is more ecient
than previous ones; however, it cannot be used to achieve PCSI. In addition, in [14]
Ateniese et.al proposed an ecient scheme that hides the size of the input sets.
3.2.3 Protocols based on commutative encryption.
In [7], Agrawal et. al. proposed using commutative encryption to realize PSI and PC-
SI in information sharing between two databases. A commutative encryption scheme
Ek() has the commutative property: Ek1(Ek2(x)) = Ek2(Ek1(x)). The main idea is
to use the commutative encryption as a keyed one-way hash function to generate a
mapping for each element x, such that no party knows the key. Later, Vaidya and
Clifton [160] extended their scheme to N -party setting. Arb et. al. [167] applied the
same idea to detect friend-of-friend in MSN. However, known commutative encryption
primitives are all deterministic, i.e., they provide weaker security guarantees.
Remarks. Protocols in the last two categories all achieve linear complexity; how-
ever, a common drawback is that they are asymmetric, i.e., the result is only known
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or rst known by one party (say, Alice). This is undesirable in MSN prole matching,
because the other party (Bob) would also like to obtain the result for usability. To
this end, Alice can send the result back to Bob but this requires Alice to be trusted.
Otherwise, Alice can cheat [111]. Therefore, it is desirable to design a symmetric pro-
tocol such that the result is shared between both parties, and the result is revealed
to both of them at once to provide veriability2.
3.2.4 Other protocols
In [59], Emekci et.al. proposed a privacy-preserving intersection/equijoin protocol
between two databases using third parties in a P2P network. They utilize secret
sharing, however the security of their scheme is weakened since the polynomial used
is not random. Chow et. al. [43] addressed the problem of privacy-preserving queries
over distributed databases, and proposed a two-party computation model. Their
problem setting is quite dierent from us, in particular there are two trusted parties.
3.3 Notations and Technical Preliminaries
Notations. We give the main notations in Table 3.1. Note that, unless specied, we
denote [s]i as Pi's (t; 2t+1)-share of secret s under SS scheme, and when we mention
Pi, we refer to 2  i  N .
Preliminaries. Shamir secret sharing scheme (SS). A (t; w)-SS scheme [150]
shares secret s among w parties by giving each party Pi the value [s]
t;w
i , and if any at
most t parties collude they cannot gain any information about s.
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) based on SS. For addition, SS is
homomorphic: let  and  be two secrets shared using (t; w)-SS, we have [+]t;wi =
[]t;wi +[]
t;w
i [26]. However, for secure multiplication, one round of communication is
2We achieve this by committing the shares in advance.
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N , t Number of parties, maximum number of colluders
[s]t;wi Party Pi's secret share of s ((t; w)-share)
S1, Si P1's query attribute set, and Pi's prole attribute set
xj ; 1  j  n P1's query set elements, n = jS1j
yij ; 1  j  m Pi's prole set elements, m = jSij; i 2 f2;    ; Ng
I1;i Intersection set between P1 and Pi; m1;i = jI1;ij
Fp The nite eld used;  = logp: security parameter
H() A cryptographic hash function
R  , jj Random sampling from a set, concatenation
P, P1, Pi The set of all parties, the initiator and the ith party
Pi, P 0i The computing set and reconstruction set for Pi
Table 3.1: Main notations
needed and it is required that w  2t+ 1 [24]. Gennaro et. al. proposed an ecient
secure multiplication protocol [65]. Let the inputs of party Pi be []
t;w
i and []
t;w
i :
Round 1. Each party Pi shares the value []
t;w
i []
t;w
i by choosing a t-degree random
polynomial hi(x), s. t. hi(0) = []
t;w
i []
t;w
i . He sends the value hi(j) to party Pj,
1  j  w.
Round 2: Every party Pj computes his share of , i.e., the value H(j) = []
t;w
j
under a t-degree random polynomial H, by locally computing the linear combination
H(j) =
Pw
i=1 ihi(j), where 1; :::; w are known constants.
In this protocol, round 1 incurs O(w2) communication cost in total, and O(w)
for each party.
Additive homomorphic encryption. An additive homomorphic encryption
scheme E allows one to compute E(m1 + m2) given E(m1) and E(m2), without
knowing the underlying plain texts. This is only used in our protocol for PL-2.
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3.4 Design of FindU
3.4.1 Overview
We present two protocols that aim at realizing one level of privacy requirement each.
We start with the basic scheme realizing PL-1. We base our idea on the FNP scheme
[64], but use secret sharing to compute polynomial evaluation securely. At a high
level, for P1 and each Pi (2  i  N), their inputs are shared among a subset
Pi of 2t + 1 parties (the computing set) using (t; 2t + 1)-SS, based on which they
cooperatively compute shares of the function Fi(xj) = Rij  fi(xj) + xj for each
1  j  n, where fi(y) is the polynomial representing Pi's set, and Rij is a random
number jointly generated by P1 and Pi but not known to any party. We have xj 2 I1;i
i. Fi(xj) = xj. The values of fFi(xj)g1jn remain in secret-shared forms between
P1 and Pi before their shares are revealed to each other, to provide veriability. To
reduce the communication complexity, we propose an enhancement to the secure
polynomial evaluation computation.
For PL-2, the advanced scheme achieves ecient PCSI. The main idea is that, the
parties in Pi rst compute the (t; 2t+ 1)-shares of the function Fi(xj) = Rij  fi(xj),
1  j  n securely using the basic scheme, whereas xj 2 I1;i i. Rij  fi(xj) = 0. In
order to blind from P1 the correspondence between its inputs fxjg (j 2 f1;    ; ng)
and the outputs Fi(xj0) (j
0 2 f1;    ; ng), we employ a blind-and-permute (BP)
method. To reduce the number of invocations of the BP protocol, we use share
conversion to convert the (t; t + 1)-shares of fFi(xj)g1jn (held by parties in the
reconstruction set P 0i) into (2; 2)-shares shared between P1 and Pi, so that only one
BP invocation is needed between P1 and each Pi. The security of both the basic and
advanced schemes are proved.
Finally, we also discuss possible solutions to achieve PL-3, and leave practical
solutions that achieve PL-3 as future work.
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P1's private inputs: S1 = fx1; :::; xng, I1;i  ;; Pi's private inputs: Si = fyi1; :::; yimg, I01;i  ;. Public inputs: t,
Pi;P 0i; 2  i  N .
1. Data share distribution:
1. P1 generates frijg2iN;1jn randomly from Fp. And for each 2  i  N , it shares frijg1jn among parties
in Pi using (t; 2t+ 1)-SS. Also, P1 shares fxj ; x2j ; :::; xmj g1jn among all N parties in P, using (t;N)-SS.
2. Each Pi 2 P generates fr0ijg1jn randomly from Fp, lets fi(y) =
Qm
k=1(y   yik) =
Pm
k=0 aiky
k, and shares
fr0ijg1jn, faikg0km 1 among parties in Pi using (t; 2t+ 1)-SS.
2. Computation: Each party Pl 2 P executes the following:
1. For each i that Pi 3 Pl and for each j; 1  j  n, Pl locally computes zijl = [ai1]l[xj ]l + :::+ [ai;m 1]l[xm 1j ]l.
2. Pl generates new t-degree random polynomials fhijl(y)g8i;Pi3Pl;1jn such that hijl(0) = zijl, and for each i
that Pi 3 Pl, it shares fzijlg1jn among parties in Pi using (t; 2t+ 1)-SS.
3. Pl receives f[zijk]lg8i;PifPl;Pkg;1jn, and for each i that Pi 3 Pl and 1  j  n, locally computes its (t; 2t+1)-
share of fi(xj) as: [fi(xj)]l = [ai0]l +
P
Pk2Pi ik[zijk]l + [x
m
j ]l = Hij(l), where Hij(y) is a random t-degree
polynomial (unknown to Pl) and i1; :::; i;2t+1 are publicly known numbers pertinent to each Pi.
4. Pl computes [Rij ]l = [rijr
0
ij ]l and [Fi(xj)]l = [Rijfi(xj) + xj ]l, 8i that Pi 3 Pl and 1  j  n, through two
invocations (rounds) of the SS-multiplication protocol.
3. Reconstruction:
1. Commit shares: each Pl 2 P computes ci = H([Fi(x1)]ljj[Fi(x2)]ljj    jj[Fi(xn)]l), for each i that P 0i 3 Pl, and
sends them to both P1 and Pi.
2. Aggregate shares: each Pl 2 P sends its shares f[Fi(xj)]lg8i;P0i3Pl;1jn to P1 and Pi, who verify their authen-
ticity. If any of them fails, an abort signal is broadcasted.
3. Reconstruction: if no abort signal is received, P1 computes Fi(xj) =
P
Pl2P0i il[Fi(xj)]l for each i that P
0
i 3 P1,
1  j  n, where filgPl2P0i are Lagrangian coecients of P
0
i. If Fi(xj) 2 S1, I1;i  I1;i
S
Fi(xj). The similar
is done for Pi.
4. Matching:
Pi sends a request to the best match Pi based on the intersection sets obtained; if Pi accepts, a \connection" is
established.
Figure 3.2: The basic scheme, which is carried out between the initiator P1 and each
candidate Pi.
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3.4.2 The Basic Scheme
In the basic scheme, P1 and each Pi (2  i  N) obtain the intersection set between
them. The protocol consists of four phases, and is described in Fig. 3.2. The following
two denitions capture the idea to involve the minimum number of parties during
computation.
Denition 3.4.1 (Computing set of Pi). A set of 2t+1 parties Pi  P, who help P1
and Pi to compute the shares of Fi(xj), 1  j  n. Pi includes P1 and Pi, and the
rest 2t  1 parties are chosen as Pi+1; Pi+2;    with indices wrapping around.
Denition 3.4.2 (Reconstruction set of Pi). A set of t+1 parties P 0i  Pi, who will
contribute the shares of Fi(xj), 1  j  n to P1 and Pi for reconstruction, P 0i also
includes P1 and Pi, and the rest t   1 parties are chosen in the same way as in the
computing set.
At rst, each party has a set of attributes: P1 has S1 = fx1; x2; :::; xng and Pi
has Si = fyi1; yi2; :::; yimg, respectively, where each element is an encoded attribute in
Fp. For example, a hash algorithm can be used for encoding. Rather than publishing
the sets as they are, each Pi rst generates an m-degree polynomial based on Si as
follows:
fi(y) = (y   yi1)  (y   yi2)    (y   yim) =
mX
k=0
aiky
k; (3.1)
where faikg0km 1 are coecients. Obviously, for each of P1's attribute xj,
fi(xj) = 0 i. xj 2 Si. In order to let Pi also know the result, we shall compute
function Fi(xj) = Rij  fi(xj) + xj for each 1  j  n, where Rij = rijr0ij, rij and r0ij
are random numbers generated by P1 and Pi, respectively. In this way, if Fi(xj) 2 Si,
xj 2 I1;i with high probability, and if Fi(xj) =2 S1 then xj =2 I1;i. The same applies
for P1. P1 and each Pi compute the above function securely by secret-sharing their
inputs among Pi's computing set.
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Data share distribution. To begin with, P1 generates the 1 to m powers of
each of its set elements: fx1j ; :::; xmj g1jn, and shares them among all N parties
using (t; N)-SS, by giving each Pl 2 P the values f[xj]t;Nl ; [x2j ]t;Nl ; :::; [xmj ]t;Nl g1jn.
Also, Pi shares faikg0km 1 among parties in Pi using (t; 2t+ 1)-SS, by giving each
Pl 2 Pi the values f[aik]lg0km 1. Note that, we require aim  1 so that Pi cannot
give an all-zero polynomial.
In addition, P1 generates n(N  1) random numbers rij; 2  i  N; 1  j  n and
gives f[rij]lg1jn to each Pl 2 Pi, while Pi generates n random numbers r0ij; 1  j  n
and gives f[r0ij]lg1jn to each Pl 2 Pi. The parties in the computing set will compute
shares of Rij = rijr
0
ij to blind the fi(xj) values, so that neither P1 nor Pi can gain
any information about each other's set elements not belonging to their intersection
set.
Finally, each party Pl 2 P possess the following: f[xj]l; [x2j ]l; :::; [xmj ]lg1jn,
f[aik]lg8i;Pi3Pl;0km 1, f[rij]lg8i;Pi3Pl;1jn, and f[r0ij]lg8i;Pi3Pl;1jn.
Computation phase. In this phase, the parties in each Pi participate in secure
computation of the shares of fFi(xj)g1jn. In particular, to evaluate fi(xj) oblivious-
ly, a straightforward way is to compute m  1 multiplications of aikxkj ; 1  k  m  1
by invoking the SS-multiplication protocol m  1 times. However, this will introduce
too much communication cost.
Therefore, we propose to aggregate those multiplications into one round. The
idea is to let each party Pl 2 Pi rst locally compute zijl =
Pm 1
k=1 [aik]l[x
k
j ]l. Since zijl
can be viewed as the (2t; 2t+ 1)-share of Zij =
Pm 1
k=1 aikx
k
j under a new polynomial
which is not random, we need to re-randomize zijl. Also, to do further multiplications,
we need to reduce the polynomial's degree to t. Using the same idea from [65], Pl
generates a t-degree random polynomial hl(y), and re-shares zijl among other parties
in Pi under hl(y) using (t; 2t+ 1)-SS. Each party Pl upon receiving others' shares of
their zijk (Pk & Pl 2 Pi) can linearly reconstruct its (t; 2t + 1)-share of Zij. Since
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Fi(xj) = rijr
0
ij(Zij + ai0 + x
m
j ) + xj, Pl's share of Fi(xj) can then be easily computed
by invoking two more SS-multiplications.
Lemma 3.4.3. The computation phase correctly computes the (t; 2t + 1)-shares of
Fi(xj) at each Pl 2 Pi.
Proof. Idea. Similar to the correctness of secure multiplication in [65]. It is sucient
to show that Zij can be expressed as a linear combination of zijl = [aik]l[x
k
j ]l; Pl 2 Pi,
and that Hij(y) =
PN
l=1 lhl(y) is a t-degree polynomial with Hij(0) = Zij.
Consider a specic party Pl. The following applies for all i such that Pi 3
Pl. Let the underlying t-degree polynomials of secrets faikg0km 1; fxkjg1jn be
gik(y); g
0
jk(y), 0  k  m   1; 1  j  n. Then, dene a 2t degree polyno-
mial Gij(y) =
Pm 1
k=1 gik(y)g
0
jk(y), we have zijl = Gij(l) since gik(l) = [aik]l and
g0jk(l) = [x
k
j ]l. Also, Zij = Gij(0). Thus we have the following linear equations:
(denote the subscripts of parties in Pi as k1, k2,..., k2t+1)
M 
h
Zij 1 2    2t
iT
= (3.2)h
zijk1 zijk2 zijk3    zijk2t+1
iT
;
where Zij; 1;    ; 2t are the coecients of Gij(y), and M is a Vandermone matrix.
Since M is invertible, Zij can be expressed as: Zij =
P2t+1
l=1 ilzijl, (jPij = 2t + 1),
where il are elements of rst row of M
 1.
After each Pl Shamir-shares zijl using a new t-degree polynomial hijl(y), Pl receives
[zijk]l from each i that Pi 3 Pk. Dene polynomial Hij(y) =
P2t+1
l=1 ilhijl(y)+gi0(y)+
g0jm(y), then Hij(y) is of degree t and Hij(0) = Zij + ai0 + x
m
j = fi(xj). Since Pl
computes
P2t+1
k=1 ik[zijk]l + [ai0]l + [x
m
j ]l in step 2.3, it obtains Hij(l) which is the its
share of fi(xj). Finally, by running the multiplication protocol twice, Pl computes its
share of rijr
0
ijfi(xj) + xj.
Reconstruction phase. In this phase, at least t+ 1 shares of Fi(xj) are needed
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to reconstruct Fi(xj). To this end, for each 2  i  N , the parties in reconstruction
set P 0i commit their shares to P1 and Pi so that they cannot change them later. Next,
they reveal their shares to P1 and Pi only, who can verify the correctness of them, and
obtain Fi(xj) by polynomial interpolation. P1 and Pi can test if Fi(xj) = xj; 1  j  n
and Fi(xj) = yj; 1  j  m respectively, to determine their intersection set I1;i. In
the matching phase, we do not restrict P1 to send connection requests to the best
match, since it already knows the intersection sets with each candidate.
3.4.3 The advanced scheme
The goal of the advanced scheme is to compute cardinality of set intersection privately
(PL-2). Observe that, in the basic scheme if we set Fi(xj) = rijr
0
ijfi(xj), then the
result will be 0 if xj 2 I1;i, otherwise a random number. In order to obtain the
number of matching attributes (m1;i), one way is to employ the equality-test protocol
[135] based on SS, which tests whether each shared secret output equals to 0 or
not, and if yes, the result is 1; otherwise it is 0, which is still shared among the
parties. Then P1 and each Pi can locally add together their results to get their
shares of m1;i. When P1 collects enough shares to reconstruct m1;i, the results are
still veriable. However, the equality-test protocol incurs too high communication
cost. Considering that in modern smart mobile devices, the wireless transmission
is more costly than computation ability, we would like to tradeo computation for
communication complexity.
Thus, we adopt a blind-and-permute (BP) method to obliviously permute P1's
shares of each Fi(xj), so that the linkage between Fi(xj) and its corresponding at-
tribute xj is broken. A BP protocol between two parties A and B where each data
item (e.g., Fi(xj)) is additively split between them is described in [146]. The main
idea is, A encrypts each of its shares using additive homomorphic encryption and
sends to B. B then generates a dierent random number rj for each shared item,
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Inputs: basically the same as those in Fig. 3.2. In addition, P1 sets m1;i = 0, and has a public key pk1 and private key
sk1, and pk1 is known by all others. Pi sets m
0
1;i = 0.
1. Data share distribution: the same as in Fig. 3.2.
2. Computation: Basically the same as in Fig. 3.2, except each Pl 2 P computes [Fi(xj)]l = [Rijfi(xj)]l, 8i;Pi 3 Pl,
1  j  n. For each Pl 2 P 0i  Pi, its shares are also denoted as [Fi(xj)]t;t+1l .
3. Reconstruction:
1. Share conversion: (executed by each Pl 2 P:)
(a) For each i that P 0i 3 Pl, Pl generates a new 1-degree random polynomial gijl(y) for each 1  j  n, and
re-shares each [Fi(xj)]
t;t+1
l with P1 and Pi, by giving them gijl(1) and gijl(i) (called secondary share),
respectively, such that gijl(0) = [Fi(xj)]
t;t+1
l . Note, P1 and Pi send their secondary shares to each other.
(b) Pl; l  2 computes [Fl(xj)]2;2l =
P
Pk2P0i ikgijk(l) for each 1  j  n, where ik is the Lagrangian
coecient as dened in Fig. 3.2. Similarly, P1 computes [Fl(xj)]
2;2
1 for each 2  l  N and 1  j  n.
2. Blind and permute P1's shares: P1 and each Pi 2 P; 2  i  N involve in one BP-protocol where Pi generates
permutation  and frjg1jn.
3. Commit shares: P1 computes fci = H([Fi(x10 )]2;21 jj    jj[Fi(xn0 )]2;21 )g2iN and broadcasts to all parties; Also,
each Pi; 2  i  N computes c0i = H([Fi(x10 )]2;2i jj    jj[Fi(xn0 )]2;2i ) and broadcasts it.
4. Reconstruction: P1 and each Pi; 2  i  N exchange their shares of fFi(xj0 )gj02f1; ;ng and verify them against
c0i and ci, respectively. If no verication fails, they compute Fi(xj0 ) = 1[Fi(xj0 )]
2;2
1 + i[Fi(xj0 )]
2;2
i for each j
0.
Then P1 count the number of Fi(xj0 ) = 0, and set this number to m1;i. The similar is done for each Pi.
4. Matching:
1. P1 locally ranks the numbers fm1;ig2iN and nds the best match Pi. Then P1 sends to Pi a connection
request with the following proofs: f[Fi(xj0 )]2;2i g2iN;1j0n; f[Fi(xj0 )]2;21 g2iN;1j0n.
2. Pi upon receiving the request, repeats the computations P1 did in step 3.4, veries the proof and tests whether
itself has the largest m1;i value. If not, then do nothing.
3. Otherwise, Pi and Pi will mutually nd out their intersection set I1;i by running one sub-protocol of basic
scheme between them, and Pi decides whether to connect with P1.
Figure 3.3: The advanced scheme.
and randomizes each of A's shares by adding rj, while subtracting rj for its own
corresponding shares. B randomly permutes the randomized shares, and sends back
to A. All the computations are done over the ciphertexts.
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However, the BP protocol cannot be applied directly. In our protocol, each Fi(xj)
is polynomially shared among t + 1 parties in P 0i, where at most t of them may be
adversarial. If Pi were the party that generates the random permutation (), in order
to randomly permute all the rest parties' shares, there would be at least t invoca-
tions of the BP protocol between Pi and parties in P 0i, which is too computationally
expensive.
Hence, in our scheme we propose an improvement that only requires one invo-
cation of BP protocol between P1 and each Pi; 2  i  N . The main idea is to
convert the (t; t + 1)-shares of each secret Fi(xj) among P 0i into (2; 2)-shares shared
between P1 and Pi. The conversion from (t; t+ 1)-share to (2; t+ 1)-share is a fairly
standard procedure [88]. Each party Pl in P 0i, holding [Fi(xj)]t;t+1l , simply re-shares
[Fi(xj)]
t;t+1
l among all other parties using (2; t + 1)-SS. Then Pl interpolates all the
received secondary shares to obtain [Fi(xj)]
2;t+1
l .
To transform (t; t + 1)-shares into (2; 2)-shares, we use a trick in which all the
parties in P 0i only re-share their (t; t + 1)-shares of Fi(xj) to P1 and Pi, so that only
P1 and Pi together can reconstruct s. Here the BP protocol is performed only once
between them.
Next we explain the matching phase. The goal is to enforce that P1 only gets the
best match's intersection set in the end. That is, if P1 sends requests to multiple users,
only Pi will reply. Thus we employ another verication mechanism so as to let each
Pi test whether itself is the best match. The idea is to let P1 and each Pi; 2  i  N
rst commit their respective shares [Fi(xj)]
2;2
1 and [Fi(xj)]
2;2
i to all other players using
broadcast (see step 3.3 in reconstruction phase). When P1 sends a request to Pi , it
also attaches a proof containing the original shares of P1 and each Pi. In this way,
Pi can verify the correctness of those shares, repeat the computation of P1 to obtain
the true best match. Note that, the m1;l values between P1 and other parties Pl are
revealed to Pi . However, this does not violate our privacy goal (PL-2). The whole
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protocol is described in Fig. 3.3. We will prove it secure in the next section.
3.4.4 Towards Achieving PL-3
We consider a scheme that achieves PL-3. Continuing from the computation phase
in the previous protocol, all the parties could test if each Fi(xj) equals to 0 using the
equality test protocol [135], and then locally sum the shares of the results to obtain
shares of m1;i. After that, the parties perform share conversion as before, so that
m1;i is only shared between P1 and Pi. Next the parties use a secure comparison
protocol [135] to compare the m1;i values and nally derive the party with largest
m1;i, but without knowing others' m1;i values. However, the communication cost is
279L+5 invocations of the secure multiplication protocol for even a single comparison,
where L = p. This even exceeds the total invocations of secure multiplication protocol
in our proposed schemes. Therefore, we leave construction of practical scheme that
achieves PL-3 as future work.
3.4.5 Personalizing Users' Privacy Levels
In our design, a user can choose her privacy level by telling other parties her choice
in the beginning. For example, if a candidate Pi chooses PL-1, she can broadcast
a message indicating \Pi selects PL-1". Then the parties in Pi's computing set and
reconstruction sets will follow the basic scheme to compute the desired results for Pi.
However, the initiator should always agree on the privacy level that each candidate
proposes, since P1 is at a position easier to conduct user proling.
3.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of each scheme rst under the HBC model
(passive adversary), and then discuss their security against a series of active attacks
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that deviate from the protocol run.
3.5.1 Analysis of the Basic Scheme
Security under the HBC Model.
Lemma 3.5.1. In the computation phase, a passive adversary A controlling up to t
parties cannot gain any additional information about each fi(xj) other than what can
be learnt from its own inputs and outputs.
Proof. Idea. It is sucient to show that the t-degree polynomial Hij(y) is random
and unknown to A.
We can see that the t-degree polynomial Hij(y) is random. This is because
hijl(y);8i;Pi 3 Pl are all random, and gi0(y), g0jm(y) are also random. Therefore,
by the properties of Shamir SS, by only knowing Hij(l), Pl 2 ~P  P ; j ~Pj  t, the
adversary cannot gain any information about Hij(0) = fi(xj).
Theorem 3.5.2. The basic scheme is unconditionally secure under a passive adver-
sary controlling up to t parties.
Proof. Idea. By analyzing the view of a passive adversary A controlling up to t
parties, it is not hard to show that: 1) A learns nothing about all parties' private
inputs by observing their shares; 2) A learns nothing about fi(xj) if fi(xj) 6= 0 from
the outputs since rijr
0
ij is unknown to A. Thus, A cannot distinguish dierent inputs
of each party after seeing the protocol transcript, i.e., the probability of successful
guessing is the same as before.
We want to show that, for a passive adversary A controlling up to t parties
Pk1 ; Pk2 ;    ; Pkt in ~P  P ; j ~Pj  t, 1) A learns nothing about all parties' private
inputs by observing their shares; 2) A learns nothing about fi(xj) if fi(xj) 6= 0 from
the outputs since rijr
0
ij is unknown to A.
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The passive adversaryA possesses the following: f[xj]kl ; [x2j ]kl ; :::; [xmj ]klg1jn;1lt,
f[aik]klg1lt;8i;Pi3Pkl ;0km 1, f[rij]klg1lt;8i;Pi3Pkl ;1jn, f[r0ij]klg1lt;8i;Pi3Pkl ;1jn. By
the properties of Shamir SS, frijg1lt;8i;Pi3Pkl ;1jn; fr0ijg1lt;8i;Pi3Pkl ;1jn,
and faikg1lt;8i;Pi3Pkl ;0km 1 are all unconditionally secure against A. In addition,
by knowing at most t shares of fxj; x2j ;    ; xmj g1jn, using Claim 3 in [132], A also
learns nothing about each xj.
Now A can only guess the values of each rij; r0ij, aik and fxjg1jn up to the
computation phase. Suppose that A knows some fi(xj) values, then if P1 2 ~P , A will
be able to derive fi(y) and thus Pi's inputs for some Pi =2 ~P ; or if P1 =2 ~P , A will be
able to obtain P1's inputs fxjg1jn by solving non-linear equations.
However, using Lemma 2, A gains nothing about fi(xj) from the computation
phase. In addition, by knowing the nal results Fi(xj) = Rijfi(xj) + xj, A also
cannot obtain anything about fi(xj) (if fi(xj) 6= 0) since each fi(xj) is blinded by a
dierent random Rij not known to A. Thus, after reconstruction, except those xjs
which make fi(xj) = 0; Pi 2 ~P , if P1 =2 ~P , A will know nothing about the rest of P1's
private inputs xjs.
On the other hand, if P1 2 ~P , we show that for all Pl =2 ~P , A also gains nothing
about Pl's private inputs ylk; 1  k  m. Note that, A can try to obtain something
by bruteforcing the coecients of Pl's polynomial fl(y) representing its attribute set.
Assume A correctly guesses ~a0 = a0 (omit the subscript l). The rest coecients
a1;    ; am 1 remain unknown. Then he denes f 0l (y) = ym + a0, and evaluates f 0l (y)
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at every attributes yj in a dictionary D to construct a system of jDj linear equations:
f 0l (y1) = a0 + y
m
1 = fl(y1) 
m 1X
k=1
aky
m 1
1 ;
f 0l (y2) = a0 + y
m
2 = fl(y2) 
m 1X
k=1
aky
m 1
2 ;
...
...
f 0l (yjDj) = a0 + y
m
jDj = fl(yjDj) 
m 1X
k=1
aky
m 1
jDj ;
Since D  Sl, in somem = jSlj of the above equations yj is a root such that fl(yj) = 0.
The rest of the fl(yj)s are unknown, since we use rljr
0
lj to blind fl(yj), and from Fl(yj)
A cannot derive fl(yj) since A does not simultaneously control P1 and Pl.
Thus, there are jDj equations but only jDj   1 unknowns, and ~a1;    ; ~am 1 can
be solved. Now A obtains ~fl(yj), and can try to factorize ~fl(yj) into a product of m
linear factors in polynomial time [45]. However, since there are
 jDj
m

such polynomials
by denition, A can only randomly guess which is the one generated by Pl, yet this
gives no advantage over random guessing without knowing the protocol transcript.
Therefore, we can conclude that A obtains nothing beyond what it can get from
the inputs and outputs.
Remark on security parameters. Due to unconditional security, the eld size should
be large enough to represent all the attributes in the dictionary, and more than that
is not necessary. Therefore, if there are 1 106 attributes,  = 24 should be enough.
The hash function does not aect the security under HBC, because the committed
shares will be nally known only by parties receiving them. For the hash function,
160 bits should be enough.
Security under Active Attacks. The goal of the active attacks are all geared
towards user proling, and we do not consider attacks that aim at disrupting the
protocol. The following attacks include those conducted by single party P1 or any
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Pi; 2  i  N , or up to t parties' coalitions. Note, when we mention Pi, we mean it
is not in the same coalition with P1. Otherwise, proling does not make sense.
a) P1 can use a large attribute set from the dictionary as input, so as to nd out as
many attributes in Pi's set as possible. Note this attack can be prevented by limiting
the size of all parties' input sets. For example, we can set this limit to 200.
b) All zero polynomial attack [64]. If the coecients of Pi's polynomial is all
zero, after reconstruction Pi gets every xj; 1  j  n of P1. In our basic scheme, we
mandatorily set am to 1 that prevents this attack, the same approach as in [110].
c) A candidate Pi within a t-party coalition A  Pi can try to inate its intersec-
tion set I1;i in the reconstruction phase. Especially, if there is no \commit shares"
step, before Pi reveals its shares, as long as some Pk 2 Pi, Pk =2 A sends [Fi(xj)]k to
Pi, Pi can reconstruct Fi(xj) and the underlying t-degree polynomial. Thus Pi may
use a dierent attribute x0j that he guesses to be in P1's set, and modify [Fi(xj)]i such
that Fi(xj) = x
0
j to inate I1;i.
The basic scheme prevents such kind of attack, by letting each party commit to its
shares before any reconstruction happens (step 3.1). Due to the hiding and binding
properties of hash commitments, parties in A can neither know the shares of honest
parties in advance, nor change their own shares after others reveal theirs, except with
negligible probability.
Note that, we do not consider the adversary giving wrong shares before the re-
construction phase, because it cannot predict how the output will be and can only
change it randomly which brings no gain.
3.5.2 Analysis of the Advanced Scheme
We assume computationally bounded adversaries here.
Security under the HBC Model.
Theorem 3.5.3. Assuming the random permutation is truly random and the hash
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function is pre-image resistant, the advanced scheme satises the security properties
of PL-2.
Proof. Idea. It is sucient to show that, unless m1;i = n, P1 cannot distinguish
from two sets of dierent permutated and randomized shares, while Pi learns nothing
about which of its attributes are in I1;i unless m1;i = m. Also, Pi cannot learn other
parties' shares of m1;i as long as it is infeasible to nd pre-image of the hash values.
Under the HBC model, since the data share distribution and computation phases
remain the same with the basic scheme, Lemma 2 still applies. Now that each party
obtains the intersection set's cardinality, we will show that, unless m1;i = n, P1
cannot distinguish from two sets of dierent permutated and randomized shares,
while Pi; 2  i  N always learns nothing about which of its attributes are in I1;i
unless m1;i = m.
First, after the share conversion step only P1 and Pi learns the necessary shares
to reconstruct Fi(xj). Second, after blind-and-permute, P1 only obtains permuted
versions of its shares f[Fi(xj0)]2;21 + irj0=1g1j0n, where rj0 is a dierent random
number chosen by Pi for each j
0. Thus, assuming the random permutation generated
by Pi is truly random, for P1 all the permutations  : f1;   ng ! f1;   ng are
possible with equal probability.
Also, for Pi, by receiving P1's encryption of its shares, it is infeasible for A to
obtain information about the plaintexts (shares) by the semantic security of the ho-
momorphic encryption scheme. In fact, even if it were to know P1's randomized shares
at this point, it does not gain any additional information under HBC model, since
after all Pi will obtain P1's shares and reconstruct the Fi(xj0) values. On the other
hand, by inspecting Fi(xj0), Pi learns nothing about the actual intersection set unless
m1;i = m, since all it obtains is a series of 0s or random numbers.
Third, after reconstruction, P1 and Pi both obtain the Fi(xj0) values. Since neither
P1 nor Pi (nor a coalition of t parties) knows rij0r
0
ij0 , the fi(xj0) values are blinded
94
from them for fi(xj0) 6= 0. Therefore, P1 and Pi will only be able to guess randomly
about the real intersection set unless m1;i = n or m1;i = m. Also, from the results
they cannot derive any additional information about each party's private input sets.
Finally, it is easy to see that Pi cannot learn any other party, say, Pl's shares of
m1;l in step 3.3, as long as it is infeasible to nd pre-image of the hash values.
In conclusion, both P1 and Pi cannot obtain more information than what can be
derived from their inputs and outputs, under a computationally bounded adversary,
assuming that the random permutation is truly random and the hash commitment is
pre-image resistant.
Remark. The advanced scheme does not achieve unconditional security because of
broadcasting the hash commitments in step 3.3 leaks information about other parties'
shares to Pi. However, we note that this is the only way the attacker can learn about
other parties' m1;i. Thus, apart from this, the rest of the protocol is still secure
unconditionally, i.e., we can still use a small p, e.g., 24 bits.
Security under Active Attacks. a) We still consider Pi in a t-party coalition
trying to inate the intersection set size in the reconstruction phase. During share
conversion, every honest party Pk (not in A) will send gijk(1) to party P1. Since A
does not contain P1, it can only collect at most t pairs of gijl(1) and gijl(i) (Pl 2 A).
Lacking at least one secondary share, Pi cannot recover Fi(xj) until P1 reveals its
own (2; 2)-shares [Fi(xj)]
2;2
1 to Pi in step 3.4.
In addition, during the BP protocol (step 3.2), P1's shares are encrypted. By
the semantic security of the homomorphic encryption, the shares of P1 are hidden
from Pi. Moreover, after BP and before actual reconstruction, P1 and Pi's shares are
committed rst (step 3.3). Due to the one-wayness of hash commitments, Pi cannot
learn [Fi(xj)]
2;2
1 before all parties nish sending their commitments. Thus, Pi cannot
change the outputs (m1;i) in its favorable way in phase 3.
b) If a coalition of t parties that includes P1 wants to inate m1;i for some Pi,
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from a similar analysis as above, this attack will not succeed.
c) In the matching phase, P1 may trick some party Pi to believe it is the best
match and then obtain its intersection set. But each Pi will be able to detect whether
itself is the best match by verifying the authenticity of shares and compute all m1;i
values by itself. If not, it will not let P1 learn I1;i.
d) Input manipulation. In the advanced scheme, if P1 inputs a few attributes (e.g.,
only one), it can know exactly which parties have those attributes whenever S1  Si.
In order to thwart this attack, we can set a lower limit to the number of attributes
in the query.
3.5.3 Security of personalized privacy levels
The adversary may try to deviate from executing the corresponding protocol chosen
by a specic user. Suppose a user Pi chooses PL-2, A will try to execute the basic
scheme instead, and thenA can learn the intersection set between P1 and Pi. However,
A will not succeed. This is because it can only control t parties at most; as long as
there is one honest party following Pi's own choice of protocol, A cannot obtain its
desired results. In this way, each user Pi's own privacy level is still enforced.
3.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we rst give a detailed complexity analysis for our proposed schemes,
including the decomposed and overall computation and communication costs. Then
we carry out an extensive simulation study of the protocols' performance. Final-
ly, we compare them with several state-of-the-art schemes in terms of security and
performance.
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Party Basic scheme FC10 (PSI) [46] Advanced scheme FNP (PCSI) [64]
Computation
P1 6nNt +mnN(1 + tlogN=) mul1 1:5nN mul2 3nN exp3 (2n +mN) exp3
Pi 2mnt + 2(m + 6nt)t
2logN= mul1 (m + n) exp2 n exp3 mlog(logn) exp3
Comm. (TX)
P1 (mnN + 8nNt) 2nNq (mnN + 8nNt) + 2nNq 2nq
Pi 2t(m + 6nt) (n +m)q 2t(m + 6nt) + 2nq 2mq
Comm. (RX)
P1 [N(m + n) + 8nNt] (n +m)Nq N [m + (t + 3N)n] + 2nNq 2mNq
Pi [m(n + 2t) + 12nt
2] 2nq [m(n + 2t) + 12nt2] + 2nq 2nq
Comm. total All [mnN + tN(8n + 2m + 12nt)] N(3n +m)q [mnN + tN(8n + 2m + 12nt)] + 4nNq 2(n +mN)q
Table 3.2: Comparison of complexity (q = 1024,  = 24)
3.6.1 Complexity Analysis
The computational cost is evaluated using the number of modular multiplication and
exponentiation operations, while the communication cost is calculated in terms of
number of transmitted/received bits. We compare our basic and advanced schemes
with existing schemes, FC10 (PSI) [46] and FNP (PCSI under HBC model) [64],
respectively. Due to space limitations, we only present the results in Table 3.2, where
mul1 stands for -bit multiplication operations, mul2 is 1024-bit multiplication, exp2
is 1024-bit exponentiation, and exp3 is 2048-bit exponentiation. And we set q =
1024;  = 24, where q is the length of RSA modulus, and 2q = 2048 is the ciphertext
length of homomorphic encryption. The details of the analysis are presented in [104].
From Table 3.2, the basic scheme's total computation complexity is much smaller
than that of FC10's since q  , while that of the advanced scheme's is smaller
than FNP's when n is relatively small w.r.t. m. Although the total communication
costs may seem large in our schemes, they are on the same orders with the compared
schemes in terms of m, n and N . The eect of the O(t2) factor is moderate unless t
scales linearly with N , as we will see in the simulation results.
3.6.2 Simulation Study
Methodology. We implement our proposed and compared schemes in NS-2 [5].
Since the related crypto libraries for smartphone platforms are unavailable yet, as-
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suming 400MHz CPU and WIFI, we simulate the protocols' communications and
computations by telling the simulator the sizes and number of packets each party
should send, ll each packet with dummy contents, and estimate the latency of each
computation. We adopt energy consumption and total run time as unied evalua-
tion metrics, which include both communication and computation costs. Please refer
to [104] for more detailed simulated methodology.
Note, in those schemes, only one party knows the result or knows it rst. We
always assume that to be P1, and to let the other party Pi know the results, P1
simply sends the result to Pi
3.
The simulation of a protocol is done by telling the simulator the size and number
of packets each party should send to others in each step, and ll the packets with
dummy contents. The computation times for each party in each step are represented
as time delays in the simulator, and we use a few control messages to schedule the
transmissions to avoid interference.
We assume the use of WiFi as the wireless interface operating in the ad-hoc mode,
and IEEE 802.11a is used for MAC and PHY layer. Nodes (parties) are immobile and
randomly distributed in a 50m  50m area. The transmission range is set to 200m,
and two-ray-ground propagation model is adopted.
Evaluation Metrics. Energy consumption is a unied metric which includes the
total run time, computation and communication time. We assume a 400MHz CPU,
and estimate the computation time for one 24-bit multiplication ( 3 10 8s) using
existing benchmark test results, while using empirical data for power consumption of
WIFI communication [147]. Also, whenever a party's computation time in one step
exceeds 15 seconds, we let all parties shut down their WIFI radios to save energy.
Our model is described in in [104].
3If P1 and Pi run the protocol twice by reversing their roles, P1 can still manipulate its inputs
and thus Pi's outputs since it knows the result rst.
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Figure 3.4: Total protocol run time. (Y-axis: protocol run time (s).)
Simulation Results. We show the simulation results in Fig. 3.4 and Fig. 3.5.
The basic scheme is compared with the FC10 scheme [46], which represents a category
that uses oblivious pseudo random functions. In it, the RSA exponents and modulus
are both 1024-bits. The advanced scheme is compared with the FNP scheme [64]
which represents schemes based on oblivious polynomial evaluation with additive
homomorphic encryption. We also assume the use of Paillier's crytosystem for FNP,
with 2048 bit modulus. Note that, we use  = 24 bits for our schemes.
In Fig. 3.4 (a) and Fig. 3.5 (a), we x the network size N = 10, maximum number
of colluders t = 4, number of prole attributes m = 100, and change number of query
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attributes n. It can be seen that, the basic scheme takes less than 1 second when
n < 100. Both the total run time and energy consumption of it is much less than
that of FC10's in this case and they all increase linearly with n. For the advanced
scheme, the time and energy are smaller than those of FNP's when n < 40. This is
mainly because the computation in the advanced scheme scales as O(nN), which is
O(n+mN) for the FNP scheme. Nevertheless, for the prole matching application,
in reality it is often the case that n is small.
On the other hand, from Fig. 3.4 (b) and Fig. 3.5 (b) in which n is xed to 10 but
m changes from 10 to 200, it can be see that both the basic and the advanced schemes
are more ecient than their counterparts, more importantly our proposed schemes
are hardly aected by m. The above shows that our schemes are more practical when
the number of prole attributes is large, while the number of query attributes is small.
Next, we change the number of parties. We rst x the maximum number of
colluders to 4. From Fig. 3.4 (c) and Fig. 3.5 (c), one can observe that the basic
scheme's costs increase linearly with N . This is because its run time and energy costs
are both dominated by communication which is linear in N when t is xed, since
the computations are quite fast. The FC10 scheme is much more computationally
intensive under this case. For the advanced scheme and FNP, their costs are both
dominated by computation rather than communication, yet the advanced scheme
performs much better due to n < m. Pi has almost constant energy consumption
except in the basic scheme, since in those three schemes Pi's computation cost is
mainly aected by m, not N .
Finally, we scale t with N (t = bN=4c) in Fig. 3.4 (d) and Fig. 3.5 (d). Interest-
ingly, the advanced scheme is still much more ecient than the FNP scheme, and it
exhibits a super-linear eect (O(t3) in overall communication) only when N > 50 for
Pi's energy consumption. Meanwhile, the basic scheme suers from this eect earlier
than the advanced scheme (better than FC10 when N < 30), since it is dominated
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Figure 3.5: Energy consumption for P1 and Pi. (Y-axis: energy consumption (J).)
by communication.
The above demonstrates the advantage of our proposed schemes when n and N are
both relatively small (in the order of tens), which is usual in mobile social networks.
Note that, in all the compared protocols, it is always the case that P1 uses more
energy than Pi. Through using the energy-saving strategy, for the advanced scheme
the parties' energy consumption seldom exceed 100J (equivalent to purely using WIFI
for 5min), while that of the basic scheme is below 10J.
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Schemes Basic Advanced FC10 [46] Agrawal [7] FNP [64] CANS09 [132] CANS09 [132]
Category PSI PCSI PSI PSI/PCSI PSI/PCSI PSI PCSI
Security Uncond./HBC (PL-1) PL-2/HBC ROM/HBC ROM/HBC Standard/HBC Uncond./HBC Uncond./HBC
Resist active attacks Yes Yes No No No No No
Table 3.3: Comparison of Security
3.6.3 Further Comparison with Related Works
We now compare our schemes with more state-of-the-art schemes, in terms of secu-
rity and eciency. The Agrawal's scheme [7] represents schemes using commutative
encryption. For example, in pohlig-hellman (PH), encryption and decryption both
involve one 1024-bit modular exponentiation. The CANS'09 [132] schemes represent
a category with unconditional security.
For FC10 (PSI) and FNP (PCSI) schemes, they are designed solely under the
HBC model, and can not prevent the malicious attacks mentioned in this chapter.
They do not provide result veriability, including both the other party and a third
party. Note for FNP scheme, the Fi(xj) values can be additively split between two
parties, however in our setting, for PCSI only one of them (Pi) should know those
values, thus it is again not veriable. For the CANS'09 PSI scheme, we modify it to
t our problem setting (by adding rij and r
0
ij), and it diers from the basic scheme in
that it does not aggregate the multiplications in the computation phase. The security
comparison is summarized in Table 3.3.
For eciency comparison, we set the parameters to be typical values: n = 10,
m = 100, N = 10 and t = 4, and numerically evaluate the computation and com-
munication costs. Note that, we also count oine computations since those also
consume energy. From Table 3.4, it can be seen that the basic scheme outperforms
all the PSI schemes, while the advanced scheme is slightly slower in computationally
than Agrawal's scheme. However, the latter does not protect against active attacks.
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Schemes Basic Advanced FC10 [46] Agrawal [7] FNP [64] [132] (PSI) [132] (PCSI)
Computation
P1 1:6 104 mul1 300 exp3 250 mul2 1010 exp2 1020 exp3 6 104 mul1 4:4 104 mul1
Pi 9:5 103 mul1 20 exp3 110 exp2 110 exp2 173 exp3 4:5 104 mul1 3:5 104 mul1
Communication (TX/RX)(KB)
P1 40=13 76=39 26=141 128=141 2:6=256 280=253 528=528
Pi 8:2=11 11=13:6 14=2:6 14=14 25:6=2:6 200=203 422=422
Time of comp. (s) 0:023 80 4:42 45 298 0:14 0:093
Total sent bytes (KB) 114 175 166 269 259 2080 4326
Table 3.4: Numerical Comparison of Computation and Communication Eciency
under Typical Parameters
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we formalize the problem of privacy-preserving distributed prole
matching in MSNs, and propose two concrete schemes that achieves increasing lev-
els of user privacy preservation. Towards designing lightweight protocols, we utilize
Shamir secret sharing as the main secure computation technique, while we propose ad-
ditional enhancements to lower the proposed schemes' communication costs. Through
extensive security analysis and simulation study, we show that 1) our schemes are not
only secure under the HBC model, but also prevents certain active attacks; 2) our
schemes are much more ecient than state-of-the-art ones in MSNs where the net-
work size is in the order of tens, and when the number of query attributes is smaller
than the number of prole attributes.
Chapter 4
User-Centric Secure Data Sharing
in Cloud Computing using
Attribute-based Encryption
Moving into cloud introduces a challenging issue of securing data storage and shar-
ing. However, there have been wide privacy concerns as private information, such
as personal health records (PHRs) could be exposed to the cloud servers and to u-
nauthorized parties. To assure the owners' control over access to their data, it is a
promising method to encrypt the data before outsourcing. Yet, issues such as exible
and ne-grained access control, scalability in key management, ecient user revo-
cation and risks of privacy exposure, have remained the most important challenges
toward achieving user-centric cryptographically enforced data sharing. In this chap-
ter, using cloud-based PHR system as a motivating application, we propose a novel
patient-centric framework and a suite of mechanisms for data access control to PHRs
stored in semi-trusted cloud servers. To achieve ne-grained and scalable data access
control for PHRs, we leverage attribute based encryption (ABE) techniques to encrypt
each patient's PHR le. Dierent from previous works in secure data outsourcing, we
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focus on the multiple data owner scenario, and divide the users in the PHR system
into multiple security domains that greatly reduces the key management complexity
for owners and users. A high degree of patient privacy is guaranteed simultaneously
by exploiting multi-authority ABE. Our scheme also enables dynamic modication
of access policies or le attributes, supports ecient on-demand user/attribute revo-
cation and break-glass access under emergency scenarios. Extensive analytical and
experimental results are presented which show the security, scalability and eciency
of our proposed scheme.
4.1 Related Works
This chapter is mostly related to works in cryptographically enforced access control
for outsourced data. This line of work is dierent from research in access control
models for EHRs [82,126,128,149].
Many early schemes are either based on symmetric key encryption (SKE) [12,
25, 49, 52, 53, 169], or traditional public key encryption (PKE) [25, 55]. However, to
implement ne-grained access control policies, the SKE-based solutions usually have
high key management complexities, especially when there are a large number of users
and owners in the system. The traditional PKE-based schemes either suer from the
same problem, or require encrypting multiple copies of a le using dierent users'
keys. To improve upon the scalability of the above solutions, one-to-many encryption
methods such as ABE can be used. Thus we will mainly discuss ABE based solutions
in the following.
In Goyal et. al's seminal paper on ABE [71], data is encrypted to a group of users
characterized by a set of attributes, which potentially makes the key management
more ecient. A fundamental property of ABE is preventing against user collusion.
In addition, the encryptor is not required to know the ACL.
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A number of works used ABE to realize ne-grained access control for outsourced
data [31, 79, 178, 179]. Recently, Narayan et al. proposed an attribute-based infras-
tructure for EHR systems, where each patient's EHR les are encrypted using a
broadcast variant of CP-ABE [130] that allows direct revocation. However, the ci-
phertext length grows linearly with the number of unrevoked users. In [113], a variant
of ABE that allows delegation of access rights is proposed for encrypted EHRs. Ibrai-
mi et.al. [78] applied ciphertext policy ABE (CP-ABE) [28] to manage the sharing
of PHRs, and introduced the concept of social/professional domains. In [8], Akinyele
et al. investigated using ABE to generate self-protecting EMRs, which can either be
stored on cloud servers or cellphones so that EMR could be accessed when the health
provider is oine.
However, a common drawback of the above works is that they always assume the
use of a single TA in the architecture. This not only may create a load bottleneck,
but also suers from the key escrow problem since the TA can access all the encrypt-
ed les, opening the door for potential privacy exposure. In addition, there lacks an
ecient and on-demand revocation mechanism and the support of dynamic policy up-
dates/changes, which are essential parts of secure PHR sharing. Finally, most of the
existing works do not dierentiate between the personal and public domains, which
have dierent key management requirements and scalability issues. Our idea of con-
ceptually dividing the system into two types of domains is similar with that in [78],
however a key dierence is in [78] a single TA is still assumed to govern the whole
professional domain. Besides security concerns, we observe that in reality it would
be impractical to let one centralized authority manage and certify all the professional
attributes/users. In fact, dierent organizations usually form their own (sub)domains
and become suitable authorities to dene and certify dierent sets of attributes be-
longing to their (sub)domains (i.e., divide and rule). For example, a national-wide
professional association would be responsible for certifying medical specialties, while
106
a regional health provider would certify the job ranks of its stas.
In this chapter we bridge the above gaps by proposing a framework for patient-
centric sharing of PHRs in a multi-owner, multiple-authority PHR system, and a suite
of access control mechanisms by uniquely combining techniques from MA-ABE [40]
and revocable ABE [179].
4.2 Technical Preliminaries
4.2.1 Denitions and Notations
Attribute. Attributes are represented by their index values (1,2,...). There are two
types of attributes in the PHR system, namely data attribute and role attribute and
their universes are denoted as jUDj and jURj, respectively. The former refers to the
intrinsic properties of the PHR data, such as the category of a PHR le. The latter
represents the roles of the entities in the system, such as the professional role of a
user in an organization.
Access Structure and Policy. An access structure is represented by a boolean
formula over a set of attributes, which can be regarded as an access tree T whose
internal nodes are logic gates and leaf nodes L(T ) are the attributes. We consid-
er monotone access structures [71]. An access policy refers to a role-based access
structure (dened by the encryptor) in this chapter.
The main notations are summarized in Table 4.1.
4.2.2 Attribute-based Encryption Schemes
Key-policy Attribute-based Encryption (KP-ABE). The KP-ABE associates
a set of (data) attributes with the ciphertext, and the access policies are enforced
in the keys distributed to each user. Here we briey review the GPSW KP-ABE
scheme [71].
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UD;UR The attribute universes for data and roles
T ; L(T ) A user access tree and its leaf node set
ACk Attributes in the ciphertext (from the kth AA)
Auk User u's attributes given by the kth AA
A; a An attribute type, a specic attribute value of that type
P Access policy for a PHR document
P A key-policy assigned to a user
MK;PK Master key and public key in ABE
SK A user's secret key in ABE
rk
(k)
j Proxy re-key for attribute j and version k
Table 4.1: Frequently used notations
There are four algorithms. Setup denes bilinear groups G1 with prime order p
and generator g1, and an admissible bilinear map e : G1 G1 ! GT 1. The MK/PK
are generated as:
MK = hy; ftigi2f1;:::;ngi;
PK = hY = e(g1; g1)y; fTi = gti1 gi2f1;:::;ngi
where n = jUDj. In Key generation(T ;MK), given an access structure T , the SKu =
fDi = gqx(i)=ti1 gi2L(T ), where qx() is the polynomial for parent of leaf node i. The
Encryption(;M; PK) algorithm outputs a ciphertext CT = h;E 0 = MY s; fEi =
T si gi2i under a set of attributes , and the Decryption(SK;CT ) is an iterative algo-
rithm that recovers e(g1; g1)
sy, which involves L(T ) bilinear pairing operations.
Multi-authority Attribute-based Encryption (MA-ABE). Next we review
the Chase and Chow's basic MA-ABE (CC) [40]. Assume there are N AAs in total.
The CC scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
Setup This algorithm is cooperatively executed by all N AAs. It denes bilinear
groups G1, G2 with prime order p and generators g1; g2 respectively, and an admissible
1To be consistent with MA-ABE, we use GT instead of G2 here.
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bilinear map e : G1G2 ! GT with a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1. The
input is each AA's attribute universe fUkgk2f1;:::;Ng, and outputs a master key for
each AA and the public key. The PK and AAk's master key MKk are as:
MKk = hskk; vk; ftk;igi2Uki
PK = hY = e(g1; g2)
P
k vk ; fyk; fTk;i = gtk;i2 gi2Ukgk2f1;:::;Ngi
where skk is AAk's secret used only in key issuing, vk is the master secret of each AA,
yk is only used by the AAs, and tk;i 2 Zp and Tk;i 2 G2 are attribute private/public
key components for attribute i.
Key issuing In this algorithm, the AAs collectively and interactively generates a
secret key for a user. For a user with (secret) ID u, the secret key is in the form
SKu = hDu = gRu1 ; fDk;i = gqk(i)=tk;i1 gk2f1;:::;Ng;i2Auk i;
where Ru is a random number for user u, and qk() is a dk degree polynomial generated
by the kth AA where
P
k qk(0) =
P
k vk  Ru.
Encryption This algorithm takes a messageM , PK and a set of attributes fAC1 ; :::;ACNg
as input, and outputs the ciphertext E as follows. The encryptor rst chooses an
s 2R Zp, and then returns
CT = hE0 =M  Y s; E1 = gs2; fCk;i = T sk;igi2ACk ;k2f1;:::;Ngi:
Decryption This algorithm takes as input a ciphertext E, PK, and a user secret
key SKu. If for each AA k, jACk \ Aukj  dk, the user pairs up Dk;i and Ck;i and
reconstructs e(g1; g2)
sqk(0). After multiplying all these values together with e(Du; E1),
u recovers the blind factor Y s and thus gets M .
In [40], there is a construction that allows for arbitrary key access structure for
each AA, beyond the threshold gates. We will make use of that construction.
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4.3 Framework for Patient-centric, Secure and S-
calable Data Sharing
4.3.1 Problem Denition
We consider a PHR system where there are multiple PHR owners and multiple PHR
users. The owners refer to patients who have full control over their own PHR data,
i.e., they can create, manage and delete it. There is a central server belonging to the
PHR service provider that stores all the owners' PHRs. The users may come from
various aspects; for example, a friend, a caregiver or a researcher. Users access the
PHR documents through the server in order to read or write to someone's PHR, and
a user can simultaneously have access to multiple owners' data. The PHR documents
can be organized by their categories in a hierarchical way [25].
Security Model. In this chapter, we consider the server to be semi-trusted, i.e.,
honest but curious as those in [53] and [179]. That means the server will try to nd out
as much secret information in the stored PHR les as possible, but they will honestly
follow the protocol in general. On the other hand, some users will also try to access
the les beyond their privileges. For example, a pharmacy may want to obtain the
prescriptions of patients for marketing and boosting its prots. To do so, they may
collude with other users, or even with the server. In addition, we assume each party
in our system is preloaded with a public/private key pair, and entity authentication
can be done by traditional challenge-response protocols.
Requirements. To achieve \patient-centric" PHR sharing, a core requirement is
that each patient can control who are authorized to access to her own PHR documents.
In particular, we have the following objectives:
 Data condentiality. Unauthorized users (including the server) who do not
possess enough attributes satisfying the access policy or do not have proper key
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access privileges should be prevented from decrypting a PHR document, even
under user collusion. Fine-grained access control should be enforced, meaning
dierent users are authorized to read dierent sets of documents.
 On-demand revocation. Whenever a user's attribute is no longer valid, the user
should be able to access future PHR les using that attribute. This is usually
called attribute revocation, and the corresponding security property is forward
secrecy [76]. There is also user revocation, where all of a user's access privileges
are revoked.
 Write access control. We shall prevent the unauthorized contributors to gain
write-access to owners' PHRs, while the legitimate contributors should access
the server with accountability.
 The data access policies should be exible, i.e., dynamic changes to the prede-
ned policies shall be allowed, especially the PHRs should be accessible under
emergency scenarios.
 Scalability, eciency and usability. The PHR system should support users from
both the personal domain and public domains. Since the set of users from the
public domain may be large in size and unpredictable, the system should be
highly scalable, in terms of complexity in key management, communication,
computation and storage. Additionally, the owners' eorts in managing users
and keys should be minimized to enjoy usability.
4.3.2 Overview of Our Framework
The main goal of our framework is to provide secure patient-centric PHR access and
ecient key management at the same time. The key idea is, we utilize ABE in both
public domains (PUDs) and personal domains (PSDs) to realize cryptographically
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Figure 4.1: The proposed framework for patient-centric, secure and scalable PHR
sharing on semi-trusted storage under multi-owner settings.
enforced, patient-centric PHR access. In the PUDs, since the users usually make ac-
cess based on their professional roles, such as doctors, nurses and medical researchers,
they are characterized by their roles via ABE. In practice, a PUD can be mapped to
an independent sector in the society, such as the health care, government or insurance
sector. In each PUD there are multiple \attribute authorities" (AAs), each governing
a disjoint subset of role attributes. Users in PUDs obtain their attribute-based secret
keys from the AAs, without directly interacting with the owners. To control access
from PUD users, owners are free to specify role-based ne-grained access policies for
her PHR les, while do not need to know the list of authorized users when doing
encryption. Since the PUDs contain the majority of users, it greatly reduces the key
management overhead for both the owners and users.
For a PSD, the users are directly connected with the owner, and make accesses
to PHR based on their personal relationship with the owner. For example, close
friends and family members. Since the owner knows them best, to realize patient-
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Figure 4.2: The attribute hierarchy of les { leaf nodes are atomic le categories while
internal nodes are compound categories. Dark boxes are the categories that a PSD's
data reader have access to.
centric access, herself is at the best position to grant user access privileges to her
PHR. Using GPSW KP-ABE in the PSD, each PHR le is labeled with its data
attributes/categories, and the key distribution overhead is only linear with the number
of le categories a user can access. Since the number of users in a PSD is often small,
it reduces the burden for the owner. When encrypting the data for PSD, all that the
owner needs to know is the intrinsic data properties.
The multi-domain approach best models dierent user types and access require-
ments in a PHR system. The use of ABE makes the encrypted PHRs self-protective,
i.e., they can be accessed by only authorized users even when storing on a semi-
trusted server, and when the owner is not online/connected. In addition, ecient
and on-demand user revocation is made possible via our ABE enhancements.
4.3.3 Details of the Proposed Framework
The framework is illustrated in Fig. 4.1, which features multiple SDs, multiple owners,
multiple AAs, and multiple users. We term the users having read and write access as
data readers and contributors, respectively.
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Key Distribution. The system denes a common universe of data attributes for
every owner, such as \basic prole", \medical history", \allergies", and \prescription-
s". Each PHR owner's client application generates its corresponding public/master
keys. The public keys can be published via user's prole in an online healthcare
social-network (HSN) (which could be part of the PHR service; e.g., the Indivo sys-
tem [4]). There are two ways for distributing secret keys. First, when rst using
the PHR service, a PHR owner can specify the access privilege of a data reader in
her PSD, and let her application generate and distribute corresponding key to the
latter, in a way resembling invitations in GoogleDoc. Second, a reader in PSD could
obtain the secret key by sending a request (indicating which types of les she wants
to access) to the PHR owner via HSN, and the owner will grant her a subset of re-
quested data types. Based on that, the policy engine of the application automatically
derives an access structure, and runs keygen of KP-ABE to generate the user secret
key that embeds her access structure. For example, a family member may request
for le types fpersonal infog and fmedical historyg. If both categories are granted
by the owner, the access structure looks like (personal info _medical history). In
addition, the data attributes can be organized in a hierarchical manner for ecient
policy generation, see Fig. 4.2. When the user is granted all the le types under a
category, her access privilege will be represented by the that category instead.
On the other hand, a reader in a PUD obtains secret key from attribute authorities,
where the key binds the user to her claimed attributes/roles. For example, a physician
in it would receive \hospital A, physician, M.D., internal medicine" as her attributes
from the AAs. In practice, there may exist multiple AAs each governing a dierent
subset of role attributes. For instance, hospital stas shall have a dierent AA from
pharmacy specialists. This is reected by (1) in Fig. 4.1. MA-ABE is used to encrypt
the data, and the concrete mechanism will be presented in the next section. In
addition, the AAs distribute write keys that permit contributors in their PUD to
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write to some patients' PHR ((2)).
PHR Encryption and Access. The owners upload ABE-encrypted PHR les to
the server ((3)). Each owner's PHR le is encrypted both under a certain ne-grained
and role-based access policy for users from the PUD to access, and under a selected
set of data attributes that allows access from users in the PSD. Only authorized users
can decrypt the PHR les, excluding the server. For improving eciency, the data at-
tributes will include all the intermediate le types from a leaf node to the root. For ex-
ample, in Fig. 4.2, an \allergy" le's attributes are fallergy;medical history; PHRg.
A role-based policy may look like P :=\(profession=physician)^ (specialty=internal
medicine)^(organization=hospital A)". The data readers download PHR les from
the server, and they can decrypt the les only if they have suitable attribute-based
keys ((5)). The data contributors will be granted write access to someone's PHR, if
they present proper write keys ((4)).
User Revocation. Here we consider revocation of a data reader or her at-
tributes/access privileges. There are several possible cases: 1) revocation of one or
more role attributes of a public domain user; 2) revocation of a public domain user
which is equivalent to revoking all of that user's attributes. These operations are done
by the AA that the user belongs to, where the actual computations can be delegated
to the server to improve eciency ((8)). 3) Revocation of a personal domain user's
access privileges; 4) revocation of a personal domain user. These can be initiated
through the PHR owner's client application in a similar way.
Policy Updates. A PHR owner can update her sharing policy for an existing
PHR document by updating the attributes (or access policy) in the ciphertext. The
supported operations include add/delete/modify, which can be done by the server on
behalf of the user.
Break-glass. When an emergency happens, the regular access policies may no
longer be applicable. To handle this situation, break-glass access is needed to access
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the victim's PHR. In our framework, each owner's PHR's access right is also delegated
to an emergency department (ED, (6)). To prevent from abuse of break-glass option,
the emergency sta needs to contact the ED to verify her identity and the emergency
situation, and obtain temporary read keys ((7)). After the emergency is over, the
patient can revoke the emergent access via the ED.
Remarks. The separation of data and role attributes reects the real-world sit-
uation: \friends" in a HSN are usually of small number and are not organized by
roles. Rather, dierent friends may have dierent access privileges assigned by the
owner. In this way, owners can exert ne-control over the access for each user in their
PSDs. By our multi-domain and multi-authority framework, each public user only
needs to contact AAs in its own PUD who collaboratively generates a secret key for
the user, which reduces the workload per AA (since each AA handles fewer number
of attributes per key issuing). In addition, the multi-authority ABE is resilient to
compromise of up to N   2 AAs in a PUD, which solves the key-escrow problem.
Furthermore, in our framework user's role verication is much easier. Dierent orga-
nizations can form their own (sub)domains and become AAs to manage and certify
dierent sets of attributes, which is similar to divide and rule.
4.4 Main Design Issues
In this section, we address several key design issues in secure and scalable sharing of
PHRs in cloud computing, under the proposed framework.
4.4.1 MA-ABE for the Public Domain
For the PUDs, our framework delegates the key management functions to attribute
authorities. In order to achieve stronger privacy guarantee for the owners, we adopt
the Chase-Chow (CC) MA-ABE scheme [40], where each authority governs a disjoint
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Figure 4.3: An example policy realizable using MA-ABE under our framework.
set of attributes distributively. It is natural to associate the ciphertext of a PHR
document with an owner-specied access policy for users from PUD. However, one
technical challenge is that CC MA-ABE is essentially a KP-ABE scheme, where
the access policies are enforced in users' secret keys, and those key-policies do not
directly translate to document access policies from the owners' points of view. By
our design, we show that by agreeing upon the formats of the key-policies and the
rules of specifying which attributes are required in the ciphertext, the CC MA-ABE
can actually support owner-specied document access policies with some degree of
exibility (such as the one in Fig. 4.3), i.e., it functions similar to CP-ABE2.
In order to allow the owners to specify an access policy for each PHR document,
we exploit the fact that the basic CC MA-ABE works in a way similar to fuzzy-IBE,
where the threshold policies (e.g., k out of n) are supported. Since the threshold gate
has an intrinsic symmetry from both the encryptor and the user's point of views, we
can pre-dene the formats of the allowed document policies as well as those of the
key-policies, so that an owner can enforce a document access policy through choosing
which set of attributes to be included in the ciphertext.
Setup. In particular, the AAs rst generate the MKs and PK using setup as
2Recently Lewko and Waters proposed a multi-authority CP-ABE construction [100], but it does
not support on-demand attribute revocation.
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in CC MA-ABE. The k-th AA denes a disjoint set of role attributes Uk, which are
relatively static properties of the public users. These attributes are classied by their
types, such as profession and license status, medical specialty, and aliation where
each type has multiple possible values. Basically, each AA monitors a disjoint subset
of attribute types. For example, in the healthcare domain, the American Medical
Association (AMA) may issue medical professional licenses like \physician", \M.D.",
\nurse", \entry-level license" etc., the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS)
could certify specialties like \internal medicine", \surgery" etc; and the American
Hospital Association (AHA) may dene user aliations such as \hospital A" and
\pharmacy D". In order to represent the \do not care" option for the owners, we add
one wildcard attribute \*" in each type of the attributes.
Document Policy Generation and Encryption. In the following, we rst
consider a special case of access policy |- conjunctive normal form (CNF), P := 
(A1 = a1;1)_  _ (A1 = a1;d1)
!
^  ^
 
(Am = am;1)_  _ (Am = am;dm)
!
, where
ai;j could be \*", and m is the total number of attribute types. For such a document
policy, an owner encrypts the document as follows:
Denition 4.4.1 (Encryption Rule for PUD). Let P be in CNF form, then P is
required to contain at least one attribute from each type, and the encryptor associates
the ciphertext with all the attributes on the leaf of the access tree corresponding to P.
Key Policy Generation and Key Distribution. In CC [40], the format of
the key-policies is restricted to conjunctions among dierent AAs, i.e., P := P1 ^
   ^ PN , where Pk could correspond to arbitrary monotonic access structure. To be
able to implement the CNF document policy, each AA need to follow the rule of key
distribution:
Denition 4.4.2 (Key Policy Generation Rule for PUD). Let P be in the above form.
For the secret key of user u, Auk should contain at least one attribute from every type of
118
Attribute authority AMA ABMS AHA
Attribute type A1 :Profession A2 :License status A3 :Medical specialty A4 : Organization
Au1 : user 1 Physician * M.D. * Internal medicine * Hospital A *
Au2 : user 2 Nurse * Nurse license * Gerontology * Hospital B *
Au3 : user 3 Pharmacist * Pharm. license * General * Pharmacy C *
Key policies 1-out-of-n1 ^ 1-out-of-n2 1-out-of-n3 1-out-of-n4
Table 4.2: Sample secret keys and key-policies for three public users in the health
care domain.
attributes governed by AAk, and always include the wildcard associated with each type.
In addition, the key policy Pk of u issued by AAk is (1 out of nk1)^  ^(1 out of nkt),
where nk1   nkt are the indices of attribute types governed by AAk.
In the above, Auk is the set of role attributes u obtains from AAk, After key distri-
bution, the AAs can remain oine for most of the time. A detailed key distribution
example is given in Table. 4.2.
Theorem 4.4.3. Following the above two rules, the document access policy achieves
both correctness and soundness, i.e., given an attribute set AC associated with a ci-
phertext and its corresponding document access policy PAC , a user access tree T and
its leaf node set L(T ), we have PAC (L(T )) = 1 i. T (AC) = 1.
Proof. In the following, subscript i of an attribute set denotes the subset of attributes
belonging to the i-th type.
 correctness ()). If PAC (L(T )) = 1 (i.e., L(T ) satises PAC ), 8i = 1;    ;m;9a 2
ACi \ Li(T ). Since the i-th policy term in P (corresponding to user access tree
T ) is \1 out of ni", this implies T (AC) = 1.
 Soundness ((): it is easy to see the above is reversible, due to the symmetry
of set intersection.
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The above theorem essentially states, the CC MA-ABE can be used in a fashion
like CP-ABE when the document access policy is CNF. In practice, the above rules
need to be agreed and followed by each owner and AA. It is easy to generalize the
above conclusions to conjunctive forms with each term being a threshold logic formula,
which will not be elaborated here.
Discussion. To support more expressive document policies, the key-policy gener-
ation rule needs to be enhanced. For example, if an owner encrypts under f\physician",
\nurse", \M.D.", \license status", \internal medicine", \hospital A", \hospital B"g, she
may actually mean the following policy:
 
((Profession=\physician"^License=\M.D.")
_ (Profession=\nurse"^License=\any level")) ^ Specialty=\internal medicine"
!
^ 
Organization=\hospital A"_\hospital B"
!
. Note that, the rst \_" can be achieved
semantically since in practice an AA will not assign a nurse license to a physician nor
give a M.D. license to a nurse. However, since the \*" is the only and same one for
attribute type \license status", a physician without a \M.D." attribute but with a
\*" can also decrypt the message. To solve this problem, we observe that the set of
\license status" of dierent professions are disjoint in reality. Therefore we can fur-
ther classify the wildcard attributes in \license status" by its associated profession.
For example, there would be a dierent \*" for physicians and nurses. In this way,
the policy in Fig. 4.3 can be realized.
We note that the expressibility of the above approach is somewhat limited by
CC MA-ABE, which only supports policies in the conjunctive form across attribute
types. If an owner chooses hospital A and hospital B as organization attributes, the
policies over the rest of the attribute types have to be the same for the two hospitals.
However, our scheme does allow dierent policies for dierent organizations, in which
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the owner needs to attach multiple sets of ciphertext components, each corresponding
to one organization. This may result in longer ciphertext lengths. Nevertheless, we
argue that in reality most patients will not dierentiate access policies across the
same type of organizations.
If there are multiple PUDs, then P = [PUDjfPPUDjg, and multiple sets of ci-
phertext components needs to be included. Since in reality, the number of PUDs is
usually small, this method is more ecient and secure than a straightforward appli-
cation of CP-ABE in which each organization acts as an authority that governs all
types of attributes [103], and the length of ciphertext grows linearly with the number
of organizations. For eciency, each le is encrypted with a randomly generated le
encryption key (FEK), which is then encrypted by ABE.
Summary. In summary, a user u in an owner's PSD has the following keys:
SKGPSWu = hfg
qi(0)
ti
1 gi2AuPSDi where qi() is the polynomial for leaf node i in u's access
tree, and AuPSD is the attribute set in the key policy for u. For a user u in a PUD,
SKCCu = hDu; fDk;igk2f1;:::;Ng;i2Auk i, where Auk include attributes in the key policy
issued by AAk. The ciphertext for FEK of le F is:
EF (FEK) = hEPSD(FEK); EPUD(FEK)i, where
EPSD(FEK) = hACPSD; EPSD0 =MY sPSD; EPSD1 = gs1;PSD; fCPSDi = T sPSD;igi2ACPSDi
EPUD(FEK) = hACPUD = [fACPUDjg; fE
PUDj
0 =MY
s
PUDj
g; fEPUDj1 = gs2;PUDjg;
fCPUDj ;k;i = T sPUDj ;k;igk2f1;:::;Njg;i2ACPUDj;ki
where PUDj is the jth PUD, Nj is the number of AAs in it, and j 2 f1; :::; Xg where
X is the number of PUDs.
4.4.2 Enforce Write Access Control
If there is no restrictions on write access, anyone may write to someone's PHR us-
ing only public keys, which is undesirable. By granting write access, we mean a
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data contributor should obtain proper authorization from the organization she is in
(and/or from the targeting owner), which shall be able to be veried by the server
who grants/rejects write access.
A naive way is to let each contributor obtain a signature from her organization
every time she intends to write. Yet this requires the organizations be always online.
The observation is that, it is desirable and practical to authorize according to time
periods whose granularity can be adjusted. For example, a doctor should be permitted
to write only during her oce hours; on the other hand, the doctor must not be able
to write to patients that are not treated by her. Therefore, we combine signatures
with the hash chain technique to achieve our goals.
Suppose the time granularity is set to t, and the time is divided into periods
of t. For each working cycle (e.g. a day), an organization generates a hash chain
H = fh0; h1; :::; hng, where H(hi 1) = hi, 1  i  n. At time 0, the organization
broadcasts a signature of the chain end hn (org(hn)) to all users in its domain,
where () stands for an unforgeable signature scheme. After that it multicasts hn i
to the set of authorized contributors at each time period i. Note that, the above
method enables timely revocation of write access, i.e., the authority simply stops
issuing hashes for a contributor at the time of revocation. In addition, an owner
could distribute a time-related signature: owner(ts; tt) to the entities that requests
write access (which can be delegated to the organization), where ts is the start time
of the granted time window, and tt is the end of the time window. For example,
to enable a billing clerk to add billing information to Alice's PHR, Alice can specify
\8am to 5pm" as the granted time window at the beginning of a clinical visit. Note
that, for contributors in the PSD of the owner, they only need to obtain signatures
from the owner herself.
Generally, during time period j, an authorized contributor w submits a \ticket"
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to the server after being authenticated to it:
Epkserver(owner(tsjjtt)jjorg(hn)jjhn jjjr)
where Epkserver is the public key encryption using the server's public key, and r is a
nonce to prevent replay attack. The server veries if the signatures are correct using
both org's and owner's public keys, and whether Hj(hn j) = hn, where Hj() means
hash j times. Only if both holds, the contributor is granted write access and the
server accepts the contents uploaded subsequently.
4.4.3 User and Attribute Revocation
It is a well-known challenging problem to revoke users/attributes eciently and on-
demand in ABE. Traditionally this is often done by the authority broadcasting pe-
riodic key updates to unrevoked users frequently [31, 112], which does not achieve
complete backward/forward security and is less ecient. Recently, [76] and [80] pro-
posed two CP-ABE schemes with immediate attribute revocation capability, instead
of periodical revocation. However, they were not designed for MA-ABE. In this
chapter, we adapt Yu's recent revocation method for KP-ABE [178, 179], where an
authority can revoke a user or user's attributes immediately by re-encrypting the
ciphertexts and updating users' secret keys, while part of these operations can be
delegated to the server which enhances eciency.
The idea to revoke one attribute of a user in MA-ABE is as follows. The AA who
governs this attribute actively updates that attribute for all the aected unrevoked
users. To this end, the following updates should be carried out: (1) the public key
component for the aected attribute; (2) the secret key component corresponding
to that attribute of each unrevoked user; (3) Also, the server shall update all the
ciphertexts containing that attribute. In order to reduce the potential computational
burden for the AAs, we adopt proxy encryption to delegate operations (2) and (3) to
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the server, and use lazy-revocation to reduce the overhead. In particular, each data
attribute i is associated with a version number veri. Upon each revocation event, if
i is an aected attribute, the AA submits a re-key rki;i0 = t
0
i=ti to the server, who
then re-encrypts the aected ciphertexts and increases their version numbers. The
unrevoked users' secret key components are updated via a similar operation using the
re-key. To delegate secret key updates to the server, one or more dummy attribute
needs to be additionally dened by the AAs, which are always ANDed with each
user's key-policy to prevent the server from grasping the secret keys. Under lazy-
revocation, the aected ciphertexts and user secret keys are only updated when an
aected unrevoked user logs into the system next time. By the form of the re-key, all
the updates can be aggregated from the last login to the most current one.
For completeness, the enhanced CC MA-ABE scheme with immediate revocation
capabilities is formally described in Fig. 4.4. It has seven algorithms; a version number
is used to dierentiate the system state (PK, MK, SK, CT ) after each revocation
operation.
4.4.4 Handle Dynamic Policy Changes
Our scheme should support the dynamic add/modify/delete of part of the document
access policies or data attributes by the owner. For example, if a patient does not
want doctors to view her PHR after she nishes a visit to a hospital, she can simply
delete the ciphertext components corresponding to attribute \doctor" in her PHR
les. Adding and modication of attributes/access policies can be done by proxy re-
encryption techniques [112]; however they are expensive. To make the computation
more ecient, each owner could store the random number s used in encrypting the
FEK of each document on her own computer, and construct new ciphertext compo-
nents corresponding to added/changed attributes based on s. To reduce the storage
cost, the owner can merely keep a random seed s0 and generate all the s from s0,
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 Setup The same as the original one, except one of the AA (denoted as AA) denes an
additional dummy attribute A and its corresponding public key and master key compo-
nents, and each AA initializes a version number ver = 1. The AAs publish (ver; PK),
while (ver;MKk) is held by AAk.
 Key Issuing The same as the original one, except the key-policy of each user must be
ANDed with A (issued by AA). The user receives (ver; SKu), where ver is the current
version number.
 Encrypt(M;ACPUD; PK) The same as the original one, except A must be part of ACAA .
It outputs (ver; CT ).
 ReKeyGen(;MKk) Executed by AAk. Given a set of attributes   Uk where Uk is the
attribute universe governed by AAk, for each i 2 , randomly choose t0k;i 2 Zp and set
rkk;i =
t0k;i
tk;i
. For each i =2 , rkk;i = 1. Outputs local re-key as rkk = (ver; frkk;ig1ijUjk).
The global re-key is rk = frkkg1kN . Increase the system's ver by 1 (the other AAs will
synchronize).
 ReEnc(CT; rk) Executed by the server. If CT and rk contain the same ver, re-encrypt
CT as: for each 1  k  N; i 2 ACPUDk , if the corresponding rkk;i 6= 1, C 0k;i = C
rkk;i
k;i ;
otherwise, C 0k;i = Ck;i. Outputs CT
0 = (ver + 1; E0; E1; fC 0k;igi2ACPUDk ;k2f1;:::;Ng).
 KeyUpdate(SKu; rk) User u gives part of SKu to the server (except the component for A).
If SKu and rk have the same ver, for each 1  k  N; i 2 AuPUDk , if the rkk;i 6= 1, D0k;i =
D
rk 1k;i
k;i ; otherwise, D
0
k;i = Dk;i. Outputs SK
0
u = (ver + 1; Du; fD0k;igk2f1;:::;Ng;i2AuPUDk ).
 Decrypt(CT; PK; SKu) The same as the original one, except it uses PK and SKu with
the same ver as in CT .
Figure 4.4: The enhanced MA-ABE scheme with on-demand revocation capabilities.
such as using a pseudorandom generator. Thus the main computational overhead
to modify/add one attribute in the ciphertext is just one modular exponentiation
operation.
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4.4.5 Deal with Break-glass Access
For certain parts of the PHR data, medical stas need to have temporary access when
an emergency happens to a patient, who may become unconscious and is unable to
change her access policies beforehand. The medical stas will need some temporary
authorization (e.g., emergency key) to decrypt those data. Under our framework,
this can be naturally achieved by letting each patient delegate her emergency key
to an emergency department (ED). Specically, in the beginning, each owner denes
an \emergency" attribute and builds it into the PSD part of the ciphertext of each
PHR document that she allows break-glass access. She then generates an emergency
key skEM using the single-node key-policy \emergency", and delegates it to the ED
who keeps it in a database of patient directory. Upon emergency, a medical sta
authenticates herself to the ED, requests and obtains the corresponding patient's
skEM , and then decrypts the PHR documents using skEM . After the patient recovers
from the emergency, she can revoke the break-glass access by computing a re-key:
rkEM , submit it to the ED and the server to update her skEM and CT to their
newest versions, respectively.
4.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed PHR sharing mechanisms.
4.5.1 Achieved Security Goals
Data Condentiality. In a secure PHR system, the primary security goal is to keep
the owners' encrypted data condential with regard to non-authorized users, and our
proposed framework can achieve this goal.
First, in [71] and [40], respectively, the original GPSW and CC MA-ABE schemes
have been proven secure under the attribute-based selective-set model given the De-
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cisional Bilinear Die-Hellman (DBDH) problem is hard. Intuitively, for GPSW,
this means a user who does not hold proper access privilege that satisfy the data
attributes of a PHR le cannot decrypt the le. For CC MA-ABE, since we use it in
a way similar to CP-ABE, the security interpretation should be, a user who does not
have a set of role attributes that satisfy the PHR le's access policy cannot decrypt.
In our framework, we have used both enhanced versions of GPSW3 and CC MA-
ABE to encrypt each PHR le. The composition of the two schemes is still secure,
because they are independent cryptosystems with separate attribute universes and
master/public keys | the GPSW's key generation is done by each owner's application,
while that of CC MA-ABE's is done by the AAs in PUDs. So next we will show
that the enhanced MA-ABE scheme (with ecient revocation) is secure under the
attribute-based selective-set model [40,42] as well, through the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5.1. If the authority AA is not corrupted, the enhanced MA-ABE
scheme is (poly(t); N   2; )-secure, under the assumption that no probabilistic poly-
nomial time (PPT) adversary A can solve the DBDH problem with probability  better
than 1=2 (or advantage larger than ).
Our security proof leverages the method of Yu et. al. [178, 179]; the goal is to
show that the proposed enhanced scheme is as secure as the standard CC MA-ABE.
Note that, the only additional information disclosed to the server includes the proxy
re-keys, and the partial user secret keys (without the dummy attributes), while the
PKs for dierent ver can be naturally derived from the re-keys. Therefore, we can
nd a reduction from the enhanced MA-ABE scheme to the original one using a series
of games. The proof is shown in Sec. 4.5.3.
Collusion Resistance. Our scheme is resistant to user collusion, which is implied
by the security of the adopted ABE schemes. According to Theorem. 4.5.1, The
3The enhanced GPSW was proven secure in [178].
127
enhanced MA-ABE is further resistant to collusion among up to N 2 AAs, assuming
the AA is not compromised. This deserves some further discussion.
Intuitively, this is because we only introduce a dummy attribute at AA, and
collusion between AA and the server would expose the secret keys of users that have
given the server the corresponding partial keys. However, this somewhat restrictive
assumption can be relaxed or removed. The alternative solution is to let every AA
dene a dummy attribute which is required to AND with every original access policy.
In this way, as long as less than N   1 AAs are corrupted, there is still one AA with
a dummy attribute not corrupted. Then one can show that this achieves collusion
resistance against up to N   2 AAs (exactly the same security as in CC MA-ABE),
using the same proof principle to that of Theorem. 4.5.1. The cost of this solution
is to have prolonged public keys, user secret keys and ciphertexts (extended with
additional N   1 components). This means that strong privacy guarantee can be
achieved through le encryption in our secure PHR sharing framework.
Forward Secrecy. Forward secrecy means that, any user who loses an attribute
(or part of an access structure) should be prevented from accessing the plaintext of
subsequent data exchanged afterwards, unless her remaining valid attributes (access
structure) satisfy the access policy (or data attributes). Suppose a user/attribute
revocation event happens at time t0, and the revoked user u's rst login/access to the
server happens at time t1 > t0. Our enhanced MA-ABE scheme encrypts any new les
uploaded after t0 using the updated version of PK, and also re-encrypts the existing
les that u requests access using rk. Since the revoked user's SK components for her
revoked attributes are not updated, u cannot decrypt the new les added during t0
and t1 unless her remaining valid attributes satisfy the le access policy, i.e., forward
secrecy is achieved.
Security of Write Access Control. The write access is enforced by the scheme
in Sec. 4.4.2. Its security can be explained as follows. (1) Assume a contributor
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Scheme Privacy guarantee Access policy expressibility Revocation granularity Rekeying type
VLDB07 [52] Not against user-server collusion ACL level ACL level Immediate
CCSW09 [25] No collusion risk ACL level N/A N/A
HN10 [76] Not against user-server, or AA compromise Arbitrary monotonic formula Attribute-level Immediate
CCSW10 [130] Not against AA compromise Attributes and ID-based policy ACL level No rekeying
Our scheme Prevent up to N   2 AA collusion Conjunctive form with wildcard Attribute-level Immediate
Table 4.3: Comparison of security.
is allowed to write into a patient's PHR during time period [i; j]; 0  i < j  n
(discretized time slots), and the corresponding hash chain elements given by the
organization are: hn j; :::; hn i; hn. Due to the one-way property of the hash chain
and the ordered release of the hash elements, it is infeasible for the adversary to derive
hk 1 given only hk; :::; hn where H(hk 1) = hk. Thus she cannot gain write access for
any time slot not in [i; j]. (2) Also, according to the unforgeability of the underlying
signature scheme, an adversary can hardly forge an organization's signature of the
hash chain end (org(hn)). Therefore, it is infeasible for the adversary to create an
unauthenticated hash chain h00; :::; h
0
n. (3) By encrypting the ticket using server's
public key, an unauthorized contributor cannot construct a legitimate ticket for a
time slot that she does not have permission (unless a legitimate contributor or the
server misbehaves), since she cannot decrypt the desired hash chain elements and the
owner/organization's signature.
Security Comparison. We now compare the security of our scheme with existing
ones (Table 4.3), in terms of security level, access control granularity and supported
revocation method. We choose four representative state-of-the-art schemes to com-
pare with: 1) VLDB07 scheme [52] based on ACL; 2) the CCSW09 scheme based on
HIBE [25] where each owner acts as a key distribution center; 3) the HN revocable
CP-ABE scheme [76], where we adapt it by assuming using one PUD with a single
authority and multiple PSDs to t our setting; 4) the CCSW10 scheme in [130] which
is a privacy-preserving EHR system that adopts attribute-based broadcast encryption
(ABBE) to achieve data access control. Our scheme achieves high privacy guarantee
129
and on-demand revocation. The conjunctive policy restriction only applies for PUD,
while in PSD a user's access structure can still be arbitrary monotonic formula.
Discussion. In our ABE schemes, the attributes or access policies for the cipher-
texts appear in plaintext form. By looking at the attributes and policy under which
the data is encrypted, some information about the data content could be inferred. For
example, if an owner's \HIV prole" is only allowed to be accessed by a doctor that
specializes in STD, probably her HIV test result is positive. To reduce the potential
privacy leakage, one way is to let the system dene less ne-grained data attributes
without the specic le type, such as \sensitive", \less sensitive", \not sensitive". Al-
so, for sensitive role attributes similar choices could be made. Of course, this trades
o the ne-grainedness of access policies. If a PHR le has to be viewed by a few
specic user(s) with sensitive roles, an owner can always choose to include those users
into her PSD and distribute keys to them based on data attributes, to avoid disclosing
her access policy.
4.5.2 Security Denitions for MA-ABE
Next, for completeness, we rst review the security denition of the MA-ABE scheme
[40].
Denition 4.5.2. An N-authority MA-ABE scheme is (t; n; )-secure against selective-
attribute attack (or under the attribute-based selective-set model), if any t-time ad-
versary A compromising at most n authorities has advantage at most  in winning
the game in Fig. 4.5.
In Fig. 4.5, st is state information, and the attribute-key generation oracle
AKeyGenO(GID;Auk ; k) is dened as:
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if (k 2 Kcor) return ?;
if (9Au0k s:t:(GID;Au
0
k ) 2 Uk) return ?;
if (jAuk \ ACk j  dk) ^ f8j 6= k; [(j 2 Kcor) _ (9Auj s:t:(GID;Au
0
j ) 2
Uj ^ jAuj \ ACj j  dj ])g, return ?;
Uk  Uk [ (GID;Auk); return AKeyGen(MKk;GID;Auk).
Next, we formally dene the security game of the enhanced MA-ABE scheme as in
Fig. 4.6, where k refers to one of the AA(s) with a dummy attribute. Basically, the
challenger generates PK andMK forM versions, along with the re-keys. The adver-
sary B is allowed to pick a ver as the version number of the challenge ciphertext, and
can also query user secret keys for qs times for ver. Subscript v denotes the versions
of the PK;MK; rk. The oracle AKeyGenO'(GID;Auk ; k; v) is then dened as:
if (k 2 Kcor) return ?;
if (9Au0k s:t:(GID;Au
0
k ; v) 2 Uk) return ?;
if (jAuk \ACk j  dk)^f8j 6= k; [(j 2 Kcor)_ (9Auj s:t:(GID;Au
0
j ; v) 2
Uj ^ jAuj \ ACj j  dj ])g, return ?;
Uk  Uk [ (GID;Auk); return AKeyGen(MKk;GID;Auk ; v).
Game A()
(AC = fAC1 ; :::;ACNg;Kcor  [1; N ]) A;
if jKcorj > n then return 0;
fUkgk=2Kcor  ;;
(params; f(PKk;MKk)gk2f1;:::;Ng) $   Setup(1; N);
(m0;m

1; st) AAKeyGenO(;;)(`nd0; params; fPKkgk2f1;:::;Ng; fMKkgk2Kcor );
b
$   f0; 1g;Cb $   Enc(AC ;mb);
b0 $   AAKeyGenO(;;)(`guess0; Cb ; st);
if b 6= b0, then return 0 else return 1.
Figure 4.5: The security game of the original MA-ABE. Kcor is the set of corrupted
AAs.
131
4.5.3 Security Proof of the Enhanced MA-ABE Scheme
Here we prove Theorem. 4.5.1.
Proof. We dene three games: Game 0 { the same as the semantic security game in
the original CC MA-ABE which is shown in Fig. 4.5. Game 1 is dierent from Game
0, in that more than one pairs (versions) of (PK;MK) are dened, A is given the
PKs, the re-keys between any two versions, and at most qS user secret keys for access
structures non-satisable with AC submitted by her. Game 2 is the security game of
the enhanced MA-ABE, shown in Fig. 4.6. It is the same with Game 1 except that
A is specically given the \partial" user secret keys { otherwise-satisfying secret keys
without the dummy attribute (A) component. We need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.5.3. Given that the authority AA is not corrupted, the advantage of the
Game B()
(AC = fAC1 ; :::;ACNg;Kcor  [1; N ] n k; ver) B;
if jKcorj > n then return 0;
fUkgk=2Kcor  ;;
(params; f(PKvk ;MKvk )gk2f1;:::;Ng;v2f1;:::;Mg;
frkv 1;vgv2f2;:::;Mg) $   Setup(1; N);
(m0;m

1; st) BAKeyGenO'(;;)(`nd0; params;
fPKvkgk2f1;:::;Ng;v2f1;:::;Mg; fMKvkgk2Kcor;v2f1;:::;Mg; frkv 1;vgv2f2;:::;Mg);
b
$   f0; 1g;Cb $   Enc(AC ;mb ; ver);
b0 $   BAKeyGenO'(;;;)(`guess0; Cb ; st);
if b 6= b0, then return 0 else return 1.
Figure 4.6: The security game of the enhanced MA-ABE. Note that, ACk should
always include the dummy attribute A, while the SKs that B can query must be
non-satisable with AC , which includes the \partial keys" (otherwise-satisfying secret
keys without the A component).
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C A B
(AC;Kcor)         
Let PK = (Y; fyk; fTk;igi2Ukgk2[1;N]),
MKk = (skk; vk; ftk;igi2Uk ); k 2 Kcor
for v from 1 to M :
for all k 2 [1; N ]; i 2 Uk :
randomly choose rvk;i 2R Zp;
if v > 1, rkv 1;v = rv 1k;i =r
v
k;i.
add rkv 1;v to frkg.
PK0 = (Y; fyk; f(Tk;i)
rvk;igi2Ukgk2[1;N])
MK0k = fskk; vk; f(tk;i)
1=rvk;igi2Ukg; k 2 Kcor
Let SKj = (Du; fDk;igk is queried;i2Au
k
) (u = GID)
Compute SKverj = (Du; f(Dk;i)
1=rverk;i gk is queried;i2Au
k
).
Let Cb = (E0; E1; fEk;ig)
Compute C0b = (E0; E1; f(Ek;i)
rverk;i g
k2[1;N];i2AC
k
)
(AC=fAC1 ;:::;ACNg;Kcor[1;N]nk
;ver2[1;M])
                                    
(params;PK;fMKkgk2Kcor )                       !
PK0;fMK0kgk2Kcor ;frkg                    !
SK query (1;:::;qs)                SK query (1;:::;qs);ver                  
fSKjgj2[1;qs]            !
fSKverj gj2[1;qs]              !
m0 ;m1        m

0 ;m

1       
Cb  !
C0b  !
b0    b
0
   
Figure 4.7: Construction of algorithm A, which uses an adversary B that wins Game
1 to win Game 0.
adversary in Game 2 equals to that in Game 1.
Proof. We rst show that all the user secret key queries made by A in Game 2 can also
be made by A in Game 1. Suppose a SK query in Game 2 for access structure Au =
fAukgk2[1;N ] is expressed by a set of oracle queries fAKeyGenO'(GID;Auk ; k; v)gk2[1;N ].
When SK is a partial secret key, we have 8k 6= k;Auk ` ACk , while Auk 0 ACk ,
where \`" denotes the satisability relation. Thus, the above access structure is
non-satisable with AC . And since AA is not corrupted, the corresponding queries
fAKeyGenO(GID;Auk ; k)gk2[1;N ] can be made in Game 1, according to the denition of
the AKeyGenO oracle associated with Fig. 4.5.
On the other hand, all the secret key queries made by A in Game 1 can be made
in Game 2 as well, according to the denition of the two Games. Therefore, the views
of the adversary in Games 1 and 2 are the same. This proves the lemma.
Lemma 4.5.4. The advantage of the adversary in Game 1 equals to that in Game 0.
Proof. If there exists a polynomial time algorithm B that wins the Game 1 with
AdvB(Game-1) > , then we can construct a polynomial time algorithm A to win
133
Game 0 with AdvA(Game-0) > . The construction of such an algorithm A is shown
in Fig. 4.7, where C stands for the challenger in Game 0, and B is on the right side.
It is easy to see that A is a polynomial time algorithm, and if the output guess by B
is b0 = b, then A also wins Game 0. Thus, AdvB(Game-1)  AdvA(Game-0). On the
other hand, since the information available to the adversary in Game 1 is more than
that in Game 0, we have AdvB(Game-1)  AdvA(Game-0). Therefore,
AdvB(Game-1) = AdvA(Game-0): (4.1)
From the above, we can conclude that when AA is not corrupted, the adversary
has the same advantage in Game 2 with Game 0. According to [40], we know that CC
MA-ABE is (poly(t); N 2; )-secure under the assumption that no PPT adversary can
solve the DBDH problem with advantage larger than . So this proves our theorem.
4.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we analyze the eciency of the proposed PHR sharing framework and
mechanisms.
4.6.1 Scalability and Eciency
Theoretical Analysis. We evaluate the scalability and eciency of our framework in
terms of storage and communication costs. We compare the eciency with the above
schemes. Our analysis is based on the worst case where each user may potentially
access part of every owners' data. The following is a list of common notations,
where tc = jACPSDj + jACPUDj in our scheme (includes one emergency attribute), and
tu = jAuPSDj+ jAuPUDj (a user could be both in a PSD and PUD).
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Sk Bit size of a FEK
S1 Bit size of an element in G1/G2
ST Bit size of an element in GT
Sz Bit size of an element in Zp
SP Bit size of access policy and attribute set in CT
N (or Ni) Number of AAs in a PUD (or the i-th PUD)
No The number of owners in the system
Nu The number of data users in the system
Nr Number of revoked users for a le
Na Number of users in an attribute group
m Number of attribute types in the PUD
tc; tu Total number of attributes appeared in CT, sku
l Depth of le hierarchy of an owner's PHR
Table 4.4: Notations for eciency comparison.
The results are given in Table 4.5. The ciphertext size only accounts for the
encryption of FEK. In our scheme, for simplicity we assume there is only one PUD,
thus the ciphertext includes m additional wildcard attributes and up to N dummy
attributes. Our scheme requires a secret key size that is linear with jAuj, the number
of attributes of each user, while in the VLDB07 and CCSW09 schemes this is linear
with No, since a user needs to obtain at least one key from each owner whose PHR
le the user wants to access. For public key size, we count the size of the eective
information that each user needs to obtain. The VLDB07 scheme requires each owner
to publish a directed acyclic graph representing her ACL along with key assignments,
which essentially amounts to O(Nu) per owner. This puts a large burden either in
communication or storage cost on the system. For re-keying, we consider revocation
of one user by an owner in VLDB07 and CCSW09. In VLDB07, revoking one user
from a le may need over-encryption and issuing of new public tokens for all the rest
of users in the worst case. The CCSW10 scheme achieves direct user revocation using
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Scheme Ciphertext size User secret key size Public key/info. size Re-keying message
VLDB07 [52] Sk No  Sk O(No Nu) O(Nu)
CCSW09 [25] l  S1+Sk l No  S1 2S1 No N/A
HN10 [76] (2tc + 1)S1 + ST + SP (2tu + 1)S1 + 2(log Nu)Sk 2(S1 + ST ) (Nu  Na)(log NuNu Na )Sz
CCSW10 [130] (tc + 2Nr)S1 + ST (tu + 4)S1 (m+ l + 6)S1 + ST 0
Our scheme (tc +m+N)S1 + ST + SP (tu +m+ 1)S1 (jUDj+ jURj+N)S1 tu  Sz
Table 4.5: Scalability and eciency comparison.
ABBE, which eliminates the need of re-keying and re-encryption; however, attribute
revocation is not achieved; and for the revocable ABBE in [15], either the ciphertext
size is linear with the number of revoked users, or the public key is linear with the
total number of users in the system4.
In our scheme, in the worst case, revocation of one user u in the PUD requires re-
voking all her role attributes, while revoking u in a PSD requires revoking a minimum
set of data attributes that makes her access structure unsatisable. From Table 4.5,
it can be seen that our scheme has much smaller secret key size compared with VLD-
B07 and CCSW09, smaller rekeying message size than VLDB07 and HN10, the size
of ciphertext (or public key) is smaller than CCSW10 while being comparable with
HN10. Note that, in our scheme, the large universe construction [40] can be applied
to dramatically reduce the public key size. These indicate our scheme is more scalable
than existing works.
To see the storage overhead in practice, we carry out a detailed analysis by de-
composing the PSDs and PUDs.
(1) Ciphertext size. For the PUDs,
jCTPUDj =
X
i=1
 
(
NiX
k=1
jACPUDi;kj+Ni)  S1 + ST
!
; (4.2)
4In Table 4.5, for CCSW10 scheme we only listed the eciency of one of the two constructions
in [15]. m and l are the maximum number of attributes, within a ciphertext policy and in user's
secret key, respectively.
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which is linear to the number of PUDs and the number of PAAs. For a back-of-
the-envelope calculation, assume there is one PUD (X = 1), 5 AAs (N = 5) each
having 3 types of attributes, and we use CNF policy with 2 attributes for each type.
The additional storage overhead for the server created by each ciphertext is 35 G1
group elements, and if 160-bit ECC is adopted (S1 = 160; ST = 1024) equals to about
800 bytes. It is acceptable compared with the length of a PHR document (usually
in the order of KBs). In addition, for each owner, to update access policies, one
additional group elements (s0) shall be locally stored which is quite small.
For the PSD, let each le be encrypted using its type and one emergency attribute.
Assume the le hierarchy is 4 levels so the type attribute takes 4 group elements.
Then, jCTPSDj = 5  S1 + ST = 228 bytes. This shows encryption in the PSD is very
ecient.
(2) Public key size. The sizes of data and role attribute universe are system-
dependent. To get an estimation, we note that in Googlehealth [70] there are less than
10 data categories. In a case study for role-based access control system Cassandra [21],
the authors dened 58 roles for a national EHR system. So we can assume jUDj =
50; jURj = 100. So jPKPSDj = jUDj  S1  1KB for each owner, and jPKPUDj =
jURj  S1  2KB.
(3) Secret key size. For a data reader in the PSD, jSKPSDj = jAuPSDj S1. Assume
the access structure contains 10 attributes, this equals to 200 bytes. For a reader in
the PUD, jSKPUDj = (jAuPUDj+m+1) S1 where m is due to the wildcard attributes.
Let X = 1, N = 5, m = 15 and each reader possess one role in each attribute type,
then this amounts to 620 bytes.
4.6.2 Simulation and Implementation
Next we evaluate the computational cost of our scheme through both implementation
and simulation. We have implemented the GPSW KP-ABE scheme on a PC with
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Pairing (w/ preprocessing) Exp. in G1 Exp. in GT
Time (ms) 2.5 6.4 0.6
Table 4.6: Benchmark Timing Results.
3.4 GHz processor, using the pairing based cryptography (PBC) library [121]. The
public parameters are chosen to provide 80 bits security level, and we use the type-A
160-bit elliptic curve group.
Benchmark Results. First we present the benchmark timing results of several main
primitive operations, including pairing, exponentiations in G1 and GT .
Second, we study the encryption and decryption costs from the owner's and user's
points of views, respectively. For GPSW KP-ABE, the encryption performs jACPSDj
exponentiations in G1 and 1 exponentiation in GT . For CC MA-ABE, it is jACPUDj+1
exponentiations in G1 and 1 exponentiation in GT . For decryption, a personal domain
user needs to perform jL(T )j pairings in the worst case, which can be optimized for
the general case [71]. A public domain user needs to perform m + 1 pairings and
approximately m + 1 multiplications in GT if we assume CNF policies. The timing
results are reported in Fig. 4.8. We present the time measurements of KP-ABE
(assuming AND policy for decryption which is worst case), and estimate those of
MA-ABE's by adding the times of additional primitive operations w.r.t. KP-ABE. It
can be seen that all three algorithms are very ecient for both ABE schemes5.
Note that, in our enhanced MA-ABE scheme, the decryption computation cost
can be further reduced by delegating most of the pairing operations to the server. A
user can submit all the Dk;is to the server and only computes one bilinear pairing:
e(Du; E1). This is secure because the server does not know Du. Similarly, for GPSW
KP-ABE, we can also add a dummy attribute to each user's secret key which is
5For MA-ABE, the key generation time is not presented since it involves an anonymous key
issuing process. If user anonymity is not needed, then the time is similar to that of KP-ABE.
138
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Key generation time
Number of attributes in the access structure
Ke
y 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
tim
e 
(s)
 
 
GPSW KP−ABE
(a)
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Encryption times
Number of attributes in the ciphertext
En
cr
yp
tio
n 
tim
e 
(s)
 
 
GPSW KP−ABE
CC MA−ABE
(b)
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Decryption times
Number of attributes in the key
D
ec
ry
pt
io
n 
tim
e 
(s)
 
 
GPSW KP−ABE
CC MA−ABE
(c)
Figure 4.8: The timing results of ABE schemes. The ones for MA-ABE are estimated
based on those of KP-ABE.
ANDed with her original key policy, and delegate the pairings corresponding to all
the key components except the dummy one to the server. In this way, the decryption
time of a user is a constant.
Finally, we measure the time cost related to user revocation via simulations. We
focus on the enhanced MA-ABE scheme. Upon revocation of a user u in the public
domain, the AAs nd a minimal subset of attributes without which u's key-policy will
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never be satised, and those attributes should be updated to a newer version. The
straightforward way is to immediately re-encrypt all the aected documents (by the
server) and to update all the aected users' keys (the AAs can multicast the re-keys
to unrevoked users securely). However, this method incurs too much overhead; in
fact, our scheme uses lazy revocation, where the server only updates the requested
documents and u's secret key upon u's le access.
We assume that both the user revocation and user le access events arrive ac-
cording to Poisson processes with average rates  and , respectively6. The worst
case is assumed, where all the attributes in a revoked user's key need to be updated.
We set the user revocation rate to be  = 0:1=s, user access rate as  = 0:5=s; the
total number of documents is 10000, and each user access 100 documents each time;
the total number of users is 1000, and the number of attribute categories m = 10,
number of attributes in each ciphertext is 100. The attributes in each ciphertext and
user secret key are all randomly chosen from the attribute universe (containing 1000
attributes). In Fig. 4.9, we present the results comparing the overhead of revocation
between the two methods, in terms of accumulated number of exponentiations in G1
performed by the server, which further breaks down to time costs for le re-encryption
and key-updates. The concrete time cost can be estimated by multiplying the above
with benchmark time for each exponentiation. It can be seen that the lazy revoca-
tion method incurs much lower computation/time cost, which indicates our scheme
will not overwhelm the server for revocation operations. This is because the lazy
revocation method amortizes these operations over multiple le access operations in
a long time period. Finally, we note that the server's time share spent in revocation
is quite low. For our scheme, the time spent in le re-encryption operations would be
2:5 104  6:4 10 3 = 16s, accounting for only 1:6% of the 1000s period.
6This model has been adopted in previous works [76].
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4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a novel framework of secure sharing of personal
health records in cloud computing. Considering partially trustworthy cloud servers,
we argue that to fully realize the patient-centric concept, patients shall have complete
control of their own privacy through encrypting their PHR les to allow ne-grained
access. The framework addresses the unique challenges brought by multiple PHR
owners and users, in that we greatly reduce the complexity of key management while
enhance the privacy guarantees compared with previous works. We utilize multi-
authority attribute-based encryption to encrypt the PHR data, so that patients can
allow access not only by personal users, but also various users from dierent public
domains with dierent professional roles, qualications and aliations.
Chapter 5
Authorized Private Keyword
Search over Encrypted Data in
Cloud Computing
This chapter continues to explore the topic of protecting privacy of owners' out-
sourced data in cloud computing. As we can see in the last chapter, by using data
encryption, owner-controlled ne-grained data access can be realized; however, it also
introduces much diculty to performing eective searches over encrypted informa-
tion. Searchable encryption has been proposed to cope with this diculty; but most
existing works can not support ecient searches with complex query conditions, and
care needs to be taken when using them because of the potential privacy leakage
about the data owners to the data users or the cloud server. In this chapter, using
online Personal Health Record (PHR) as a case study, we rst show the necessity of
search capability authorization that reduces the privacy exposure resulting from the
search results, and establish a scalable framework for Authorized Private Keyword
Search (APKS) over encrypted cloud data. We then propose two novel solutions for
APKS based on a recent cryptographic primitive, Hierarchical Predicate Encryption
141
142
(HPE). Our solutions enable ecient multi-dimensional keyword searches with range
query, allow delegation and revocation of search capabilities. Moreover, we enhance
the query privacy which hides users' query keywords against the server. We imple-
ment our scheme on a modern workstation, and experimental results demonstrate its
suitability for practical usage.
5.1 Related Work
Our work mainly resides in the area of searchable encryption. In the following, we
will compare our solutions with existing works in realizing search authorization in a
PHR system and query privacy.
5.1.1 Searchable Encryption with Authority Generated Ca-
pabilities
In applications such as outsourced private databases, usually the (sole) owner of the
outsourced data plays the role of the authority who generates search capabilities for
users. Song et al [157] proposed the rst practical symmetric key cryptography (SKC)
based searchable encryption scheme. Later, various schemes [39, 47, 66, 174] were
proposed where a searchable encrypted index is usually created, so that the encrypted
documents can be searched given a capability. The rst public key cryptography
(PKC)-based searchable encryption scheme was proposed by Boneh et al [32] (PEKS).
Recently Wang et al [168] investigated secure ranked search over encrypted cloud data.
The above schemes are ecient in general, but are limited to single-keyword queries
which are inadequate for real-world PHR search applications.
To support more complex queries, conjunctive keyword search schemes [19,68] over
encrypted data have been proposed. Recently a more general approach, predicate en-
cryption [86, 153] was proposed that supports inner-products. They can potentially
143
support arbitrary query types including CNF/DNF formulas, however, with exponen-
tial complexity. In this chapter, we consider the multi-dimensional keyword search
supporting a subset of CNF formulas with equality, subset and a class of simple
range queries. Our work is more related to [33, 154], where multi-dimensional arbi-
trary range queries are considered. In hidden vector encryption [33], the complexity
of conjunctive subset and range query is O(Nm), which is much less ecient than
our APKS. Moreover, they do not support capability delegation. As we mentioned in
introduction, no matter authorization is done by each PHR owner or a central TA,
scalability issues arise.
Recently HPE with delegation capabilities was proposed by [137], [99] and [155].
However, these schemes are under public key setting and do not achieve query (predi-
cate) privacy [153] per se. They can only be applied to a PHR system if the eciency,
search authorization and revocation, query privacy issues are well addressed, which
are the main contributions of this chapter. Note that, recently Camenisch et al [35]
proposed a PKC-based searchable encryption scheme with an authorization process
that is oblivious to the TA, which is orthogonal to the problems addressed in our
work.
5.1.2 Searchable Encryption with User Generated Capabili-
ties
In this category, each user can generate any search capabilities of her choice. This
includes single-user scheme such as PEKS [32], and \multi-user"1 schemes such as
Curtmola et al [47], Bao et al [20], and Dong et al [55].
The main advantage of schemes in this category is they obviate the overhead
for users to acquire search capabilities. However, a key limitation is, the search
1The \multi-user setting" in the literature means each user possesses a secret/private key that
enables her generate arbitrary search capabilities.
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authorization is intrinsically dicult to achieve since it is contradictory with the user-
generated capabilities. An exception is Hwang and Lee's work [77], who proposed a
public key encryption scheme with conjunctive search (PECK) with main applications
to group email ltering. Unfortunately, the ciphertext length grows linearly with the
number of authorized users due to an \allowed user list" in the ciphertext. In contrast,
in this chapter search authorization is based on users' attributes and enforced by LTAs
indirectly, while the ciphertext length of an encrypted index does not depend on the
list of authorized users.
5.1.3 Predicate Privacy in Searchable Encryption
Shen et al [153] proposed a SKC-based predicate encryption scheme with predicate
privacy, however in a SKC-based scheme with an encryption key one can generate any
search capabilities, which is undesirable for PHR search with authorization. Under
public key setting, [16] proposed a key refreshing solution to randomize the original
keywords used in generating the trapdoors in PEKS, but that requires a user to share
a secret with all potential encryptors which needs much interaction. In contrast, in
our enhanced solution some secrets are kept by proxies, thus it does not incur any
interaction between owners and users.
5.2 Problem Formulation
5.2.1 System Model
We consider a cloud computing environment which hosts the PHR service. There are
three (types of) entities in the system: data owners/users, trusted authorities, and
the cloud server. In this chapter, owner refers to a special type of user, i.e., a patient
who creates her PHR records, and wants them to be stored in the cloud server such
that her privacy is preserved. The \users" generally refers to those who can perform
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: System architecture and ne-grained authorization framework for autho-
rized private keyword searches over encrypted data in cloud computing.
searches over the encrypted PHR database, and in this chapter we consider the users
to be from the public domain, i.e., who are usually not personally known by an owner,
and need to access or search over the PHRs due to their professional responsibilities.
We assume that the contents of the PHR are protected using separate, existing data
encryption schemes [108], which is not the focus of this chapter. The cloud server
stores the encrypted PHR of all the owners in a database and performs search for
the users. In addition, there is a central trusted authority (TA) and multiple local
trusted authorities (LTAs). The TA is responsible for high-level key management
and does NOT need to be always online, while the LTAs need to be more active. In
reality, the TA could be a governmental healthcare agency while a LTA can be a local
organization. The system architecture is illustrated in Fig. 5.1.
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5.2.2 Threat Model
We assume the cloud server to be \honest-but-curious", which is also adopted by
many existing works on searchable encryption [37,47,168] and data security in cloud
computing environments [25, 103, 130, 178]. That is, the server is \curious" to learn
and analyze the plaintext data and indexes of the PHRs, but will honestly follow the
protocol run. The server could also collude with any number of users to derive addi-
tional information about other users' queries and the encrypted PHRs. We assume
the TA and LTAs to be trusted.
5.2.3 Design Goals
The system design of APKS over encrypted PHR in cloud computing should achieve
the following main security and performance goals.
 Index and Query Privacy: The primary security goal is to prevent the
cloud server from learning any useful information about the encrypted PHR
documents, indexes, and the users' queries, except what can be derived from
the search results. Since our focus is search, we will focus on index privacy and
query privacy.
 Fine-grained Search Authorization, and Revocation: It is equally im-
portant to prevent curious users from gaining additional information from the
PHR database than what they need to know. To reduce the risk of privacy ex-
posure by unrestricted query capabilities, the users' search requests should be
authorized by an authority in a ne-grained manner. In addition, there should
exist a mechanism to revoke the search capability of a user.
 Multi-dimensional Keyword Search: The system should support multiple-
dimensional multi-keyword search functionality, namely, we want to support
147
Field notation: Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5
Field name: Age Sex Region Illness Provider
Alice: 25 Female Worcester Flu Hospital A
Bob: 61 Male Boston Diabetes Hospital B
Table 5.1: Illustration of data structure: (plaintext) keyword indexes for PHRs of
two owners.
conjunctions among dierent dimensions where in each dimension there can be
multiple keywords (including equality, subset and range queries). Note that
these types of queries are often experienced in a real-world application like
patient matching.
 Scalability and Eciency: The system should allow multiple owners to en-
crypt and contribute their PHR documents, and enable a large number of users
to search over multiple owners' PHRs. In achieving this, the system should have
high scalability, i.e., low key management overhead. Also, eciency should be
acceptable for per-search operation from a user's point of view.
In addition, other important system-level security requirements such as user au-
thentication, access control and accountability can be realized by existing techniques
[103,177,178], thus are not the main focus in this chapter.
5.2.4 Notations and denitions
Without special notice, we will use upper-case letters to denote variables and lower-
case letters for values of variables.
Attributes and Keywords. In a PHR system, an attribute generally refers
to a category of property of an owner and her PHR, such as \age", \illness", and
\provider". These attributes are multi-valued which can be either numerical or non-
numerical, for example, \age" can have values as the integers 0-100, while \illness"
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has values as the names of every illness. The universe of attributes is labeled as
W = f1;    ; g, and the universe of values for each attribute i is denoted as Wi =
fwi;1;    ; wi;`ig[\*", where special value \*" stands for \don't care". Each attribute
value is mapped to an element in Fq, a nite eld using a hash function H : f0; 1g !
Fq. In the following, we also call each attribute as a \keyword eld" in the index, and
each attribute value as a \keyword".
Data Structure. Each owner's PHR may consist of one or multiple \les", and
there can be two types of keyword indexes: the rst one is established as a summary
of all PHR les of the owner, such as the owner's demographic information and the
illnesses she has. The second type is a separate index for each single le inside her
PHR, which is more specic and detailed. For the public domain search application
considered in this chapter, usually it's enough for a user Alice to search the rst
type of index which pinpoints her to a (small) set of owners satisfying her query
condition. After that, if further ne-grained le access is needed, she can request for
query/decryption capabilities from individual owners to search/access their second
type of indexes or individual les, which can be realized by existing techniques [25,130]
in the personal domain. Thus, we assume a single searchable index is created over
each owner's PHR les, and regard an owner's PHR le collection as an abstract
\document" which is denoted as D, its encrypted form as E(D), and the original
index ~Z for D consists of m keyword elds, and each eld contains one keyword :
~Z := (z1; z2;    ; zm) 2 Wi1     Wim . The collection of all owners' indexes can be
regarded as a table of m columns, and an example is shown in Table 5.1.
Query. A query \dimension" corresponds to a \eld" in the index. There are
three types of basic query terms dened over a single dimension: equality (Zi = wi),
subset (Zi 2 Si);Si  Wi   \*", and range query (s  Zi  t). We consider boolean
formulas connecting query terms over dierent dimensions using AND (^) operator,
which we refer to as multi-dimensional multi-keyword queries. For example, a real-
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world query may look like
Q := (30  Z1  60) ^ (Z2 = \*") ^ (Z3 2 f\Boston"; \Worcester"g) ^ (Z4 =
\Diabetes").
The above can be converted into conjunctive normal form (CNF), where the subset
and range queries can be expressed using the equality and OR (_) operators. Such
a query can be uniquely characterized by the underlying keyword set W 2  where
 := f2Wi1  ;g   f2Wim  ;g, and 2Wik denotes power set. We denote the CNF
form of a query Q as bQ.
Predicates. We consider a class of predicates to be functions F := ff~vj~v 2 Fnq g,
where f~v(~x) = 1 i. ~x  ~v = 0 [86]. We dene a mapping from a query bQ to a
predicate vector ~v:  :  ! Fnq . Similarly, dene another mapping from an index ~Z
to a plaintext vector ~x:  :W1     Wm ! Fnq .
Search Capabilities. In searchable encryption, the user needs to submit a search
capability (also called trapdoor) Tf~v encoding the predicate f~v, with which the server
evaluates f~v() against the encrypted indexes. To dene search delegation, we say
that a capability Tf~v1 is more restrictive than another Tf~v2 , if Z1  Z2, where Z1 :=
f~Z =   1(~x)jf~v1(~x) = 1g, and Z2 := f~Z =   1(~x)jf~v2(~x) = 1g, and is denoted as
Tf~v1  Tf~v2 . For convenience, a capability is also denoted as TQ for underlying query
Q.
In addition, we denote \choose a value r uniformly at random from Fq by r 2R Fq".
Other notations see Table 5.2.
5.2.5 Algorithm Denitions
We formally dene the algorithms for our authorized private keyword search scheme
(APKS):
 Setup(1). This algorithm sets up the system-wide parameters, where the input
is , the security parameter. The output is public parameters PK,  and ,
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m;m0 Number of elds in original/converted index
d; di Maximum # of ORs in a query over each/i-th dimension
k Height of attribute hierarchy/expansion factor
~Z;Zi; zi An index, the i-th index eld and its value (keyword)
Q; bQ;wi A query, its CNF form and a query keyword
~x Plaintext vector
~v Predicate vector
n Length of plaintext/predicate vectors
 ,  Mappings from ~Z to ~x, and from bQ to ~v
Table 5.2: Main Notations.
and a master secret key MSK.
 GenIndex(PK, ~Z). This algorithm encrypts an index ~Z under PK and outputs
a searchable encrypted index E(~Z).
 GenCap(PK, MSK, Q). This algorithm outputs a search trapdoor TQ corre-
sponding to the predicate f~v, where ~v = ( bQ).
 Search(PK; TQ, E(~Z)). This algorithm tests E(Z) against TQ, and returns true
if f~v(~x) = 1 (i.e., Q(~Z) = 1) where ~v = ( bQ); ~x =  (~Z); Otherwise return false.
 DelegateCap(PK; TQ1 , Q2). This algorithm takes as input an existing capability
TQ1 = Tf~v1 for query Q1 where ~v1 = (
bQ1), and another query Q2, and outputs
a trapdoor f~v2 for a query Q3 such that Tf~v3  Tf~v1 .
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5.3 A Brief Review of Hierarchical Predicate En-
cryption
In HPE, given a ciphertext C for plaintext vector ~x and a secret key sk~v for predicate
vector ~v, the decryption will succeed if ~x  ~v = 0. There are two schemes of HPE
in [137] |- for hierarchical and general delegation, respectively. We use the general
delegation scheme in this chapter, in which delegation is not limited to a specic
hierarchical form dened in [137]. Its algorithm denitions and detailed scheme are
given below. In HPE, an `+1-th delegated secret key sk~v`;~v`+1 is more restrictive than
its original one sk~v` , in that sk~v`;~v`+1 can decrypt C only if (~v`  ~x = 0)^ (~v`+1  ~x = 0).
The HPE scheme for general delegation [137] is based on dual pairing vector
spaces. Let e : G1  G2 ! GT be a non-degenerate bilinear map, where G1 and G2
are two cyclic groups of prime order q with g1, g2 be generators, respectively, and
gT := e(g1; g2). Dene n-dimensional vector spaces V := G1      G1, and V :=
G2    G2 whose elements are vectors x := (gx11 ;    ; gxn1 ) and y := (gx11 ;    ; gxn1 ),
respectively, where xi; yi 2 Fq. Pairing operation between two vectors x and y is
e(x;y) :=
Qn
i=1 e(g
xi
1 ; g
yi
2 ) = e(g1; g2)
Pn
i=1 xiyi = g~x~yT .
Dene canonical bases A := (a1;    ;an) of V, where ai := (1;    ; 1; g1; 1;    ; 1)
(all identify elements except g1 at the i-th position), and A := (a1;    ;an) of V
is dened similarly. Canonical basis A can be changed to basis B := (b1;    ; bn) by
B = X A where X := (i;j) 2R GL(n;Fq), and B = (XT ) 1 A. B and B are dual
orthonormal bases of V and V. The HPE scheme is given in Fig 5.2.
The complexity of HPE : for n dimensional vectors, the ciphertext and secret key
sizes are both of n+ 3 length, while decryption involves n+ 3 bilinear pairing opera-
tions.
152
HPE-Setup(1): param := (q;V;V;GT ;A;A) where V;V are n + 3 dimensional spaces.
Generate X, B, B as above; dn+1 := bn+1 + bn+2, bB := (b1;    ; bn;dn+1; bn+3), return
pk := (1; param; bB), msk := (X;B).
HPE-GenKey(pk, msk, ~v1 := (v1;1;    ; v1;n)): Pick dec; dec; ran;1; ran;2; ran,1; ran;2; del;j ; del;j ; ' 2R
Fq, for j = 1;    ; n. Output sk~v1 := ~k

1 := (k

1;dec; k

1;ran;1; k

1;ran;2; k

1;del;1;    ; k1;del;n), where:
k1;dec := dec(
Pn
i=1 v1;ib

i ) + decb

n+1 + (1  dec)bn+2;
k1;ran;j := ran;j(
Pn
i=1 v1;ib

i ) + ran;jb

n+1   ran;jbn+2 (j = 1; 2);
k1;del;j := del;j(
Pn
i=1 v1;ib

i ) + 'b

j + del;jb

n+1   del;jbn+2 (j = 1;    ; n).
HPE-Enc(pk,~x := (x1;    ; xn), m 2 GT ): Pick 1; 2;  2R Fq, return C := (c1; c2) where
c1 := 1(
Pn
i=1 xibi) + dn+1 + 2bn+3, c2 := g

Tm.
HPE-Dec(pk, kdec, c1; c2): m
0 := c2=e(c1; kdec), return m
0.
HPE-Delegate(pk,~k

` , ~v`+1 := (v`+1;1;    ; v`+1;n)): Output sk~v1; ;~v`+1 := ~k

`+1 :=
(k`+1;dec; k

`+1;ran;1;    ; k`+1;ran;`+2; k`+1;del;1;    ; k`+1;del;n), where:
k`+1;dec := k

`;dec +
P`
i=1 dec;ik

`;ran;i + `+1;dec(
Pn
i=1 v`+1;ik

`;del;i), (dec;i; `+1;dec 2R Fq; i =
1;    ; `);
k`+1;ran;j :=
P`
i=1 ran;ik

`;ran;i + `+1;ran;j(
Pn
i=1 v`+1;ik

`;del;i), (ran;i; `+1;ran;j 2R Fq; i =
1;    ; `; j = 1;    ; `+ 2);
k`+1;del;j :=
P`
i=1 del;ik

`;ran;i + `+1;del;j(
Pn
i=1 v`+1;ik

`;del;i) + '
0k`;del;j , (del;i; `+1;del;j ; '
0 2R
Fq; i = 1;    ; `; j = 1;    ; n).
Figure 5.2: The HPE scheme.
5.4 Fine-Grained Authorization Framework for APKS
The search authorization framework in this section adds another layer of ne-grained
privacy protection beyond the underlying cryptographic mechanisms used to enforce
encrypted search or data access control. Note that, this framework is complementary
and compatible with the \user-centric" data access control framework proposed by
us in [108].
Basically, since the owners do not directly interact with users in the public domain,
we delegate owners' trust to the TA and LTAs who are in charge of authorizing users'
search privileges. We dene a hierarchical relationship between the TA and LTAs
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(Fig. 5.1 (b)), which may have at most L levels where the TA is always at the top
(1st) level; the hierarchy can be mapped into any tree topology. Dene the \local
domain" of an LTA to be the set of lower-level LTAs and users directly governed by
it. The TA runs Setup, and distributes some basic search capabilities via GenCap to
each 2nd level LTA, after this the TA can be oine most of the time; while an ith
level LTA runs DelegateCap to delegate the capabilities of itself to members in its
local domain. A delegated capability must be more restrictive than its original one.
When a user requests a capability for query bQ from an LTA, the LTA checks
whether a user either actually possesses the attribute value set W underlying the bQ,
or is \eligible" for those values. One way to achieve this is to maintain a database of
attribute values for all users in the LTA's local domain, which records the users' real
attributes (e.g., illness=\diabetes") and \eligible attribute values" as their profes-
sional needs (e.g., illness=\diabetes" is authorized to a researcher who is specialized
in studying diabetes). Alternatively, the LTA can issue to each user in its domain a
set of credentials certifying the user's attribute values, and veries those credentials
upon a request for capability. In order to prove its authorization on a capability, a
TA/LTA can issue an identity-based signature [141] on each capability it generat-
ed/delegated. The server has to verify that a received capability has a valid signature
from a registered LTA before performing search for a user.
The rules of delegating search capabilities by the TA/LTAs to their local do-
mains can be predened by the TA, which may abide by existing healthcare laws or
regulations. The owners who care about their privacy should read the rules about
authorization rst before registering in the system. The above captures the hierar-
chical relationship of access privileges of personnel in the real-world, and since the
authorization tasks are distributed to each LTA, the system becomes more scalable.
Fig. 5.1 (a) illustrates the data ow. Multiple owners can encrypt their PHRs
and indexes while multiple users can search over all the indexes. Revocation is not
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shown, since it is implicitly enforced by the users' capabilities.
Example. Let the TA be the public health agency of Boston, the 2nd level LTA
be a hospital-A in Boston. TA gives the basic capability (provider = \hospital-A")
to hospital-A which indicates the basic restriction for searching on PHRs of patients
who are treated by that hospital. The LTA can then delegate another capability like
(age = \*") ^ (illness = \diabetes") to a patient who is actually diagnosed to have
diabetes by hospital-A, for patient matching. In contrast, a doctor can request to
search for the specic type of disease she is treating on. Their capabilities should
automatically inherit the restrictions of the LTA's.
5.5 Basic Solution of APKS
5.5.1 Overview
In order to satisfy multiple design objectives at the same time, especially multi-
dimensional keyword query and capability delegation, we resort to hierarchical predi-
cate encryption (HPE) for inner-products [137]. However, the key challenge in build-
ing an APKS scheme from HPE is how to eciently support equality, subset and
range queries at the same time. HPE can potentially support arbitrary CNF/DNF
query formulas [86, 99] but with exponential complexity. In this section, we aim at
supporting multi-dimensional multi-keyword search which is a special type of CNF
formula; however, directly applying HPE still does not result in acceptable eciency
due to the subset and range queries. Therefore, we use HPE in a novel way to achieve
our performance goals; especially, we use attribute hierarchy to express a class of
simple range queries. The per-index search cost is O(d m  log N) in the worst case,
where N is the maximum size of Wi, d N is the maximum allowed number of OR
terms over all dimensions. As it turns out, how to convert the indexes and the queries
into vectors are key factors in reducing the complexity.
155
5.5.2 Building APKS based on HPE
We will rst present the basic representation method of indexes and predicates, and
show that directly applying it results in an inecient scheme. Then we propose novel
representations that lead to APKS.
Basic Vector Representation for Indexes and Predicates. According to
[86], one can represent the basic AND, OR predicates by rst converting them into
polynomial forms and then converting to vectors. In particular:
 For \(Z1 = w1) ^ (Z2 = w2)": the polynomial is written as p(Z1; Z2) = r(Z1  
w1) + (Z2   w2), where r 2R Fq. Since p(Z1; Z2) = rZ1 + Z2   (rw1 + w2),
the attribute vector is ~x = (Z1; Z2; 1) where we should substitute Zi by the
actual keyword zi, while the predicate vector is ~v = (r; 1; (rw1 + w2)), and
p(Z1; Z2) = 0 i. ~x  ~v = 0.
 For \(Z1 = w1)_ (Z2 = w2)": p(Z1; x2) = (Z1 w1)(Z2 w2) = Z1Z2+w2Z1+
w1Z2 + w1w2. Thus ~x = (Z1Z2; Z1; Z2; 1) and ~v = (1; w2; w1; w1w2).
Combinations of the above can be used to represent arbitrary CNF/DNF formulas.
However, with the increase of the maximum number of OR terms d over each dimen-
sion, the number of cross-terms in polynomial p(Z1;    ; Zm) increases exponentially,
thus the vector length becomes (d+ 1)m. This is prohibitive.
The multi-dimensional multi-keyword query considered in this chapter is a special
type of CNF formula, where conjunction are across dimensions while disjunctions
are within each dimension. This yields a tradeo in expressiveness and complexity;
however, it is versatile enough to support equality, subset and simple range queries.
In fact, in the real-world these types of queries are mostly common, while disjunctions
across dimensions does not give much practical meaning.
In general, the polynomial corresponding to our choice of formulas can be ex-
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pressed as a summation of m univariate polynomials:
p(Z1;    ; Zm) = r1((Z1   w1;1)    (Z1   w1;d1)) + (5.1)
  + rm((Zm   wm;1)    (Zm   wm;dm));
where r1;    ; rm 2R Fq.
The plaintext vector is ~x =  (~Z) = (Zd11 ;    ; Z1; Zd22 ;    ; Z2;    ; Zdmm ;    ; Zm; 1),
where 81  i  m;Zi = zi, and the predicate vector is ~v = ( bQ) = (c1;d1 ;    ; c1;1; c2;d2 ;
   ; c2;1;    ; cm;dm ;    ; cm;1; c0), where ci;j is the coecient of Zji and c0 =
Pm
i=1 ci;0.
Apparently, the lengths of the vectors are both n =
Pm
i=1 di+1. When each univariate
polynomial's degree di = d, n = md+1. For simplicity, we assume 81  i  m; di = d
in the following.
A Straightforward Scheme. Given a query Q, we rst convert it to its CNF
form bQ, where a range query s  Zi  t (assume numerical attribute) is converted
to (Zi = s)_ (Zi = s+ 1)_    _ (Zi = t), and a subset query Zi 2 Si;Si  Wi   \*"
is converted to (Zi = w
0
1) _    _ (Zi = w0jSij). For a \don't care" query (Zi =
\*"), the eld variable Zi will not appear in the polynomial p(Z1;    ; Zm), i.e., the
corresponding coecients of Zji ; 1  j  d in ~v are all 0. Thus, a query will have
at most N OR terms in each eld, where N is the maximum range of Zi's attribute
values (or the maximum of jWij), which means the polynomial degree d should be at
least N . The complexity of this scheme is O(Nm) in ciphertext and trapdoor sizes
and decryption cost.
Improved Scheme as the Basic Solution. The ineciency of the above scheme
is due to the large polynomial degree incurred by range/subset queries. To eciently
support these two types of queries, it is benecial to dene attributes in a hierarchical
way. The basic idea is similar to that of [154], however in order to support delegation
we need to build the encrypted index in a specialized way. Note that, arbitrary range
query is dicult to achieve with high eciency using HPE, instead our solution
supports a class of simple range queries.
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Figure 5.3: Attribute hierarchies over dierent types of elds. (a): numerical attribute
|- age. The path of leaf node \0-10" is (\0-100"; \0-30"; \0-10"), and \0-30" is a level-
2 simple range. (b): non-numerical attributes |- residency region, which illustrates
semantic containment.
Attribute Hierarchies. First we dene attribute hierarchy over numerical eld
and then generalize to non-numerical ones.
Denition 5.5.1 (Attribute hierarchy over numerical eld). Let Z be a numerical
keyword eld whose value set WZ is [1;    ;N]. Dene a balanced tree T (Z) of max-
imum level k over WZ such that the branching factor of each node is larger than 1.
Every node is assigned a unique id and each leaf node is an element in WZ, while
every internal node with identier id is a new value representing a range (or inter-
val): int(id) = int(id1) [    [ int(idj), where int() denotes interval, id1;    ; idj are
the identiers of id's children, and int(id) = i when id is the i-th leaf node.
Denition 5.5.2 (Semantic containment). If w and a set fw1;    ; wug are equivalent
semantically, we say wi is semantically contained by w, denoted by wi < w.
For example, the attribute value \MA" semantically contains all the cities within
the state MA and \u" contains all kinds of illnesses that are u.
An attribute hierarchy over non-numerical eld Z is dened similarly to the one
over numerical eld, with the dierence that each internal node id semantically con-
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tains all its child nodes. And similarly, a semantic range of a node id includes all the
leaf nodes that can be reached from id.
For either types of hierarchies (T (Z)), we denote the node set in the l-th level as
Tl(Z), called a \level-l attribute". A node in Tl(Z) is called a \level-l keyword", a.k.a.
level-l simple range. For numerical attributes, multiple adjacent level-l simple ranges
consist of a level-l range, while for non-numerical attributes each single node at level
l < k represents a level-l semantic range. The path from a leaf node z to the root is
denoted as P(z), whereas for every node id in P(z), z 2 int(id) or z < id.
Fig. 5.3 shows two examples. In Fig. 5.3 (a), a hierarchy (assuming k = 3) is
dened for the numerical eld \age", while in Fig. 5.3 (b) a hierarchy is dened for
non-numerical eld \residency region". Intuitively, we can use the hierarchies and
simple ranges to make the range query more ecient. For example, the level-2 simple
range [0  30] represents all the integers from 0 to 30, so instead of converting query
\0  age  30" to 30 equality terms ORed together, there will be one equality term.
In addition, we allow at most d OR combinations of multiple simple ranges of the
same level like: (region = \East MA" _ region = \West MA").
Note that, in this chapter, we are not aiming at representing an arbitrary range
[s; t]  [1; N ] for a numerical eld. Although it can be represented by a collection of
nodes from dierent levels [154], such combinations will incur high complexity which
will be clear below. Thus we only consider the class of range queries containing one
or more simple ranges or semantic ranges from one specic level over each dimension.
Nevertheless, this class of query is useful and exible in practice. On the one hand,
the hierarchy on a numerical eld can be well-designed to support semantic uses. For
example, in Fig. 5.3 (a) the nodes are annotated with their semantic meanings for
dierent age groups, such as \0-10" stands for childhood and \10-20" for teenager.
And there are unlimited ways to pre-dene those ranges since the tree's branching
factors are variable. On the other hand, a user can choose which range she wants
159
(a) Index conversion. Age and region are hierarchical elds.
(b) Query conversion. The rest of dimensions Z1;1; Z1;3; Z1;4; Z3;1; Z3;3 are not
shown since they are \don't care".
Figure 5.4: Conversion of the index and query.
to query, with dierent choices of granularity. For example, Alice could either query
(0  age  30) ^ (region = \MA") or (1  age  3) ^ (region = \MA") if the
branching factor of \0-10" (assume k = 4) is 10 and d = 3.
Generating the Encrypted Index and Trapdoors. For a eld with hierarchy
dened, the basic idea is to include the path P(z) of its value z in the index, and the
query over this dimension may consist of simple range query terms from one level.
The converted index and query should be consistent with the original denitions of
indexes and queries in order to use HPE and enjoy its delegation capability. Therefore
we dene the following pre-processing steps.
 Index conversion. For each hierarchical eld Zi in an original index and whose
maximum level is k, we expand it into k subelds (k is called expansion factor):
Zi;1;    ; Zi;k, where the value set of Zi;l is Tl(Zi) and the value of Zi;l is the l-th
element in Pl(zi). This is shown in Fig. 5.4 (a), where Z1 (age) is expanded into
4 subelds with a level-4 hierarchy. The converted index has m0 (sub)elds in
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total.
 Query conversion. An original query should be generated according to the
guidelines pre-dened by the system. If a user Alice wants to make a range
query over the i-th dimension, she should choose simple ranges or semantic
ranges from a specic level. Suppose she chooses level l, she can select up to
d l-level simple ranges or sematic ranges, either to compose a continuous range
or discontinuous ranges. For example, if d = 2, an original query may look like
Q := (31  Z1  100). Then it is converted into a query over Zi;l and expressed
in CNF form: bQ := (Z1;2 = \31-60"_Z1;2 = \61-100"). This is shown in Fig. 5.4
(b). The maximum dimension of a query also becomes m0.
The converted plaintext and query are fed into GenIndex and GenCap algorithms
to generate vectors ~x and ~v, respectively. The formal denitions of the algorithms
are in Fig. 5.5, and we will illustrate the scheme using an example.
Example. The TA generates a capability Tf~v1 forQ1 := (provider = \Hospital A")^
(region = \East MA") (the rest of the elds are don't care) and gives it to hos-
pital A's LTA. When a physician Peter in Hospital A requests for a capability for
Q2 := ((age > 60) ^ (illness = \Diabetes")), Hospital A converts Q2 to ~v2 and gen-
erates a delegated capability Tf~v1;~v2 based on Tf~v1 and ~v2, which actually gives Peter
the capability for restricted query (Q1 AND Q2). Hospital A can generate delegated
capabilities for any of the \don't care" dimensions in Q1; it can also delegate a subset
of her capabilities on existing dimensions, such as (region = \Boston")^   to a user.
Revocation. Our solution eciently supports revocation by adding another time
attribute in the indexes and capabilities, in which the former indicates the create
time of an owner's PHR index, the latter species a user's authorized search peri-
od. The periods can be eciently expressed by simple ranges or semantic ranges
using the above attribute hierarchy. For example, the hierarchy may be designed
according to the \year-month-week-day" fashion, and a capability may look like
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 Setup(1). Given n =Pm0i=1 di, ,  as in Sec. IV-C.1, run HPE-Setup(1), output
PK = (pk; ;  ), and MSK = msk.
 GenIndex(PK, ~Z). First convert the index according to Sec. IV-C.3. Set m =
Msgjj0, where Msg 2R f0; 1g , and compute ~x =  (~Z). Output E(~Z) =HPE-
Enc(PK, ~x, m).
 GenCap(PK, MSK, Q). First convert Q to its CNF form: bQ using the method
above, and compute ~v = ( bQ). Then run HPE-GenKey(PK,MSK, ~v), and output
TQ = sk~v.
 Search(PK; TQ, E(~Z)). Run HPE-Dec(PK, sk~v = TQ, C = E(~Z)), and returns
true if HPE-Dec(PK; sk~v; C) = Msgjj0 for some Msg; Otherwise return false.
 DelegateCap(PK; TQ1 ; Q2). Convert Q2 to bQ2, and set sk~v1; ;~v` = TQ1 and ~v`+1 =
( bQ2), run HPE-Delegate(sk~v1; ;~v` , ~v`+1), outputs T~v1; ;~v`+1 = sk~v1; ;~v`+1 . Note
that T~v1; ;~v`+1 corresponds to query Q1 ^Q2.
Figure 5.5: The Details of Basic APKS Solution.
\(time = [Jan.2010   Jun.2010]) ^    " which can search the PHRs created dur-
ing Jan. 2010 and Jun. 2010. When an owner updates her PHR and the index, she
may also change the time value. A capability with expired time period cannot be
used to search newer indexes, to do that a user must obtain a new capability from an
LTA.
Complexity. For our solution, there are at most k = log 2N sub-elds for each
hierarchical eld, thus in the worst case when every eld is hierarchical, m0 = mk and
the length of plaintext and predicate vectors is O(m0 d) = O(m d  log N). However,
if we were to support arbitrary numerical ranges, a query would contain OR terms
across multiple sub-elds. This is undesirable, as there are O(log N) sub-elds for
each hierarchical eld but OR incurs high complexity: at least O((d + 1)log Nm).
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When d = 1, this is approximately Nm which essentially gives the same complexity
as the straightforward scheme.
5.6 Enhanced Solution: Achieving Query Privacy
The basic solution achieves index privacy due to the security of the HPE scheme.
However, it cannot not prevent the server from knowing the underlying query within
a capability by launching the dictionary attack. This is because the HPE is a public
key based predicate encryption scheme; given a capability TQ for some m-dimensional
keyword query Q and an attribute universe W , the server can try to encrypt all
possible indexes ~Z by brute-force through all combinations of keywords in each eld.
It tests each of those encrypted indexes against TQ; if TQ matches with a ciphertext
E(~Z), the server can deduce Q from Q(~Z) = 12. For example, if Q := (Z1 = z1^Z2 =
z2) the complexity of such attack is only jW1j  jW2j.
The above attack leads to the compromise of query privacy, or predicate privacy
[153]. In a PHR system which requires query privacy, this is undesirable. However, it
is claimed that under public-key setting it is inherently impossible to achieve predicate
privacy [153]. In this section, we propose APKS+, which prevents the dictionary attack
with the help of auxiliary infrastructure.
5.6.1 Solution Overview
Observe that the fundamental enabler for the dictionary attack is anyone can generate
a valid ciphertext based on PK and a set of meaningful keywords. Thus, our main
idea is to insert some additional randomness during the ciphertext generation process,
while keeping the secret used in producing the randomness away from the server.
That randomness is generated by the TA, and in order to allow normal encryption
2Especially when the query's form is simple and can be easily guessed by the server.
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Figure 5.6: The enhanced framework for APKS+ that preserves query privacy: single
proxy case.
it is also held by some proxy server(s) in the system. Each ciphertext generated
by a legitimate user must be transformed by proxy server(s) using the randomness
before outsourced to the cloud server. To allow normal search, that randomness is
integrated into users' capabilities generated/delegated from the TA/LTAs. In this
way, as long as the additional secret is not compromised, the server can no longer
eciently guess the predicates via dictionary attack. In addition, it does not require
interactions between the owners and the users.
Our idea is partly inspired by Zhu et al [180] who addressed predicate privacy
in PEKS. However, our solution is dierent from theirs in two key aspects: (1) The
application scenario and system framework in this chapter are dierent. PEKS is suit-
able for email ltering applications and in PEKS each user can generate unrestricted
search capabilities by herself. (2) We aim at providing query privacy for HPE and
our construction is dierent from theirs.
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5.6.2 Main Design of APKS+
Enhanced System Framework. First, we give the enhanced system framework in
Fig. 5.6. Compared with Fig. 5.1, we have added one or more proxy servers (only
the one proxy case is depicted). The TA generates a random secret r in addition to
MSK and PK, the proxy is given r, which is also embedded into the capabilities
for the LTAs and users. An owner partially encrypts a PHR index using PK, which
will be transformed by the proxy before storing it on the cloud server. To break the
security an adversary must compromise both the cloud server and the proxy.
To increase the attack-resiliency, a second choice is to employ multiple proxies
(not shown) where each of them can be hosted by a local domain. And the secret r
will be divided into r1;    ; rP s.t. r = r1r2    rP where each ri is distributed to one
proxy. In this case, a partial ciphertext needs to traverse all P proxies before sent to
the cloud server, with the cost of increased delay. Our solution supports both design
choices.
For the threat model, we assume that the proxy server(s) are semi-trusted, and an
adversary cannot control both cloud server and more than a certain number of (one
or more in the above two cases, respectively) proxy servers at the same time. We
argue this is reasonable in practice since a proxy server can be well protected by the
organization that owns it (e.g., the TA's organization). Also, we assume the proxy
and cloud server do not launch active attacks such as probe-response attack [27], or
there's some mechanism (e.g., by trac monitoring) to detect it should the proxy and
cloud server be compromised.
Scheme Details. In Fig. 5.7, we present an enhanced HPE+ scheme under the
rst case (one proxy). The application of it to APKS+ is the same as in the basic
solution. We will denote a vector of points on elliptic curve as a; b; c;d; k; rb stands
for point multiplication of r with each element in b, and B for basis in a vector space.
Correctness. In key generation, the only change is from basis B to eB := rB,
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 HPE+ Setup(1). Generate param of a n+3 dimensional vector space, and X, B, bB, B in
the same way as in HPE-Setup. Pick r 2R Fq f0g, set basis eB := rB = frb1;    ; rbn+3g,
and output pk := (1; param; bB) (same), msk := (X; eB) (changed from (X;B)). The TA
distributes r 1 to the proxy server via a secure channel.
 HPE+ PartialEnc(pk,~x := (x1;    ; xn), m): Executed by the encryptor, which is the same
with HPE-Enc and return C := (c1; c2).
 HPE+ ProxyEnc(r 1, C): Executed by a proxy. Parse C as (c1; c2), compute c01 = r 1c1.
Output C 0 = (c01; c2).
 HPE+   GenKey(pk, msk, ~v1 := (v1;1;    ; v1;n)): Basically the same as HPE-GenKey,
dierence is that now sk~v1 is generated using basis
eB instead of B. A user delivers the
key (trapdoor) to the cloud server via a secure channel.
 HPE+   Dec(pk, kdec, c01; c2): The same as HPE-Dec.
 HPE+   Delegate(pk,~k` , ~v`+1 := (v`+1;1;    ; v`+1;n)): The same as HPE-Delegate.
Figure 5.7: The details of HPE+ scheme.
while the HPE+   GenKey and HPE+   Delegate algorithms remain the same. For
the encryption, r 1 is integrated into HPE+   ProxyEnc, the transformed ciphertext
c01 = r
 1[1(
Pn
i=1 xibi)+dn+1+2bn+3] = 1(
Pn
i=1 xir
 1bi)+r 1dn+1+2r 1bn+3 =
1(
Pn
i=1 xi
ebi) + edn+1 + 2ebn+3, and dene eB := feb1;    ;ebn+3g = r 1B. Because B
and B are orthonormal bases, eB and eB are also orthonormal, and since C 0 and sk are
generated based on eB and eB, respectively, the decryption is correct as in the original
HPE scheme. Discussion. In case the proxy is detected to be compromised and the
secret r is leaked, we should renew r. This can be achieved by the TA generating a
new r0 and give it to the proxy after it is recovered. All subsequent partial ciphertexts
will be transformed using this r0 1, and the capabilities requested by users afterwards
will be produced using r0. To update the capabilities for the LTAs more eciently,
the TA can distribute a single number r0=r to its lower-level LTAs (trusted) instead
of regenerating all their capabilities, and those LTAs locally update their capabilities
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(secret keys in HPE+) to the newer version by computing r0r 1kdec. Then they can
further delegate new capabilities (which embed r0 automatically) to lower level LTAs
or users.
5.7 Security Analysis
5.7.1 Security of the Basic Solution
Index Privacy. The basic solution is based on the original HPE scheme for general
delegation, while the original HPE scheme has been proven selectively attribute-hiding
secure under the standard model [137]. That is, when HPE is used for searchable
encryption, two attribute/plaintext vectors encrypted in two ciphertexts are indis-
tinguishable for a computationally bounded adversary (e.g., cloud server), as long as
the adversary does not obtain a trapdoor that distinguishes the two ciphertexts. In
other words, the adversary learns nothing about the index ~Z underlying a ciphertex-
t in polynomial time unless it obtains a capability TQ such that Q(~Z) = 1, which
corresponds to our goal of index privacy.
Note that, by dictionary attack, a trapdoor will reveal information about the
underlying query; and combined with search results (by observing which ciphertexts
match with the query), the adversary can guess the underlying plaintexts with non-
negligible probability. Those information are not supposed to be obtained based on
the search results. Thus the basic solution does not achieve query privacy.
5.7.2 Security of the Enhanced Solution
Query Privacy. We claim that the APKS+ achieves query privacy in addition to
index privacy. The TA publishes pk := (1; param; bB) where bB is based on B, while the
ciphertexts (after proxy transformation) and capabilities are actually based on eB andeB, respectively, where eB = r 1B and eB = rB. On the one hand, r is kept by the
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TA and r 1 are kept by the proxy server(s). On the other hand, even if the adversary
eavesdrops the communication between owners and proxies and obtains pairs of partial
ciphertexts c1 and their corresponding transformed ciphertexts c
0
1 = r
 1c1, because
of the intractability of Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), the
adversary cannot get r. Thus, without the ability to generate a legitimate ciphertext
for meaningful index, the adversary cannot launch the dictionary attack.
In addition, since we assume the cloud server cannot launch probe-response at-
tack, it cannot deliver a large number of partially encrypted, guessed indexes to the
proxy and receive the transformed ciphertexts. Moreover, if the cloud server or proxy
colludes with some malicious users, their advantage is limited since in the former case
the number r is still not known, while in the latter case although the coalition knows
r they cannot obtain other users' trapdoors.
Statistical Attacks. When the adversary has some background information
such as the probability distribution of appearance of each keyword in all the indexes,
it will be able to guess the underlying query keyword of a search capability. This
is especially easy in the extreme case when the queries only contain single equality
term.
However, with the increase of the number of dimensions in a query, it becomes
harder to perform statistical attack. This is because the number of possible combina-
tions of query keywords increases exponentially, and the distribution of appearances
for keyword combinations is more straightened than the single dimension case. For a
not so large sample size (total number of indexes), it is harder to distinguish between
dierent keyword combinations statistically. Thus, a natural countermeasure is to
require each query must contain no less than a threshold number of dimensions.
An alternative countermeasure to such statistical attacks for single keyword query
is proposed in [180], where the probability distribution of keyword appearances is s-
traightened out through an one-to-many mapping from query keywords to trapdoors.
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Figure 5.8: Time Eciency of APKS.
Their method comes at much higher costs in communication, storage and computa-
tion.
Finally, our solutions do not prevent the cloud server from correlating two queries
from the search results. Hiding the search results/pattern is very challenging and is
addressed separately by other techniques such as private information retrieval (PIR)
[138].
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5.8 Performance Evaluation
We have implemented HPE and the basic solution of APKS in C, using the Pairing-
Based Cryptography (PBC) Library [121]. We run the experiments on a server run-
ning Ubuntu Linux with a 32-bit, 3.4GHz Pentium D CPU. We adopt the type A
elliptic curve parameter [121], where the group order q is 160-bits, which provides
1024-bit discrete log security strength equivalently.
5.8.1 Experimental Setup
Since there are yet no PHR databases publicly available for research purposes, we
carry out a proof-of-concept performance demonstration of our solution using the
Nursery data set from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [63], which has also
been used in previous works on searchable encryption [174]. The data set features
categorical attributes and has 8 attributes where each attribute has up to 5 values.
Each attribute is treated as a keyword eld and each attribute value as a keyword,
and the keywords are converted into elements in Fq using SHA1 hash algorithm. The
original data set contains 12,960 instances (rows) and 9 elds (columns).
5.8.2 Results
In the following we evaluate the computation, communication and storage overhead of
APKS. Notem0 denotes the total number of index elds after conversion. As far as we
know, there are few existing works on multi-dimensional searchable encryption with
experimental results. We will compare the eciency of APKS with the MRQEDD
range query scheme in [154] (where d = 1), where the running times were estimated
based on benchmark results. As a result, although APKS is slower than MRQEDD
in setup, encryption and capability generation, it is much faster in search operations.
We should note that there are no existing works that can achieve search delegation
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and query privacy at the same time.
Setup. The major overhead of the setup process is generating the bases bB and B,
which involves O(n20) = O(n
2) exponentiations (point multiplications) each3, where
n0 = n + 3 =
Pm0
i=1 di + 4 is the dimension of the ECC vector spaces in HPE and
n is lengths of ~x;~v. In Fig. 5.8 (a), we plot the average time for setup against n.
The setup time is about 40s when n = 46, which is reasonable since this is only
one-time cost. For storage overhead, although the size of the base eld for G1;G2 is
512-bits, an elements in G1;G2;GT can be represented by 65B in compressed form,
while q is 20B. Thus the total size of PK is 65[n0(n0   1) + 3]B4, that of MSK is
n20(65 + 20) = 85n
2
0B. When n = 46, these equal to 153KB and 204KB, respectively.
For the MRQEDD scheme, setup takes O(n) exponentiations. When n = 46, the
setup time and key sizes equal to 4.6s, 22.5KB and 22.5KB, respectively.
Encrypted Index Generation. In order to obtain the per-index encryption
time, we choose the rst 100 rows from the data set as input indexes and compute the
average encryption time. To generate the data points, we assume 81  i  m0; di = d,
and either x m0 = 9 and vary d from 1 to 5, or x d = 1 and vary m0 from 9 to 72,
and conrmed the time depends only on m0d, i.e, n. Note that, for the latter case,
each original index eld is duplicate by factors of 2; 3;    ; 8 to mimic the expansions
of hierarchical attributes in APKS. The results are presented in Fig. 5.8 (b); again, the
per-index encryption time scales as O(n20). When n = 46, encrypting an index takes
about 15s. Since we are aiming at searching on encrypted PHR in the public domain
and each owner generates one (or a few) index for her PHR documents, this overhead is
acceptable in practice. In addition, there are ways to speed up the exponentiations by
200 times using specialized hardware [1]. The size of an encrypted index is 65(n0+1),
which equals to merely 3.25KB when n = 46. For the MRQEDD scheme, encryption
3Multiply of a matrix X 2R GL(n0;Fq) with an arbitrary basis A takes O(n30) exponentiations,
but in our case A is canonical, i.e., each vector in it contains only one element that is not identity.
4Canonical bases A and A can be represented using only n0, g1 and g2.
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takes O(n) exponentiations. When n = 46, the time and ciphertext size equal to 2.3s
and 11.6KB, respectively.
Capability Generation and Delegation. We carry out two sets of experiments
here, and show timing results of both capability generation and the rst level dele-
gation in Fig. 5.8 (c). In the rst set, we assume there are no hierarchical attributes
(k = 1) and the input query covers all m0 dimensions. Also, in each query dimension
the maximum number of OR terms is set to d, so we randomly select d keywords
from the keyword universe in each dimension to form a query. In this case, the pred-
icate vector ~v does not contain element 0 2 Fq, which can be regarded as the worst
case5. It can be seen that, although the direct capability generation takes relatively
long time, the delegation takes less time. Since the former happens when a Level-1
LTA obtains basic capabilities from the TA and the number of such LTAs and their
requests are relatively small, it is not a large burden for the TA and the LTAs. The
latter is experienced by a Level-2 TA and users under a Level-1 LTA, which is faster.
Note that, the capability generation/delegation times both scale as O(n20).
In the second set, the query over some of the dimensions are set to \don't care",
so as to represent the more realistic case. In particular, each original eld in the index
is expanded into k subelds (m0 = 9k), a query involves at most 9 non-don't care
elds instead of m0. In Fig. 5.8 (c) we set di = d = 1 and change the expansion factor
k from 1 to 8. One can observe that both the capability generation and delegation
times increase slower with n than in the rst set, which is due to the \don't care"
terms. When n = 46, delegating a capability takes about 35s. Finally, the total size
of a capability is 65[n20 + (l+ 3)n0]B, where l is the number of times a capability has
been delegated. When n = 46; l = 1, this is 169KB which is also the communication
overhead in a query. For the MRQEDD scheme, capability generation takes O(n)
exponentiations. When n = 46, the time and capability sizes are 2.3s and 14.4KB,
5Usually the numbers of OR terms in some dimensions are smaller than d.
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n 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73
Time (s) 424 714 1016 1330 1625 1911 2194 2498
Table 5.3: Projected total search times for the Nursery data set (12,960 indexes)
under dierent n values, with pairing preprocessing.
respectively.
Search. We show in Fig. 5.8 (d) the average search time on single encrypted
index under dierent n values, and we implement the bilinear pairings both with and
without preprocessing. It can be seen that the search is much faster than encryption
and is linear to n, since it only takes n + 3 pairing operations. With preprocessing,
the search time is reduced to half. Single pairing operation using type-A parameter is
the fastest, which takes 5.5ms without preprocessing and 2.5ms with preprocessing in
our benchmark tests. Based on the above, we estimate the total search time for the
Nursery data set, by multiplying the average search times with 12,960. The results
are given in Table 5.3. When n = 46, it takes about 27min to search; although it
seems large, we argue that this is still acceptable for practical use, especially for delay-
tolerant applications like patient-matching, medical research etc. Also, if the cloud
server have multiple processors the search computation can be done in a paralleled
way. For the MRQEDD scheme, per-index search takes O(mlogN) = 5n pairings.
When n = 46, the time equals to 0.59s with preprocessing, 5 times of ours.
5.8.3 Discussion
In the above results, for the same n value, there are multiple design choices of m,
k and d. This actually provides a tradeo between the number of index elds and
the maximum number of OR terms. In general, the larger the expansion factor k,
the more expressive is a simple range query over each dimension, and the maximum
number of OR terms d can be made smaller. For example, for the Nursery data set,
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if n = 46, we can have m = 9; d = 5 and k = 1, or m = 9; d = 1 while k = 5.
Moreover, in practice not all the attributes are hierarchical. For example, \age",
\region",\illness" are but \provider", \sex" etc are not. If Z1; Z2; Z3 out of Z1    ; Z9
are hierarchical, and k = 9, the maximum number of OR terms over each sub-eld is
1, but 3 for Z4;    ; Z9, we have n = 3 9+ 6 3+ 1 = 46. Thus, the case of n = 46
is a representative one.
5.9 Summary
In this chapter, we address the problem of authorized private searches (APKS) over
encrypted data in cloud computing, using a PHR system as a case study. Multiple
PHR owners encrypt their health records along with a keyword index to allow searches
by multiple users in the public domain. To limit the exposure of sensitive patient
health information from unrestricted query capabilities, we propose a scalable, ne-
grained authorization framework where users obtain their search capabilities from
local trusted authorities according to their \eligible attributes". We then propose
two novel solutions for APKS over encrypted PHR based on HPE, where in the rst
one we enhance the eciency by dening hierarchical attributes, and in the second we
enhance the query privacy via the help of proxy servers. Our solutions also enjoy the
advantages of supporting multi-dimensional multi-keyword query, search capability
delegation and ecient revocation. In addition, we implement our solution on a
modern workstation; the results demonstrate that APKS achieves reasonable search
performances.
Chapter 6
Summary, Conclusions and Future
Research
In this Chapter, we summarize our contributions in this dissertation and draw our
conclusions. After that, we outline several possible future works that are worthwhile
to be studied.
6.1 Dissertation Summary and Conclusion
Recent advances in information technology have led to the proliferation of mobile
devices and the emergence of cloud computing. For the former, the communica-
tion paradigm is decentralized, untethered, and ad hoc, therefore the communication
channel is adversarial and communicating hosts are not all trustworthy from the be-
ginning. For the latter, the storage and computation tasks are operated by remote
servers which are usually outside of users' security domain, thus the servers are again
not fully trusted by the users to protect their private information. These untrusted
networking and computing environments create new challenges in security and pri-
vacy, as traditional solutions mostly rely on additional trust assumptions about the
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corresponding networks and servers.
In this dissertation, we have explored research in both directions, unied under
two concepts | \user-centric" and \lack of trust". We used an E-healthcare system
as a motivating example, and are among the rst to resolve the above challenges by
proposing a series of user-centric security & privacy mechanisms that minimize users'
trust toward the networks and systems. We established secure mechanisms to boot-
strap initial trust among a group of network nodes without relying on pre-distributed
secrets, we proposed ecient methods to exchange sensitive information among dis-
tributed, mutually untrusted mobile devices without leaking too much user's privacy,
we put forward a novel framework to enable scalable and ne-grained data sharing on
semi-trusted cloud servers with owner-controlled access rules, and we studied how to
perform ecient and authorized keyword searches over encrypted data with complex
query conditions, while preserving both owner and user's privacy from the curious
server.
Our main nding and their implications can be concluded as follows.
 We proposed novel secure device pairing protocols (GDP) to bootstrap initial
trust among a group of network nodes without relying on any common prior
security context. Using our mechanisms, there do not need to exist a public key
infrastructure (PKI), the devices' distribution chains need not to be trusted,
passive and active attacks in the wireless communication channel are prevent-
ed, and the majority of devices are not assumed to be trustworthy as well. All
we need, however, is the existence of an auxiliary visual channel that can be
easily realized by an unexperienced and unaided human user. Our solutions are
lightweight and save both time and energy, which are critical factors for many
time-sensitive applications with resource-constrained network devices. Securi-
ty of our approaches have been proven and experimental results demonstrate
their practicality. The suitable application scenarios range from networks of
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interoperable medical devices to mobile phones etc.
 We studied ecient methods to exchange sensitive information among distribut-
ed, mutually untrusted mobile devices. In order to protect users' personal pro-
le information while enable them to match with each other, we leverage secret
sharing techniques to distribute each user's prole among multiple collaborative
nodes and perform secure computations based on those shares. Our solutions
are fully decentralized, and require no trusted authority to arbitrate during the
computations. The participating hosts do not need to be fully trustworthy since
both passive and certain active attacks are prevented. Also, the communication
channel can be protected using the secret keys initialized by our GDP proto-
col. The proposed solutions are shown to be secure, while more ecient than
previous works in secure computation under a reasonable sized network. They
can be used in mobile social networks, where there are a diverse range of mobile
information sharing applications that enhance and enrich people's social lives.
 We addressed the user-centric secure data sharing for sensitive information s-
tored on semi-trusted cloud servers. We adopt an encryption-based approach,
and aim at resolving the tensions among exible and ne-grained access control,
scalability in key management, while considering ecient user revocation and
reducing risks of privacy exposure. We propose a data access control framework
using attribute-based encryption (ABE), in which data owners have full control
over the access policies of their encrypted les. The use of ABE greatly reduces
the key management complexity, in terms of size of keys maintained by each
owner/user, and re-keying messages; breaking the system users into multiple
security domains and using multi-authority ABE reduces key-escrow risks. We
also propose to enhance an existing multi-authority ABE scheme with ecient
and on-demand attribute/user revocation capabilities. Our proposed scheme
is proven under standard hardness assumption, while we use experimental and
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simulation results to show the eciency of the scheme. Our solutions can be
applied to general scenarios with storage sites that are not fully trusted.
 We continued to study untrusted computing environments, by targeting at ef-
fective and ecient data utilization problem over encrypted cloud data. We
propose authorized private keyword search (APKS) schemes with ecient multi-
dimensional range, subset and equality query capabilities, while preserving both
owner and user's privacy from the curious server | which are referred to as index
privacy and query privacy, respectively. Since the adopted original searchable
encryption primitive is a public key based one, it has the intrinsical diculty to
achieve query privacy and index privacy due to the dictionary attacks. We then
enhance the privacy levels through a novel system architecture that thwarts the
dictionary attack. We also report experimental results and show its advantage
compared with existing schemes. Our solutions may inspire further research
ideas in searchable encryption.
6.2 Future Research Directions
Our proposed trust initialization protocols in Chapter 2 requires the OOB channel to
be authentic, that is, no message transmitted in the visual channel can be maliciously
modied. Thus one direction is to relax this assumption by allowing the OOB channel
to be unauthentic. Concurrently to our work, the authors in [142] have noticed this
issue and adopted manchester coding to protect against modications in a visual light
channel, where an attacker could ip some bits from 0 to 1 in the device's LED display.
Their OOB channel is called \semi-authentic". It would be interesting to further
investigate stronger attacker models along this direction, or using a combination of
multiple weakly authenticated OOB channels such as audio and visual channels.
In addition, currently we have not addressed denial of service (DoS) attacks during
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trust initialization. Our GDP protocol is able to detect active attacks during the
initialization process and start over again. However, under DoS attack the GDP
process may never be successful. Therefore, we must also be able to detect and defend
against DoS attacks. By DoS attack, we mean the attacker always injects messages,
but not jam the channel. In this case, the attacker's device should be identied and
excluded from the network. Another motivation is from improving robustness. When
multiple networks, say WBANs, are being set up at the same time in large scale E-
healthcare applications like in a hospital ward, there may be unexpected interference
coming from nearby user's WBANs. Since the devices might have never met each
other before, the controller cannot determine which sensors are legitimate (i.e., in its
intended WBAN) only from IDs reported from wireless interfaces.
Towards this end, a practical solution is to attach a RFID tag to each device
during the manufacturing phase, and the controller can act as a RFID reader. When
the GDP protocol initiates, the controller reads each sensor node's unique ID. Since
RFID is a close range communication technique, the user can have high condence
that the read IDs only come from the sensor devices near him/her. Thus the faraway
attackers and interferers can be avoided. However, this approach requires additional
hardware. Therefore, the challenge here is how can we nd out and exclude the DoS
attacker(s) without any prior-established secrets among nodes and without depending
on additional hardware.
Furthermore, we note that a limitation of the GDP protocol is that the controller
must always be a trusted device. Although having at least two trusted device is the
minimum meaningful setting to perform a GDP protocol, an interesting theoretical
research direction would be to relax this assumption, such that the trusted devices
are not xed participants.
Continuing along our line of research in private matching in mobile social net-
works, an important direction is to realize private prole matching protocols that
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can defend against malicious participants. Currently our protocols can only prevent
some specic kinds of misbehavior during the protocol run; but in reality a stronger
adversary would be able to falsify her own prole and arbitrarily alter the intersection
set computation process to inate the common set size. Therefore, both authentica-
tion and computation verication should be considered in the future. Concurrently
to our work, a secure friend discovery protocol based on dot product has been pro-
posed in [56], but a centralized trusted authority is needed to provide authentication
credentials.
In addition, it would be interesting to develop ecient protocols that can achieve
the privacy level three dened in Chapter 3, or privacy requirements similar to it.
For example, we ask ourselves: is it possible to let Alice and Bob nd out whether
their intersection set is larger than a pre-dened threshold, while only a binary output
(yes/no) is known by each of them? Currently such functionality can only be achieved
through secure circuit evaluation [64,131], which is far from practical. This has largely
been remained an open problem up to date.
For user-centric data privacy in cloud computing environments, our proposed cryp-
tographically enforced data access control schemes using ABE in Chapter 4 leave the
access policies in plaintext form, which still leaks information about the encrypted
le. It is important to develop a solution that also hides the access policies. On
the other hand, the usability of the security mechanisms deserves further study. It
would be interesting to integrate the proposed data access control & search solutions
on encrypted data with real-world systems, and to evaluate their usability with real
users. Novel schemes will be needed to reduce the computational overhead brought
by security design.
Another direction of eort is to protect users' data based on untrusted servers.
The current cryptographically enforced data access control schemes assume semi-
trusted servers; it would be interesting to relax that assumption. One possible way
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is to investigate trusted computing techniques, which assure users that the cloud
server has honestly performed the designated computations. It is also worthwhile to
investigate secure outsourced computation under dierent types of real-world settings,
especially on a mobile platform given the exponential growth in the number of mobile
applications.
Finally, I would like to end this dissertation with the famous quote from Albert
Einstein:
\If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called research,
would it?"
| Albert Einstein
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